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A Note for Reading this Thesis 
This thesis by publication follows the standard practice for theses of this 
format. It is one coherent project but the body section is composed of four 
peer-reviewed articles. Each of the articles underwent extensive workshop 
sessions before being sent for publication and each has been improved by 
responses to reviewer comments. As each article was also written for 
publication in its own right, this means that some points are repeated. In 
particular, the theory that informs the thesis as a whole is introduced within 
each article. The first article, 'The Politics Prime Ministers Make' is co-
authored with Matthew Laing. The work for this article, from its conception to 
its completion, was conducted equally by Matthew and .1:1e, his name appears 
first purely for alphabetical reasons. 
The articles have not been amended for their presentation in this thesis except 
that they have been reformatted to provide uniform appearance and 
referencing for readers' convenience. As the articles themselves stand alone, 
the introduction and conclusion have a larger role than these sections of an 
unpublished thesis would. It is these two sections that explain how the peer-
reviewed articles fit together to form the overall thesis. Thus, the introduction 
includes a section that summarises the articles and explains their contribution 
to the broader argument. The articles provide the material from which a 
historical contextual framework for analysing the success of political leaders is 
drawn. The conclusion brings the findings of the various articles together to 
provide a full expression of the framework. 
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Abstract 
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the analysis of successful 
political leadership. It argues that we should judge leaders operating in 
different historical contexts by different criteria. Historical context shapes the 
opportunities leaders have to achieve their goals, enabling some leaders to 
achieve more than others. Furthermore, in different historical contexts society 
demands different types of leadership. Therefore, taking account of historical 
context allows us to make a fair comparison of leaders when assessing their 
success and it allows us to encourage leaders to behave in ways that provide 
better results for their nations. 
The thesis derives its understanding of the relationship between historical 
context and political leadership from Stephen Skowronek's conceptualisation 
of the US Presidency and his four leadership types. It demonsh·ates that 
Skowronek's theory operates in Australia and other so-called Westminster 
countries. In particular, political time operates where the executive leader is 
the most creative agent of change within the political system, and where 
competing conservative and progressive political actors contest to control the 
direction of political change. 
Regardless of their political system, leaders are always in a contest with 
opponents and the interaction between these leaders and their oppositions is 
vital to their eventual success or failure. The thesis shows that oppositions can 
encourage the success of political lead ers, sometimes unintentionally, 
sometimes in a positive and deliberate manner through engaging with leaders' 
ideas. The relationship between political leaders and oppositions can be 
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complex but it must be examined closely in order to understand leaders' 
success or failure. 
The second half of the thesis focuses heavily on how political leaders can 
succeed and it creates four separate frameworks for analysing presidents and 
prime ministers. These frameworks take account of both material and 
interpretive realms of success. Naturally, leaders' concrete achievements are 
important but so is their interpretive success, in which they convince publics 
and political elites that their actions are successes and that they are successes 
as a result of leaders' actions. Political leaders' success comes in three forms: 
personal success, partisan regime success and normative success and these 
form the basis of the four frameworks of political success. The three forms of 
success are available to Skowronek's four leadership types to differing degrees 
and so the four leadership types are examined according to different criteria. 
The most important form of success is partisan regime success, as success of 
this form allows leaders' achievements to endure. Partisan regime success is 
the form that alters most among the different leadership types. The conclusion 
also examines the thesis' implications for how we understand political 
leadership and how we understand the broader operation of democratic 
politics. It argues that once we examine them in context, more leaders have 
been successful than is commonly supposed. Political leadership studies must 
pay more attention to historical context and come to understand leadership in 
relationship to the full range of social and political forces that act upon it. 
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Introduction 
Contextualising Political Leadership Success 
Prime ministers and presidents provide crucial leadership of their 
governments, parties, administrations and nations. They provide the public 
face of their nations when they travel abroad and the public face of their 
parties at elections. They are the individuals that publics hold most 
accountable for the actions of their governments. Although political leaders' 
actions are constrained by institutions and other political actors, they are the 
most authoritative and powerful single figures within governments. It is hard 
to imagine modern democracy existing without leaders, in some way chosen 
by and accountable to the people. As Kane and Patapan state, 'Good 
leadership is essential for a well-functioning democracy' (2012: 1). But how 
well do we understand what "good" leadership is? 
Modern democracies constrain leaders with various institutional checks and 
balances because of suspicions they will misuse power. Yet these institutions 
cannot actually force leaders to represent their constituencies at all, let alone 
well (Urbinati 2006: 36). Constitutional designs assume the worst of political 
leaders and constrain them, but this only makes it more difficult for leaders to 
meet public expectations. Barack Obama has recently been re-elected as US 
President despite strong public sentiment that he had not fulfilled the promise 
of hope and change that swept him to power in the 2008 election (see Jacobson 
2011). This story of unfulfilled promise is common. 
Public cynicism about politicians at all levels suggests that good leadership is 
rare (see Stoker 2006, Hay 2007). But do our national leaders deserve the low 
opinions so often bestowed on them? Paradoxically, despite cynicism about 
whether politicians and political leaders have their interests at heart, publics 
and scholarly observers tend to celebrate strong leaders with great 
achievements who change the political landscape (see for example Landy and 
Milkis 2000: 2) . But are they right to do so? Is it always best to make major 
changes to the nation? Is it even possible in all situations? Public expectations 
are important in determining leaders' actions. Leaders wish to be seen as 
successful, so public expectations about the type of leadership they should 
provide influence their behaviour. 
Political leaders also often model themselves on past leaders with reputations 
for success. Current Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard has in some 
respects modelled her leadership on that of Bob Hawke, calling him 'the 
benchmark for the prime ministership' and 'a role model' (Sydney Morning 
Herald 2010). Similarly, US President Lyndon Johnson sought to match, or 
even surpass, Franklin Roosevelt (Dallek 1991: 6). Hawke and Roosevelt are 
among those who made major changes and left enduring legacies. These 
comparisons and public demands encourage leaders to act in ways that were 
appropriate for the historical context of Roosevelt or Hawke but not 
necessarily appropriate for that of Johnson or Gillard. Clarifying the criteria of 
political leadership success with respect to historical context is essential as it 
can encourage better political leadership and it enables scholars to better 
understand the varied challenges of political leadership. 
The study of leaders, as opposed to leadership events such as presidential 
elections, parliamentary addresses or legislative su ccesses, has not seen the 
advances evident in other areas of political study. This field has long been 
lamented as theoretically underdeveloped, a problem which exists partly 
because of political leadership's existence outside mainstream political science 
(Peele 2005, Hartley and Benington 2011). It has been largely neglected by 
those who employ quantitative research methods, as leaders are perennially 
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subjects of too small a sample size. However, leaders do not easily lend 
themselves to other forms of observation either. They are elusive because they 
seek to exhibit only positive behaviours in public performances and they are 
universally secretive about their decision-making processes (Hart 1998, 
Bowles 1999). Many of the shortcomings of existing work on leadership 
success result from the relative scarcity of political leadership success studies. 
Existing studies of political leadership success have often been simplistic, 
particularly in lacking a systematic approach to historical context. 
Trus introduction describes the aim of the thesis, as well as four major areas in 
which the thesis contributes to our understanding of political leadership 
success. The importance of these areas is highlighted in the second section, 
which reviews the litera ture on political leadersrup success, detailing why it is 
difficult to study and the common ways of understanding the concept. In 
addition, it reviews the emerging field of historical-contextual leadership 
studies. Although trus field currently pays little attention to political 
leadership success itself, it provides a way to examine success with greater 
attention to historical context. The literature review also contains a di scussion 
of the potential difficulties of usin g the historical-contextual approach. Finally, 
the introduction presents summaries of each of the peer-reviewed articles that 
make up the body of the thesis. 
Aim and focus. 
This thesis seeks to make a theoretical contribution to the study of political 
leadersrup by developing an approach to analysing leadership success for 
presidents and prime mini sters, with leaders' historical contexts as its 
foundation. In doing this it builds upon, reapplies and augments Stephen 
Skowronek's work on the American presidency (see especially 1986, 1997, 
2008), which defines four leadership types based on leaders' historical 
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contexts. The thesis creates an original historical-contextual framework for 
analysing success for each of these four types of president. It adopts an 
approach in which historical context is defined by a cyclical pattern. Thus 
analysing leaders in their historical contexts allows us to examine multiple 
leaders from various eras who shared similar constraints on their authority. 
Such examination suggests that a greater number of leaders have succeeded 
than is presently acknowledged in studies that take insufficient account of 
historical context, suggesting that historical context is crucial to a broader 
understanding of political leadership. 
While the thesis' focus is theoretical, there are many empirical examples 
included within but these are chiefly used to illustrate and inform theoretical 
points. The purpose of this thesis is to advance our theoretical understanding 
of leadership success rather than our empirical knowledge, and thus the 
empirical research largely relies on secondary political and historical material. 
In developing an original conceptualisation of leadership success, the thesis 
furthers scholarly understanding of political leadership in four main areas. 
First and most important is historical context. Too many attempts to analyse 
leadership either ignore or under-examine the historical context in which 
leaders operate. This thesis argues that success is possible for all leaders, but 
that the definition of success differs depending on the historical context 
leaders occupy. Success should not be equated with contextually derived 
advantage. Understanding success differently in different contexts is 
important, not just because leaders have varying opportunities depending 
upon their historical context, but also because different contexts imply 
different societal demands. Thus it benefits society and is in leaders' interests 
that leaders act in different ways at different times. 
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Our conceptualisation of context needs to be complex enough to acknowledge 
that context can alter in response to leaders' actions. For leaders to achieve 
success in their context they must capitalise on the opportunities their 
situation provides. However, it also requires that leaders enhance their 
capacity and authority to act by structuring situations to their advantage (see 
Riker 1986, Heffernan 2003, Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 't Hart 2012). 
The second area in which this thesis advances our knowledge of political 
leadership success is the relationship between government leaders and their 
oppositions. Leaders always have opponents and are always in contests. The 
actions of these opponents are a significant part of any explanation of 
government leaders' success. The institutional and constitutional 
environments of different countries mean that those opponents have varying 
resources and power to use against a leader. Where legislative and executive 
powers are separate, as in the US, opposition is diffuse and can struggle to 
consistently compete with the leader's legitimacy (Polsby 1997: 517-518). In 
majoritarian parliamentary systems, a permanent opposition has little chance 
of directly influencing policy (Kaiser 2008, Uhr 2009), but it gains legitimacy 
from its status as an alternative government (Helms 2004: 27, Maddox 2005: 
237). This allows a greater sense of authority as opposition leaders have some 
ability to speak for the nation as alternative leaders. In consensus systems, 
opposition parties frequently also have the legislative ability to alter or halt 
leaders' actions (Helms 2004: 30-34). 
Within each of these systems, oppositions can be stronger and weaker. Their 
relative strength is partly related to the perceived performance of the 
government and its leader, but the reverse is also true. Some leaders are 
unfortunate enough to take office at a time when the opposition is united and 
ascendant, while others face weak oppositions, which are consumed with 
infighting and lack of direction. The contest between government leaders and 
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oppositions becomes in part a contest to frame the public understanding of 
events (see McCaffrie 2009) and thus becomes a contest over public 
perceptions of leaders and their actions as successes or failures . Furthermore, 
oppositions can and do make positive contributions to the success of poli tical 
leaders, particularly through their engagement with and acceptance of certain 
policies. 
The third major area in which this thesis seeks to develop our understanding 
is in how cross-national political leadership studies are conceptualised. Calls 
for more cross-national comparisons in executive leadership studies are 
plentiful but such studies are too rarely conducted (but see Helms 2005, 
Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes 1997, Weller 1985). Many problems political 
leaders face are not nation specific, but result from the nature of executive 
leadership in a modern representative democracy (Kane and Patapan 2012, 
Skowronek 1995). Consequently, it is not always necessary to separate the 
study of political leadership by nation or political system. Naturally, cross-
national leadership studies should be sensitive to the intricacies of different 
political systems, but there is much to be gained by judiciously applying the 
theoretical advances of one country to the empirical examples of others. In 
particular, much of the academic work on poli tical leadership focuses on the 
American presidency, but many of the advances in the understanding of the 
presidency can also apply to other execu tive political leaders (see Johansson 
2009, Theakston 2011) . Furthermore, applying a theory to different empirical 
material allows us to improve our understanding of the original theory and 
make adjustments and improvements to it. 
Throughout this thesis examples are taken from Australia, the US and, to a 
lesser extent, the UK. Skowronek's presidential theory is more usefully 
applied to majoritarian than to con sensus systems. Even in reapplying 
Skowronek's theory to majoritarian systems, there is a need for some 
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adjustment to account for different institutional realities. However, the thesis 
argues that there are many similar historical-contextual forces acting upon 
both US presidents and so-called Westminster prime ministers, which justify 
reapplication of the theory. 
The fourth area in which the thesis extends our knowledge is its development 
of a stronger understanding of what success means in political leadership. 
Even those who study leadership success rarely subject the concept to in-
depth investigation (see 't Hart 2011). The way success is conceptualised 
develops throughout the thesis. Initially, it applies the most typical view of 
success from the literature, one based on achieving major change and leaving 
a lasting legacy. As the thesis progresses, its concept of success develops to 
acknowledge that success is different for leaders in different contexts and to 
conceptualise success with greater complexity than most existing studies. 
McConnell's work on policy success provides a basis for the study of political 
leadership success (2010) . McConnell argues that both the. foundationalist and 
the anti-foundationalist versions of success are important. Foundationalist 
arguments hold that success is objective and verifiable against measurable 
standards. There are material goals in policy and these are either met or not 
met. The anti-foundationalist perspective maintains that there are no objective 
standards of success, and that success is purely a matter of individual 
interpretation (McConnell 2010: 30-31). McConnell shows that both of these 
elemer1ts are essential. As political leaders are both actors and spokespeople 
for their actions, they are largely responsible for both the material and the 
interpretive elements of their own success. 
Political leadership success has three forms: personal success, partisan regime 
success and normative success. These are discussed in detail in the fourth 
article of the thesis. The availability of these types of success varies for leaders 
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in different historical contexts, primarily because access to the interpretive 
elements of success differs across these three forms . This knowledge informs 
the four historical contextual frameworks of leadership success that are 
presented in the conclusion of the thesis. 
Na turally, there are limitations in the scope of the thesis. As acknowledged 
above, the thesis is largely theoretical and does not present a detailed new 
empirical study. In part, the lack of new empirical investigation results from 
the space limita tions of the thesis-by-publication format. However, it also 
reflects the fact that the field of political leadership studies is in greater need of 
theoretical advancement than it is in need of new empirical material. 
The format of the thesis also limits its capacity to explore certain arguments to 
their absolute conclusion. For example, the examination of oppositions' 
contributions to leadership success is approached in terms of one type of 
leadership, rather than all types. This reflects the trade-off that this thesis 
format allows. The advan tage is that this thesis is able to explore a broader 
range of phenomena, even if it does so in slightly less detail. This balance suits 
this particular thesis, as it allows broader extension of theoretical boundaries 
than a more narrowly focused study would. 
Literature Review 
There are multiple ways to understand political leadership. For some scholars, 
few politicians can truly display leadership even if they are in official positions 
of authority (see Burns 2003: 27-29), while for others, all politics is leadership 
(Tucker 1981). On the one hand, leadership is limited to those who possess 
higher virtues and is therefore difficult to find, on the other it is so broad that 
it is difficult to distinguish from other political phenomena (see Buller and 
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James 2012: 539). Throughout this thesis, "political leadership" refers to the 
executive political leader; in the examples presented here this means the 
president or the prime minister. The restrictiveness of this conception is partly 
imposed by Skowronek's theory. It is also a necessary, pragmatic limit that 
prevents the thesis from investigating inherently different types of leadership. 
The leadership of ministers cannot be understood in the same way as that of 
prime ministers, unless the focus is only on the range of activi ties that both 
types of leader performs and not those that are intrinsic to either role. 
The term "political leadership" is equated with the institutions of prime 
minister and president here, purely as a convenient term that covers both 
institutions. This does not mean that political leadership should be defined 
exclusively as that which comprises these two institutions. While a definition 
of political leadership must take account of many factors, the one provided 
here aims for simplicity. Burns argues that leadership must be moral, or it is 
not leadership (1978). However, it is best to avoid including normative 
judgments in such a definition, in particular because the definition must 
include the possibility of bad leadership, both in terms of ethics and in terms 
of quality, which can still be defined as leadershjp. Other definitions often 
include the need to create change as essential for a definition of leadership 
(Rost 1991). Such a requirement is ideologically charged, and ignores the fact 
that in some instances, the exercise of leadership involves preserving good 
elements of society rather than changing them. 
Political leadership should be defined as a process, in which leaders engage in 
a series of relationships with their multiple and separate constituencies of 
followers (see Burns 2003: 170-172). These relationships are unequal. Leaders 
have greater powers than their followers, however followers, in various parts 
of the polity or political system, can grant or withhold the authority to exercise 
those powers. In this way, these relationships involve leaders' dependence 
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upon followers as well as their power over them. Naturally, this definition 
allows political leadership to occur beyond the institutions of president and 
prime minister, which are the focus of th.is thesis. 
The Difficulties of Studying Political Leadership Success 
The reasons for studying success in executive political leadership may seem 
obvious. The importance of political leaders makes it undeniably worth 
improving our understanding of them. Furthermore, assessment of leaders' 
performance is a means of encouraging their accountability. Leaders wish to 
be judged as successful and therefore adjust their behaviour in an effort to 
achieve this. Leaders' desire for success suggests that an unsoph.isticated view 
of th.is concept, particularly one based on perpetuating major change, may 
encourage leaders to take actions with negative consequences for society. 
More realistic criteria for judging leadership success can therefore encourage 
better political outcomes. 
Consequently, the dearth of direct studies of successful executive leadership is 
surprising. As Paul ' t Hart notes, th.is neglect is partly because success is 
difficult to define and measure (2011: 324). This difficulty affl icts all political 
leadership studies. The limited number of cases means political leadersh.ip is 
difficult to study with quantitative research methods, which represent 
mainstream political science research, especially in America (Bowles 1999: 3). 
However, leadership success is not just difficult to quantify, but also difficult 
to define for use in more interpretive studies. Success is usually associated 
with positive outcomes, but this is too simplistic given that even single 
policies can create both positive and negative results (McConnell 2010: 27-28) . 
For prime ministers and presidents, especially those with lengthy tenures, 
there are positive and negative outcomes to consider. 
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The extent to which leaders are responsible for political outcomes is often 
unclear. Clearly, leaders are often important but many political outcomes are 
neither determined, nor even influenced, by executive leaders (Ahlquist and 
Levi 2011: 3, 't Hart 2011: 324). It is difficult to know the extent of leaders' 
contributions to particular policies, especially given the complexity of modern 
governance as represented in various conceptions of network governance ('t 
Hart 2011: 326, Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes 1997, Bell and Hindmoor 2009). 
This is exacerbated by the complications of understanding the results of policy 
and the tendency of governments to claim that actions were successful 
regardless of ambiguous outcomes (Bovens and ' t Hart 1996). 
Despite, or because of, leaders' near-universal propensity to claim success, it 
can be difficult for them to convince publics of their successes. Australian 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's experience of the acute phase of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 exemplifies this difficulty. The Australian 
economy proved more resilient than most developed economies throughout 
the crisis. The Rudd Government claimed that this was mainly because of its 
stimulus packages (Kelly 2009). Others emphasised the continuing success of 
Australia's resources sector and main trading partners. Regardless, with 
Australia avoiding the worst effects of the financia l crisis, Rudd received little 
credit for his efforts and opponents even criticised the stimulus packages as a 
waste of money (Taylor and Uren 2010: 153, 206) . Ironically, he might have 
received more credit had the crisis more deeply affected Australia. 
The partly subjective nature of success also means that ideology can influence 
perceptions of success. Observers often judge policies by different criteria that 
accord with their political priorities. In the US, Obama's federal health care 
reforms to increase health insurance coverage may be responsible for 
improved health standards and therefore viewed as a success by some. 
However, they will likely be viewed as a failure by people who are opposed to 
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the expansion of federal government powers. Others who vehemently support 
an increase in federal government health care responsibilities may view the 
reforms as inadequate and judge them as failures. It is unsurprising that 
people who agree with leaders have different opinions of them than those 
who do not. However, this shows that leaders are often assessed in terms of 
politically contested values, not their performance. 
Many general difficulties always present in political leadership studies affect 
this particular project. Biographical accounts of leaders rely on records of the 
private actions of leaders, which vary in quantity and quality (Hart 1998: 388-
393). Autobiographies and insider accounts of the actions of political leaders 
play a role in filling gaps in our knowledge, but they are subjective and often 
serve to justify authors' actions or downplay their part in controversies or 
failures. Like political scholars, internal observers lack a complete 
understanding of leaders' actions. This is one of the more telling criticisms of 
Neustadt's Presidential Power (1980), a work which has formed the basis of 
much of the political science understanding of the presidency in the latter half 
of the 20th Century, but which some, like Terry Moe considered too personal 
and informal (2009: 703). Insider accounts can struggle to comprehend the 
scope of options available to leaders and the broader context of their actions. 
In particular, the political effects of leaders' actions can be more obvious to 
insiders than the societal effects for which external observers have clearer 
perspectives. 
Irrespective of the difficulties inherent in understanding successful political 
leadership, success deserves more attention. Leadership scholars are often 
willing to give advice to leaders but without defining what success is, the 
advice lacks valid basis ('t Hart 2011: 324). More broadly, understanding 
success in leadership is fundamental to understanding leadership itself. As 
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Ciulla and Forsyth note, 'the question, "What is a leader?" is really the 
question "What is a good leader?" (2011: 230). 
Political leadership success is potentially a fruitful area for cross-national 
research. All leaders wish to be successful and are often willing to learn from 
examples of quality political leadership in other countries. This concept driven 
analysis allows greater focus on the similarities of executive leaders' 
motivations and actions rather than the emphasis on difference encouraged by 
constitutional and institutional work. Naturally, comparative institutional 
accounts of leadership remain important (see Elgie 1995, Helms 2005, Weller 
1985, Hargrove 2001, Heffernan 2005, Hart 1992, Bennister 2007). 
Understanding institutional constraints and opportunities is essential to a 
complete comprehension of political leaders and how they succeed. However, 
a focus on institutional differences among leaders in different countries should 
be placed alongside multinational studies that emphasise the similarities 
among national democratic leaders. 
How Has Political Leadership Success Been Studied? 
Attempts to define and understand success are unfortunately rare in political 
leadership studies. The concept of success is important in understanding 
political leadership but leadership scholars regularly either ignore the need to 
define it, or choose to work backwards, beginning with leaders who have 
reputations for "good" "great" or "successful" leadership and studying those 
leaders to better understand how current leaders can achieve success (see for 
example Ludwig 2002, Landy and Milkis 2000). This approach tends to equate 
good reputations with success and does little to help us understand what 
success actually is. Leader rankings studies which are particularly prevalent in 
the US but increasingly also present in other democracies, tend to encourage 
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this method (Schlesinger 1997, Cohen 2003, Theakston and Gill 2006, 2011, 
Sheppard 1998). 
Theoretical and interpretive understandings of political leadership success 
tend to emphasise changes made by leaders and the legacies they leave (Burns 
1978, 2003, Neustadt 1980, Landy and Milkis 2000, Crockett 2002, Hennessy 
2000). Again, these factors relate to reputation and these studies focus heavily 
on the effects leaders have but success is more complex than this. Some 
scholars invite closer assessment of issues of process, adding concerns such as 
the ability of leaders to maintain support and to meet ethical standards as well 
as effectiveness ('t Hart 2011, Uhr 2005, Masciulli, Molachinov and Knight 
2009, Ciulla 2004, Helms 2012, Neustadt 1990). Another branch of research 
focuses on the importance of skills and character traits in succeeding as 
political leaders (Theakston 2011, Greenstein 2003a, 2009, Simonton 1987, 
Barber 1992), and the need for skills to match the context in which leaders find 
themselves (Hargrove 1998, Bell, Hargrove and Theakston 1999, Keohane 
2005). 
Rankings 
Leadership rankings studies are the most common approach to distinguishing 
successful from unsuccessful leaders. Criticism of these is widespread, and 
many scholars argue that they do not genuinely measure success. Yet they are 
frequently used as a proxy for leadership success in studies that seek to 
measure some other aspect of political leadership and they are often discussed 
as measures of presidential greatness (see for example Simon and Uscinski 
2012, Baiz 2010, Adler 2003, Curry and Morris 2010). Rankings studies 
generally ask experts, such as political scientists and historians, to rate the 
leaders of a nation from best to worst. The criteria are often ill-defined or not 
defined at all (Ludwig 2002: 274), but as those who conduct them often argue, 
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the rankings themselves are fairly consistent. That is, particular leaders' 
rankings are steady, whether good, poor, or middling, over different studies 
(Cohen 2003: 914-915). 
This consistency may reflect the fact that prior rankings establish a reputation 
for leaders that influences subsequent expert perceptions. Additionally, new 
research on particular leaders can suggest that previous impressions were 
inaccurate. Dwight Eisenhower received a series of poor rankings before a 
wave of revisionist interpretations of his presidency that began in the 1970s 
revived his reputation. The alternative interpretation of Eisenhower was 
confirmed by Greenstein's evidence that Eisenhower had been more active 
behind the scenes than scholars had previously realised (1979, 1994, McAuliffe 
1981: 626-627). Eisenhower's rankings have since risen but there may be other 
political leaders' whose reputations require re-examination of a type that 
rankings studies themselves cannot provide. 
Some leaders are more frequently studied than others. P-ositive biographical 
accounts of Ronald Reagan have proliferated, likely aiding his reputation and 
ratings. In smaller nations, the dearth of research on certain leaders is 
problematic. Early 20th century Australian and New Zealand prime ministers 
are less likely to inspire the research required to adequately understand their 
national contributions. Small countries are also methodologically problematic 
as they have fewer experts. All countries have some experts with considered 
opinio11s on the relative merits of each of their nation's leaders but to obtain a 
sufficient response rate, rankings studies must also rely on the opinions of 
those whose expertise is not political leadership. Many experts have uneven 
knowledge, knowing much abou t some leaders but little about others. 
Regardless of the quantity of researchers and biographical material, rankings 
do not measure performance. Simonton has accounted for most of the variance 
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in presidential rankings using six factors that are almost entirely unrelated to 
performance (serving during wartime, length of tenure, being a war hero, 
scandal, intellectual brilliance and being assassinated) (1991). This is 
unsurprising as US presidential rankings typically ask about "greatness" 
rather than success. This term is more easily related to reputation than to 
performance. However, if Simonton's six factors have a common element it is 
that they are likely to affect presidents' reputations for reasons other than 
performance. In particular, being war heroes or being assassinated likely 
creates positive emotional responses to leaders but tells us nothing about their 
achievements as political leaders. 
Several authors have noted that some leaders have more opportunities than 
others to achieve the greatness that would see them achieve high rankings 
(Nice 1984, Ballard and Suedfeld 1988, Schlesinger 1997, Theakston and Gill 
2011). Franklin Roosevelt always rates at or near the top in these exercises, 
having led through the major challenges of the Great Depression and World 
War II. Similarly, Abraham Lincoln as president during the Civil War and 
George Washington as the first president had unusually large opportunities to 
succeed. While these presidents' challenges were significant, as were their 
successes in leading through them, leaders during comparatively prosperous 
and peaceful times have fewer chances to shape society and are less likely to 
be considered great or successful. The uneven field of comparison led Crockett 
to contend that there should be different criteria for analysing leaders in 
differei1t circumstances, a contention this thesis supports and builds upon 
(2002). The many problems with leadership rankings mean that we should 
seek other means of understanding success. Rankings should not be entirely 
ignored as they provide useful approximations of leaders' reputations among 
experts. 
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Change and Legacy 
In theoretical political leadership studies the changes leaders make and the 
endurance of their legacies, whether explicit or implicit, form the most 
common criteria of leadership success. Burns' much-used notion of 
transforming leadership stresses societal change as leaders' highest function 
(1978, 2003). Similarly, Rockman considers 'significant change' to be an 
important and natural factor in understanding what leadership is (1984: 20) . 
He places a p remium on legacy, given that we understand success 
re trospectively and therefore informed by the endurance of leaders' effects on 
their nations (1984: 187-194). Landy and Milkis state that the best p residents 
'were great not only because they brought about change but also left a legacy 
.. . that defined an era' (2000: 3). 
The same factors are central to Neustadt's understanding of success. He 
considers four factors, two of which relate to character: sensitivity to the 
effects of power and ability to cope with pressure, the others being the 
achievement of leaders' purposes and the legacy left for successors (1980: 147-
148). Hargrove also privileged major change leaders, terming them presidents 
of achievement (1998) . His other types are presidents of preparation and 
presidents of consolidation. Even the terms p reparation and consolidation 
suggest that these leaders are primarily important because of their relationship 
to presidents of achievement rather than for their own individual 
con tributions. 
The bias towards active leaders who leave durable legacies is present both in 
rankings studies and in more interpretive and theoretical work. The two types 
of study undoubtedly affect each other as contributors to the theoretical 
literature are almost certainly participants in the rankings studies and their 
work likely influences the way other participants judge leaders. Furthermore, 
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the relationship between the two types of work ensures that the rankings 
confirm, or appear to confirm, these scholars' conceptualisations of leadership 
success. It is unsurprising that change and legacy are such dominant themes in 
the literature. Defining leadership success is challenging; a wide variety of 
approaches to leadership can succeed and similar approaches can p roduce 
very different results. Thus it is tempting to simplify and judge success 
primarily by the results of leaders' tenures. This may seem fairer and more 
objective but it downplays the efforts of more conservative leaders who do not 
seek major change (Lord 2003: 19). Additionally, it ignores leaders' differences 
of opportunity and the changing requirements of society. 
Recent approaches to successful political leadership 
Two recent studies of successful political leadership emphasise permanent 
democratic concerns (Helms 2012, 't Hart 2011). Helms examines factors 
necessary for leaders to be successful given the influence of media in the 
modern political world, while ' t Hart designs a frame-work for analysing 
success that applies more broadly to public leadership, not only political 
leadership. Helms' interest in the media means that one of his three criteria for 
success is authenticity, which he defines as a concern that leaders' actions be 
consistent with their beliefs. This is a persistent concern of journalists in 
modern democracies, and creates particular difficulties for leaders who face 
legislative environments that require compromise. At the time of writing, 
Austral.ian Prime Minister Julia Gillard is troubled by such a situation. She 
leads a minority government, which is highly unusual in Australian national 
politics, requiring her to take a more pragmatic approach to legisla tive aims. 
This has meant reversing course on particular policies. Most notably, she 
introduced a tax on business carbon emissions after promising not to do so. 
This has encouraged criticism of her apparent lack of authenticity, damaged 
her authority and consequently reduced her effectiveness. 
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However, authenticity is not always important. The major-change leaders who 
have been generally considered most successful have been highly pragmatic, 
abandoning apparently important aims as well as accepting and even taking 
credit for changes that they had not desired. Franklin Roosevelt's penchant for 
adopting contradictory policies, such as increasing government spending 
while attempting to eliminate budget deficits, is a key example (Brinkley 1995: 
4-5). The pragmatism of these leaders is rarely a m ajor part of their 
reputations, largely because they have led in situations allowing them greater 
freedom to define their own projects. Thus they have enjoyed interpretive 
success. Historical context influences perceptions of leaders' authenticity and 
those leaders who achieve more are likely to be perceived as authentic because 
it is easier to remember and identify their apparent beliefs . 
Helms and ' t Hart each consider effectiveness as one of their three criteria vital 
to successful or "good" political leadership. For Helms this includes the ability 
to solve problems using democratic means, and may include other benefits 
such as efficiency (2012: 655). ' t Hart also emphasises problem solving, but 
focuses especially on inspiring and persuading followers to assist in this, as 
successful leaders must acknowledge the limits of their effectiveness when 
acting alone (2011: 326) . This is closely related to 't Hart's second criterion, that 
leaders maintain support throughout the complex networks of government 
(2011: 326). Like many of the authors mentioned above, Helms and 't Hart 
each stress outcomes as a means of understanding success but each suggest 
elemen:ts of the leadership process that are essential to procuring better 
outcomes. 
Helms' criterion of responsibility (2012: 655) mirrors ' t Hart's requirement that 
leaders should be trustworthy and accountable (2011: 327) . For each author, 
these concerns relate to responsible and accountable government. Both are 
underpinned by concerns of appropriate and ethical action . ' t Hart's analysis 
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suggests there are tensions among the three qualities and leaders must strike 
appropriate balances (2011: 328-330). For example, they must balance 
demands for ethical leadership with demands for effective leadership. 
Overemphasising ethical leadership can mean that less is achieved, while a 
sole focus on effectiveness can lead to improper practices that diminish 
support for the leader and actually hinder long term effectiveness ('t Hart 
2011: 328). Such a course may diminish support for politicians and national 
political institutions. The contextual approach of this thesis suggests that this 
trade off varies. In certain contexts, such as crises and war, national needs 
differ, and the balance favours effective leadership to such an extent that 
minor ethical failings are more easily justified. Thus, even when taking a 
micro-level approach and focusing on apparently universal criteria of 
leadership success, we must understand the context through which those 
criteria apply. 
Buller and James have developed an additional process-oriented approach for 
understanding success in British political leadership (2012). Their statecraft 
approach assesses political leadership more broadly defined than in this 
thesis, and relies on four characteristics: developing a winning electoral 
strategy, establishing a 'reputation for governing competence' (Buller and 
James 2012: 541), managing parties, and establishing 'political argument 
hegemony' (2012: 542). This last point can be more simply described as 
winning the rhetorical contest of ideas. Three of these points are largely 
uncontroversial. Managing parties and winning the rhetorical contest of ideas 
are discussed in this thesis, although not through Buller and James' lens. 
Developing a winning electoral strategy is clearly important, although this 
thesis focuses more on performance in the job than on elections. 
The second of Buller and James' criteria, establishing a reputation for 
governing competence, is less thoroughly conceptualised, reducing the task of 
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governing to creating the perception of competence at the expense of materi al 
achievement. A pure focus on perceptions of policy competence, rather than 
both perceived and material elements, can downplay the successes of 
reforming leaders who lead through turbulent times and overemphasise the 
success of leaders who lead during tranquil times. This is especially likely 
given Buller and James' use of public opinion data to measure perceived 
governing competence (2012: 546-548). Perceptions of Tony Blair's government 
in the UK were highly positive on economic and financial policy throughout 
Blair' s prime ministership. However, about a year after handing over to 
Gordon Brown, New Labour's economic management was questioned because 
of Britain's exposure to the global financial crisis. Perceptions of competence 
cannot substitute for actual competence when analysing political leaders. Both 
must be examined. Additionally, examining competence in material terms 
requires us to understand the different challenges that leaders face in a way 
that the statecraft approach does not. 
Skills and Character 
Other areas of political leadership research focus on the skills leaders need for 
success, as well as essential psychological characteristics. Greenstein 
emphasises leaders' communication, management of colleagues, political skill, 
vision, cognitive style and emotional intelligence (2003a: 5-6). Greenstein 
accepts that institutional context is important and that the job of the 
presidency varies grea tly over time. He asserts that the modern presidency is 
categorically different from the presidency before Franklin Roosevelt. If this 
were true, it would present difficulties for the approach that this thesis takes, 
as it would mean we could not compare presidents before and after Roosevelt. 
Yet Greenstein finds that the same set of skills was necessary for a p resident to 
succeed in George Washington's time as in George W. Bush's (Greenstein 
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2009: 100). That the same skills were required suggests that the job differed far 
less than the modern presidency thesis suggests. 
Skills-based approaches tell us more about the importance of certain 
leadership behaviours in achieving goals than they do about the concept of 
success. Particular skills may correlate with successful leadership, but this 
requires a pre-existing understanding of success. Naturally, the possession of 
skills alone cannot guarantee success. There is far more to be gained by 
investigating the interaction between skills and context. If a leader fails to 
convince the public of an initiative that she seeks to implement, skills-based 
leadership studies typically argue that this results from inferior 
communications skills, even if previously the leader's communications skills 
appeared exemplary. Greenstein's framework has been reapplied in Britain by 
Theakston in an analysis of Gordon Brown's leadership (2011). This thesis 
agrees with his suggestion that historical context needs to be factored in to 
Greenstein's approach (Theakston 2011: 97). 
Lord argues that personality flaws are generally the most important factors in 
explaining failures of leaders' projects (2003: 10). This is a difficult argument to 
sustain; all leaders have flaws yet some succeed despite them. The study of 
leaders' personalities is approached more systematically by Barber, in his 
work on character and attitude in predicting presidents' performance (1992). 
His typology predicted that active (as opposed to passive) presidents with 
positiv~ (as opposed to negative) attitudes towards their jobs would be most 
successful. His prediction of Richard Nixon's failure gave his work greater 
prominence, but it has since been heavily criticised for its lack of theoretical 
foundation (George 1974, Bowles 1999: 19). Furthermore, there are numerous 
examples of presidents and prime ministers who would be categorised as 
passive, but whose reputations suggest they were successful. Most obviously, 
US President Ronald Reagan and Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke are 
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two leaders with strong reputations despite expending less energy in their jobs 
than many of their peers. Similarly, President Jimmy Carter is generally 
considered a failure despite his active-positive status (Barber 1992: 447). 
Skills are necessary for success as a political leader. However, the suggestion 
that certain skills are universally important ignores the diversity of those who 
have been successful. It also ignores the differences in expectations of leaders 
at different times in history and leads to simplifications in determining for 
example "good" or "poor" communicators, or less helpfully, to assessments 
that suggest a leader is both good and poor. The example of George W. Bush is 
indicative. Bush is not considered to be among the great orators or 
communicators, but his folksy manner and the imperfections in his delivery 
appealed to many Americans who could more readily see him as "one of 
them" (Kane and Patapan 2012: 63). As Kane and Patapan argue, the best 
rhetoric in modern politics is often that which is not instantly recognisable as 
rhetoric; modern persuasion is an 'artless art' (2010). Publics often see high 
oratory either as dangerous and subversive, or as empty and unlikely to be 
fulfilled (Kane and Patapan 2010). Greenstein's own assessment suggests that 
Bush was generally better when unscripted and often poor when reading a 
prepared statement (2003b: 15). However, there are many exceptions to both 
sides of this assessment and an explanation that includes context appears 
more helpful. 
Bush's _communication in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks 
was effective in, ' rallying domestic and international support for his 
administration's "framing" of the crisis and the government's p referred 
response to it' despite his apparent lack of oratorical skill ('t Hart, Tindall and 
Brown 2009: 475). It was a situation that suited Bush's simple delivery style. 
While Bush succeeded in his crisis rhetoric in this instance, he failed in the 
Hurricane Katrina crisis four years later ('t Hart, Tindall and Brown 2009) . 
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Whether we consider Bush to have been a poor orator or one who was artfully 
artless, this is a further indication that skill alone cannot predict success in a 
single facet of the presidency, let alone in its entirety. Bush managed through 
the September 11 crisis better than Hurricane Katrina partly because existing 
organisational structures were better placed to inform him. This meant he was 
more able to communicate what the public needed to know or at least what it 
wanted to hear. While Bush made rhetorical mistakes in the Katrina response, 
these were not solely about his rhetorical skills. The context encouraged his 
success in the former instance and his failure in the latter. 
There is a significant body of research building on the notion that skills are 
context-sensitive (Hargrove and Owens 2003, Hargrove 2001, Masciulli and 
Knight 2009: 116, Helms 2012, Bell, Hargrove and Theakston 1999) . These 
studies suggest that skills are reinforced by favourable contexts and less 
effective in unfavourable contexts. Furthermore, skill can allow a leader to 
alter the context, making it more suitable ('t Hart 2012). Nevertheless, there are 
limits to how much leaders can redefine contexts. Clearly, leaders can respond 
to crises in ways that enhance their authority or ways that will diminish that 
authority (Boin, McConnell and ' t Hart 2008). While it is easy to imagine a 
leader other than Bush being advantaged by the Hurricane Katrina context, 
Katrina also had a material reality that no leader could change. Institutional 
and administrative problems, many of them within the state of Louisiana and 
many at the federal level, affected the US Government's response. 
Overcoming some of these problems would have required considerable 
foresight; while many others could not have been overcome by any president. 
Another school of the literature emphasises the need for leaders to exercise 
prudence, Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom. This is particularly 
apparent among scholars who emphasise ethics in political leadership (Uhr 
2005, Dorsey 2002, Hargrove 1998, Dobell 1998). Essentially, prudence requires 
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judgment about the salient moral issues but it also requires that leaders 
exercise the judgment to understand what is possible in their situation (Uhr 
2005: 70) . Hargrove extends this, arguing that the master skill of 'discernment' 
allows leaders to determine the appropriate balance of prudence and purpose 
for their particular historical circumstances (1998: 41) . Discernment allows 
political leaders to understand which goals to pursue and how best to pursue 
them. Like other skills-based approaches, prudence and discernment can 
suffer in that we can only know that leaders have exercised them well by the 
results of their actions, rather than by observing the actions themselves. As 
Rockman notes, the same process can lead to good or bad outcomes, so it is 
difficult to argue that good outcomes imply good processes (1984: 194). This 
makes defining success using skills problematic but prudence and 
discernment are important skills, especially as they acknowledge leaders' need 
to act differently in different circumstances. 
Historical Context in Leadership Studies 
This thesis' argument that greater attention to context is crucial to 
understanding leadership success, develops from the growing historical 
context-based approach to leadership studies most commonly associated with 
Skowronek (1986, 1997, 2008, also Crockett 2002, Polsky 2012, Nichols and 
Myers 2010, Plotke 1996, Laing 2012, Cook and Polsky 2005). Thus far, this 
approach has only been applied to the American Presidency but it can be 
applied_ to the study of democratic leadership in other nations. Skowronek's 
approach suggests that leaders' opportunities differ depending on when they 
are in power. Some have the chance to make lasting changes, while others 
have minimal opportunities (Skowronek 1997). The natural consequence for 
understanding leadership success is that leaders in different circumstances 
should act differently and therefore should be judged against different criteria. 
Crockett (2002) has made this point but as yet there is little research that 
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develops criteria for assessing groups of leaders. Crockett only utilised this 
point in relation to leaders in one historical context. 
Skowronek's book, The Politics Presidents Make (1997), gives the most thorough 
account of his "political time" theory on which most historical-contextual 
approaches to the presidency are based. He describes three permanent 
impulses of the presidency: it is order-shattering, order-affirming and order-
creating (1997: 20). There are natural tensions among these impulses, but in 
certain situations the tensions are easier to resolve. Skowronek argues that 
presidents' authority waxes and wanes depending on the strength or 
vulnerability of the dominant regime in national politics, as well as presidents' 
affiliation with or opposition to the regime. 
The regime comprises a collection of ideas, a coalition of supporters and a 
group of institutions that entrenches itself within national government and 
maintains a particular, ideologically-based logic of government action 
(Skowronek 1986: 289). If the regime appears effective in dealing with 
problems of the day and a broad but coherent coalition of political actors and 
elites continues to support its ideas, then the regime is resilient. If the coalition 
fractures and the ideas appear unable to solve contemporary political 
problems, a crisis emerges and the regime is vulnerable. Regimes usually 
contain the seeds of their own destruction (see Plotke 1996) because its 
coalition supporters have different goals and interests, some of which are 
contradktory. As some regime goals are achieved, groups that sought them 
are less likely to continue providing energetic support for the regime. Other 
groups will likely abandon the regime if their goals are not achieved. 
During Herbert Hoover's presidency, the regime was vulnerable. Support for 
orthodox ideas had all but vanished as the coalition that supported them had 
fractured and dissipated . The enervation of the regime began before the Great 
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Depression, ensuring that the existing regime was unlikely to galvanise 
support for a sufficient response to overcome this crisis. In these 
circumstances Franklin Roosevelt w as able to repudiate the old regime and 
eventually create a new one based on New Deal social measures and 
Keynesian economics. This example also demonstrates the distinction between 
leaders opposed to the existing regime as was Roosevelt, and those like 
Hoover, who are affili ated with it. Leaders' relationships with regimes of 
differing strengths create a typology of four types of president as shown in the 
table below. 
Regime Opposed leader Affiliated leader 
Vulnerable Reconstruction Disjunction 
Resilient Pre-emption Ar ticulation 
Table l. Recurrent structures of Presidentia l Authority (Skowronek 1997: 36). 
Reconstructive presidents are those, like Roosevelt, who--oppose vulnerable 
regimes, repudiating the existing logic of government action and beginning 
new regimes based on new ideas. These presidents have the greatest 
opportunity to make major changes and leave formidable legacies. They 
usually meet the criteria di scussed above that see them judged as among the 
most successful in both rankings and other interpretive studies (Nichols 2012) . 
For this reason, they are a particular focus of this thesis, with two of the four 
articles . examining reconstructive leadership. Skow ronek names Thomas 
Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald 
Reagan as reconstructors. Their situation is the one that best resolves the 
tension among presidential impulses. Reconstructive presidents gain warrants 
to shatter existing regimes, but are also able to re-affirm the values of the 
polity and constitution (Skow ronek 1997: 20, also see Johansson 2009: 39). 
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Presidents who are affiliated with a resilient regime are termed articulators. 
They seek to continue and to improve the regime rather than to destroy or 
radically alter it. Articulators often seek to extend the reconstruction by 
implementing programmes that were part of the original design of the regime 
but for various reasons were not implemented by predecessors, or they seek to 
resolve new problems while retaining the existing logic of the regime. 
Articulators are the most common presidents. They lack the opportunity to 
make the major, lasting reconstructive changes but they are not as constrained 
as disjunctive presidents. Articulators are generally unable to maintain the 
strength of the regime, as their achievements lead regime supporters to reduce 
their involvement in politics, while their failures lead supporters to become 
disenchanted. George H. W. Bush, Lyndon Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt, 
James Polk and James Monroe are the examples of articulators that Skowronek 
examines, though there are many more. They lack the warrants to be 
destructive, which limits their ability to create. 
Skowronek labelled presidents who oppose a resilient regime pre-emptive. 
They 'interrupt a still vital discourse' (Skowronek 1997: 44), and if they remain 
vigorous in their opposition to the regime, their leadership tends to end in 
disgrace. The presidencies of Bill Clinton, Richard Nixon and Andrew Johnson 
ended in impeachment proceedings or resignation under threat of 
impeachment. For Skowronek this is no coincidence. Frustrated presidents 
who are prevented from repudiating and replacing the existing regime 
attempt to find other ways to use their powers and circumvent opposition. 
Pre-emption also encourages opposition parties to become vitriolic. They are 
affronted by both pre-emptive presidents' attempts to replace the existing 
order and by their sometimes questionable methods of doing so. 
Skowronek' s examination of pre-emptive presidents was less thorough than 
any of his other types, but Crockett devoted an entire book to them (2002). 
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Each author noticed that pre-emptive presidents avoided a calamitous end if 
they pursued a moderate course of action. Skowronek argued Eisenhower's 
presidency showed ' that knowing when not to do things can be instrumental 
in maintaining authority' (1997: 49) . This case is also pressed by Harris in his 
investigation of Eisenhower (1997) . Crockett's more complete investigation of 
pre-emption allowed him to generalise and state that 'moderation is m ore 
appropriate and successful for opposition presidents' (2002: 8). While this 
situation undoubtedly calls for a unique leadership style, this thesis disagrees 
that pre-emptive leaders should necessarily apply moderation. Pre-emptive 
leaders can be more successful by pursuing an active course that works to 
dismantle the regime they oppose. 
Presidents of disjunction are the last of Skowronek's presidential categories. 
These presidents are affiliated with a vulnerable regime. Just as reconstructive 
leaders are usually seen as successes, disjunctive leaders are generally seen as 
failures . They are associated with failing ideas and lack the support to achieve 
much of lasting significance. When they attempt to alter the dominant ideas, 
substantial portions of their parties and coalition supporters are 
uncooperative, making presidents' positions even more diffi cult. Jimmy 
Carter, Herbert Hoover, James Buchanan, John Quincy Adams and John 
Adams are Skowronek's presidents of disjunction. Not only do these leaders 
fail to resolve the tension between impulses to create and destroy, they lack 
adequate warrants to convincingly follow either impulse. 
How Political Time Can Help Us to Understand Success 
The presidents within each type have similar levels of authority. In terms of 
the challenges they face in order to achieve their goals, presidents often have 
more in common with other presidents from the distant past than wi th their 
immediate predecessors and successors. Leaders' greatest difficulties are 
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defined by their position in the cycle of political time rather than the linear 
development of political institutions that Skowronek calls "secular time". It 
matters little that Reagan used television to communicate whereas Jefferson 
communicated primarily through his writing. Each had a message to deliver 
and each needed to rally a coalition of political elites and voters who would 
support a significant shift in the ideas and logic of national government. Each 
was able to repudiate the existing orthodoxy and obtain sweeping authority to 
create a new one. This is crucial to the study of success. Reagan and Jefferson 
can be more readily compared as fellow reconstructive leaders than Reagan 
and his disjunctive predecessor, Carter. The strong tendency to place 
disjunctive leaders near the bottom of rankings studies and reconstructive 
leaders near the top, and to celebrate reconstructive leaders in more theoretical 
leadership studies, suggests that much of what we usually consider success is 
about structural advantage rather than performance. 
This thesis builds upon Skowronek's view of presidential leadership to 
develop a framework for understanding successful political leadership with 
sensitivity to historical context. This involves investigating questions arising 
from Skowronek's work. Skowronek was more interested in explaining the 
history of the American presidency than in investigating how each of his 
presidential types could succeed. This thesis contends that as Skowronek's 
different presidents have unequal opportunities it is unfair to compare them 
as though their opportunities were equal. Beyond that, the different leadership 
types must respond to different societal demands and therefore should act 
differently. 
Nichols and Myers' efforts to develop our understanding of reconstructions, 
provide a foundation for developing tasks by which to judge reconstructive 
leaders (2010). They consider three main tasks essential to completing a 
reconstruction. Reconstructive presidents must shift the main axis of partisan 
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cleavage, assemble a new majority partisan coalition and institutionalise their 
new regime (2010: 815-816). The nature of these tasks requires some 
elaboration. Shifting the main axis of partisan cleavage entails raising the 
salience of certain conflicts and policy domains. For Ronald Reagan this 
involved linking his stands on reducing taxation, deregulation, and an 
aggressive Cold-War foreign policy, 'to a broader worldview emphasizing 
that "government is the problem." Disputes over this political worldview, in 
effect, became the dominant partisan cleavage' (Nichols and Myers 2010: 816). 
Shifting the axis of partisan cleavage is primarily a task that can be completed 
through rhetoric. 
Assembling a new majority partisan coalition requires that presidents 
convince legislators and other political elites of the efficacy of their plans and 
gain elite support to help instigate the new regime (2010: 816). This task will 
differ in majoritarian parliamentary democracies. While prime ministers need 
to convince social groups and stakeholders, stable parliamentary majorities 
ensure that those leaders concentrate on convincing elements of their own 
parties that reconstructive ideas are necessary. Australian Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke's experience is instructive. The parliamentary opposition agreed with 
many of his reforms, but Hawke faced a delicate task convincing elements of 
his own caucus, particularly the left faction, of his market-based economic 
reforms. 
Institutionalising the regime is a more variable task than the previous two. It 
requires that governments create or reorder political structures in a way that 
entrenches the ideas of the new regime (Nichols and Myers 2010: 816-817). 
Orren and Skowronek provide an account of this in their review of works on 
the major changes of the Roosevelt reconstruction (1998). They argue that 
reconstructors must abolish or at least substantially weaken government 
departments, authorities and other bodies that m ay have reason to oppose the 
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creation of a new regime, before producing new bodies to fit the goals of the 
new regime (Orren and Skowronek 1998: 698-701). 
In Reagan's reconstruction, the key to institutionalisation was to reduce the 
funding and power of certain government departments (see Cook and Polsky 
2005). In other reconstructions, it may be that the creation of new regulations 
and bodies to defend them are most consequential in institutionalising a 
regime. Nichols and Myers also consider that there is an electoral element to 
institutionalisation. Reconstructors should seek to alter electoral, political and 
social structures in a way that reinforces the reconstructive party's electoral 
advantage for subsequent years (2010: 817). 
Nichols and Myers' list of tasks is a useful beginning for understanding 
success in reconstructive leadership. However, this thesis argues that the tasks 
themselves need to be made more complex in order to distinguish the quality 
of one reconstructive leader's performance from that of another. This 
argument is examined in detail in the third article. The thesis reapplies 
Nichols and Myers' work in the Australian political system in order to gain a 
fuller understanding of how reconstructive leaders can succeed. It seeks to 
develop frameworks for understanding success in the underexplored other 
three categories of Skowronek's leadership typology. 
Success is more difficult to define for the three non-reconstructive types than it 
is for reconstructive leaders. Inherent in any assessment of leadership success 
are complex normative questions about how politics should work. Skowronek 
describes American political development as consisting of decades of 
"normal" or orthodox development, characterised by incremental change, 
followed by short bursts of rapid development associated with and propelled 
by crises such as the Civil War and the Great Depression. Arguably, creative 
political development requires such crises to advance society. Certainly, they 
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make major policy change easier (Hall 1993, Goldfinch and ' t Hart 2003: 238). 
However, an equally strong argument can be made for avoid ing crises because 
of their negative effects on people. From this perspective, leaders should 
encourage a more incremental form of development, focused on preventing 
crises. Such a route is at best uncertain, and it may not be possible to escape 
this cycle of crises and bursts of reform. 
A further question is whether leaders should sabotage older regimes at the 
first signs of weakness and allow another leader to take up the reconstructive 
mantle, or try to prevent the death of the regime and the suffering it would 
cause. When leaders are associated with the enerva tion of regimes, their 
reputations suffer (Nichols 2012: 291) but this is also a normative concern. 
Clearly, articulators should be motiva ted to maintain and strengthen the 
institutions and structures of a regime, but should pre-emptive leaders be 
praised or scorned for acting to destroy a working regime? Crockett suggests 
that their reputations suffer if they follow such a path (2002). However, pre-
emptive leaders may be a necessary part of the cycle in a way that is currently 
not well understood. Perhaps if we think about them as generating positive 
destruction, we can judge them as successful even in a normative sense. These 
issues are examined in greater detail in the fourth article of this thesis. 
Political time interacts with styles of leadership. There is a distinction in the 
way political time works for those who take more active approaches and those 
who ta~e more moderate or passive stances. Dwight Eisenhower, Robert 
Menzies and Calvin Coolidge are some of the most obvious examples of the 
latter approach. Their times in power saw them more concerned to maintain 
than to change. Innovation occurred during their leaderships, but such change 
was more cautious and incremental under them than under activist leaders 
like Franklin Roosevelt, Ben Chifley, Gough Whitlam, or Lyndon Johnson. The 
comparison of these two approaches to lead ership is addressed throughout 
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the thesis, wi th the finding that neither is always superior. In certain 
circumstances one or other approach gives greater, or even just different, 
possibilities of success. For example, there is little room for a moderate 
reconstructive leader, but this approach may prove more successful for 
articulators. 
Political leadership success has three central components: personal success, 
partisan regime success and normative success. The extent to which these are 
available varies for Skowronek' s four different types of leaders. Personal 
success is the most synonymous with reputation. In personal success, political 
leaders' actions lead to desired outcomes and personal acclaim. The most 
common forms of personal success are electoral victories, policy achievements 
and positive opinion poll ratings. This form of success is important in the 
short-term. Few if any personal successes are exclusively the result of a 
political leader's actions, but these successes are personal as the leader's 
standing and reputation benefits from them. 
Partisan regime success derives from leaders' influence on regimes. They can 
either strengthen or weaken regimes, which will advantage like-minded 
successors and disadvantage political opponents. Partisan regime success is 
longer-term than personal success. As well as helping the leader's party, it 
affects the political future of the nation. Depending on their affiliation with or 
opposition to the regime, leaders must improve or destroy regime ideas and 
institutions, as well as enhancing or diminishing the coalition supporting the 
regime. Doing so either allows leaders' own alterations to national politics to 
endure, or prevents opponents' alterations from doing so. 
Normative success is a complicated concept to investigate. Political leaders' 
whose actions are harmful to the population or damage the institutions of 
government, make a negative contribution to their national politics (see Ciulla 
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and Forsyth 2011). Normative success has two elements. One requires that 
political leaders act to implement their vision of good society (see Hargrove 
1998). The other is both ethical and constitutional and requires that they 
enhance the office they hold. Leaders' political beliefs will dictate their visions 
of good society. This thesis examines normative success from leaders' points 
of view to avoid using observers' political preferences as criteria of success. 
However, all leaders must respect citizens' rights, regardless of their personal 
political inclinations (see Thompson 2010: 25-26). 
The constitutional element of normative success requires that leaders 
encourage positive perceptions of the institutions of government and of their 
own office in particular. This requires that leaders respect the constitutional 
character of their political system and encourage democratic behaviour 
(Thompson 2010: 24). Leaders' positions in their constitutions are essential to 
their legitimacy as office holders. Furthermore, the institutions of government 
are designed to lessen the effects of ethical failings of leaders (Kane and 
Patapan 2012) . Thus, if leaders weaken the institutions of government they 
risk either making their successors' jobs more difficult, or diluting the 
institutions so that they can no longer provide constraints on improper 
behaviour. Therefore, leaders must respect proper processes and allow other 
political actors to perform their roles in the democratic process, as well as 
remaining accountable for their own actions (Thompson 2010, 't Hart 2011: 
327). If, as noted at the beginning of this thesis, democracy relies upon good 
leadership (Kane and Patapan 2012: 1), then leaders must ensure that they 
encourage future good leadership as well as practising it themselves . 
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Issues with using the political time approach 
The Waning of Political Time 
The most obvious difficulty of using the political time approach is that 
Skowronek argues it will, at some point, cease to explain patterns of political 
leadership. In his terms political time is "waning" (Skowronek 1997: 407-464, 
see also Laing 2012, Schier 2011), and the cyclical pattern he describes is 
weakening. The waning argument is about the increasing complexity of 
American society, although similar arguments are made about other modern 
democracies (see Keane 2009). More institutions exist than ever before, which 
makes the task of changing the institutional landscape to support a new 
regime more challenging. Creating a coalition becomes harder too, as social 
groupings continually increase in number and diversity. The waning of 
political time confounds presidents' attempts to use coalitions to ensure 
success, particularly in reconstructions. Conversely, it also means that 
presidents are more independent, and less constrained .. by the whims of 
coalitions, an advantage for most non-reconstructive presidents. For 
Skowronek, waning will lead to a time when all presidents will resemble pre-
emptive leaders. 
Clearly, this time has not yet come. Skowronek has rarely returned to the 
waning of time argument in recent years (Laing 2012: 239-240), but the last few 
presidents have been easy to place in the political time typology. Importantly, 
there has been no difficulty identifying the two Bushs as articulators. There is 
room for conjecture as to whether Barack Obama is a pre-emptor, or a 
particularly constrained reconstructor (Laing 2012, cf Johansson 2010).1 The 
argument that he is a reconstructor relies on the occurrence of a major 
financial crisis in 2008. However, the coalition supporting neoliberal economic 
1 In 2010, Johansson argued that either was possible, at wha t was an early stage of Obama's 
presidency. 
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orthodoxy remains fairly strong and certainly unchallenged by any convincing 
alternative movement. The major exogenous shock of the financial crisis may 
seem like an event that should prompt a reconstruction, but this is a common 
misreading of Skowronek's argument. Skowronek argued that the apparent 
failure of disjunctive leaders was due to the collapse of their regimes, not an 
exogenous shock or crisis. The confusion arises because reconstructive leaders 
have used crises to build momentum for their reconstructive projects. 
However, crises are insufficient to ensure a reconstruction. 
Polsky argues that regimes vary and some allow leaders greater opportunities 
than others (2012: 71). While this is almost certainly true, it does not preclude 
the waning of political time. It does not counter the argument that increased 
societal complexity makes coalition formation more difficult. This dissertation 
argues that political time has not yet waned so that Skowronek's typology no 
longer operates, but that there will likely be a time when this occurs. Yet even 
if certain that political time has waned, we should not abandon the idea of a 
contextual basis for understanding leadership success. When political time has 
waned, leadership scholars will need to reconceptualise the context through 
which leaders operate in order to keep p ace with empirical changes. 
Determinism, Structure and Agency 
Many early criticisms of Skowronek' s work suggested it was deterministic 
(Arnold 1994, Hoekstra 1999). Naturally, this would present a major problem 
for this · thesis which uses Skowronek's approach to investigate successful 
leadership, a phenomenon that relies heavily upon leaders having the agency 
to ei ther succeed or fail. If leaders' success or failure were predetermined by 
political time, this would be better described as luck rather than success. As 
noted above, Skowronek argues that leaders of the same type respond to 
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similar authority problems, although this does not mean that they respond to 
them in the same way, or that outcomes are certain. 
Leaders display a wide range of responses to similar problems, and even those 
who attempt to achieve the same goals often do so in different ways. Certain 
reconstructive leaders, for example, have reconstructed politics in a more 
complete and more secure way than others. Skowronek notes Grover 
Cleveland's lost opportunity in 1896 as a leader's failure to make the most of a 
reconstructive opportunity (Skowronek 1997: 48-49). Reagan's reconstruction 
was also completed by others in Congress after his p residency ended (Nichols 
and Myers 2010: 817). Thus, even among leaders who are usually considered 
successful, some are more successful than others. 
The root of questions about determinism in Skowronek's work is a 
misunderstanding of path dependency. Path dependency is a major part of 
most historical-institutionalist understandings of politics, but there is a 
distinction between path dependency and determinism .. Path dependency 
does not guarantee an outcome or even a way of proceeding (Pierson 2004: 52-
53). It suggests that certain options are more likely than others but nothing is 
proscribed. In this way, path dependency is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. Furthermore, as we can know which the more probable path is, 
we can also know when leaders make conscious efforts to take more difficult 
paths and therefore understand their success or failure with this in mind. 
A large· part of Skowronek's contribution to the fi eld of political leadership is 
his adjustment of the balance between structure and agency . Most previous 
leadership studies left this issue implicit in their work, and tended to privilege 
agency over structure. However, Skowronek's greater focus on structure 
should not be read as eliminating agency, even if hi s defence of his position on 
this score is not entirely convincing (see Skowronek 1995). Although 
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Skowronek does not directly engage in this issue at great length, his greater 
acknowledgement of structural constraints in the form of historical context 
allows us to observe the complexity of the relationship between structure and 
agency as it applies to political leaders. 
As explained below, even the most constrained leaders, disjunctive leaders, 
have significant capacity to act and to succeed in various ways. However, 
disjunctive leaders' lesser ability to take credit for their successes and to 
ensure that people understand them as successes, limits their capacity to use 
their powers in the future . Similarly, the successes of those leaders who can 
best control the definition of their actions, reconstructive leaders, encourages 
other actors to perceive these leaders as successful, and to allow them the 
authority to use their power on subsequent occasions. Thus, the relationship 
between structure and agency in this theoretical approach can be described as 
both dialectical and iterative (see Archer 1995). 
Leaders' Understandings of Politics 
The political time perspective can be cri ticised for its abstraction and its 
removal from leaders' actual experiences. The stud y of political leadership has 
generally sought to retain a greater practical element than many other fields 
within political studies. Furthermore, success is a topic that lends itself to 
lecturing practitioners about their shortcomings and achievements. Famously, 
when in office John F. Kennedy reacted to a presidential rankings study by 
asking dismissively, 'How the hell can you tell? Only the President himself 
can know what his real pressures and real alternatives are' (quoted in 
Schlesinger 1997: 180). If Kennedy is right, then there is little point in anyone 
outside of the political arena studying any form of institutional politics. 
However, it is fair to add that leaders themselves have difficulty gaining 
sufficient perspectives on their actions to judge their own success or failure . 
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Many of the efforts of leaders and those close to them are focused on surviving 
until the end of the week or day, rather than on the long-term effects of their 
tenure. 
We know that Barack Obama and his political advisor David Axelrod 
enthusiastically read Skowronek's work hoping that Obama would have the 
opportunity to reconstruct American politics (Johansson 2010). Ironically, 
Obama's reading may have encouraged him to hold false expectations of what 
was politically possible. This emphasises the need for leaders to discern the 
possibilities of their times (Hargrove 1998). Obama is unusual for his interest 
in Skowronek's work, but it is not uncommon for leaders to take an interest in 
theoretical approaches to leadership. Jimmy Carter reportedly read Barber's 
The Presidential Character before his election and hoped to be an active-positive 
president in his typology. However, it is the nature of political leadership 
studies that much of the day to day experience of leaders is removed from 
attempts to analyse and compare leaders' tenures in their entirety. Leaders' 
perceptions of the job are different to those of observers. 
The political time approach to leadership success takes first person 
experiences of political leadership into account. Its historical focus encourages 
such research as much as any other approach to leadership, although a 
concomitant focus on taking long periods of history into account means that 
the fine details of leaders' jobs can easily be downplayed in these accounts. 
Skowrnnek's work loses much when it is solely reduced to his historical 
patterns, and such reductionist versions of his work may appear to be 
oversimplifications to political actors. Many academics would consider the 
knowledge that political actors agreed with their accounts a dubious 
distinction. It certainly does not guarantee that an academic approach is 
accurate. Any assessment of success is likely to disappoint many if not most 
leaders, giving them cause to respond dismissively to the assessment itself. 
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Limitations 
Skowronek's political time theory is more conducive to explaining success in 
majoritarian systems and where executive leaders are strong, than in 
consensus systems and where executive leaders are weaker. In part, these 
limitations result from political time's requirement that leaders propagate 
regimes. The creation of regimes requires creativity that is most likely to come 
from individual rather than more collaborative leadership. To suggest that a 
weak leader such as a Dutch Minister-President is reconstructive would be 
strange, given that traditionally, Dutch leaders have not themselves had the 
creative capacity to reconstruct society in the way that Skowronek suggests. 
As regime creation is most often associated with crises, ideological control of 
government is crucial. When situations are framed as crises, parties tend to 
use their existing ideological frameworks to explain the failures that led to the 
current problem and to define solutions (McCaffrie 2009). This can be crucial 
in defining the new regime and the direction that it takes. Coalition and 
minority governments typical of consensus systems ensure that there is a 
greater need for ideological compromise, which means that regime patterns 
are less likely to take hold. This does not preclude the formation of regimes in 
consensus democracies, although an examination of historical patterns in 
countries such as Germany reveals a more incremental development path than 
that typical of majoritarian nations. 
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The Articles 
I. The Politics Prime Ministers Make: Political Time and Executive Leadership in 
Westminster Systems. 
The first article of the thesis examines Skowronek's political time theory and 
argues for its applicability to so-called Westminster political systems. The 
extent to which "Westminster" is an accurate description of the Australian or 
even British political systems is contested, particularly with continual 
institutional development in all modem democracies since the term was first 
used. This article does not suggest that all Westminster nations have identical 
institutions. Rather, it agrees with Rhodes, Wanna and Weller, who argue that 
there are still significant similarities of history and inclination that encourage 
their use as similar comparative examples (2009: 230). 
The reapplication of the theory provides a necessary stepping stone to the later 
articles and their cross-national approach to understanding leadership success 
using Skowronek's approach. The article introduces political time theory and 
investigates the utility of transplanting it into a Westminster institutional 
environment, in this case Australia. It finds that the political time approach is 
applicable in Australia, and suggests it w ill also be applicable in other 
Westminster nations. There are two main requirements of a political system 
that allow us to transplant Skowronek' s political time theory. The first is a 
tradition of competing progressive and conservative ideas and political actors 
in a system in which one or other of these groups is cap able of dominating 
national politics. This is particularly appropriate for traditional Westminster 
nations in which majoritarian governments still prevail, though less so for 
others like New Zealand where electoral system changes make majority 
governments less likely. 
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The second requirement for transplanting Skowronek' s theory is that the 
executive leader is strong and capable of acting independently and creatively 
within the national political system. Again, this suits most traditional 
Westminster nations where prime ministers have considerable influence over 
political outcomes and are often the main engineers of political change. The 
article determines that the three impulses Skowronek identifies (order-
shattering, order-creating and order-affirming) are intrinsic to executive 
political leadership in modern democracies rather than specifically derived 
from the US Constitution . 
The application of Skowronek's theory in Australia is demonstrated by 
illustrative case studies of Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. This 
empirical investigation of political time suggested certain adjustments to the 
theory itself. Political time does not necessarily shift when leaders' terms begin 
and end. There is a strong possibility that regime strength will alter during 
long-serving leaders' terms. This can mean that leaders shift from 
reconstruction to articulation du ring their time in office. Chan ges during 
leaders' tenures can alter their authority and hence, their ability to act. 
The way the thesis uses Skowronek's theory develops throughout and this 
article provides a less sophisticated understanding of regimes than the later 
articles. In par ticular, this article does not emphasise coalitions of politi cal 
elites nor acknowledge that the failure of a regime is inevitable. Instead it 
focu ses __ on the role of exogenous shocks in encouraging the perception of 
regime fa ilure. These shortcomings reflect the article's reliance on the version 
of Skowronek's political time theory found in The Politics Presidents Make 
(1997). While this is his most thorough account of the theory, it is limited in 
the detail it gives to regimes themselves. Political regimes have been examined 
more thoroughly by other scholars than by Skowronek himself. With many of 
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these examinations published after the article for this thesis was written in 
2009-2010 (Nichols and Myers 2010, Polsky 2012) . 
II. Understanding the Success of Presidents and Prime Ministers: The Role 
of Opposition Parties. 
The second article investigates the crea tive role of opposition parties in the 
success of prime ministers and presidents. Oppositions can obviously play 
significant roles in limiting the success of government leaders but this paper 
describes three ways in which oppositions contribute to government leaders' 
success. The article examines opposition to reconstructive leaders in the US, 
the UK and Australia in the 1980s. Many opposition contributions are 
unintentional, with their failures allowing reconstructive leaders greater scope 
to make their changes. 
More interestingly, opposition parties also m ake significant positive 
contributions to the success of reconstructive leaders. This is most obvious in 
the Australian example in which the Liberal-Na tional coalition supported 
many of the Hawke Government economic reforms. Thus, the opposition 
made it easier to pass reforms through parliament, but also made it easier to 
secure public support for the direction of the changes. The other positive 
contribution oppositions m ade w as in entrenching reconstructive reforms 
once they achieved government. After attempting to alter the Reagan legacy, 
Bill Clinton came to accept that ' the era of big government [was] over'. 
Similarly, New Labour under Tony Blair accepted m any of Margaret 
Thatcher' s changes. 
Although this article does not explici tly mention the three types of leadership 
success developed later in the thesis, it is personal success that oppositions 
contribute most heavily towards. Furthermore, they contribu te to leaders' 
partisan regime success as they accommodate to the government leaders' 
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positions and contribute to their normative success by allowing reconstructive 
leaders the scope to implement their vision of good society. 
This article's most important message for the thesis is that oppositions can be 
significant contributors to political leaders' success and that any 
understanding of political leadership success that does not take opposition 
into account misses a crucial factor. Government leaders must listen to 
oppositions at all times, not just during reconstructions, as their suggestions 
may have resonance with significant sectors of society, may be more popular 
than government suggestions and may even be better in terms of achieving 
governments' policy goals. At the very least, government leaders must be able 
to explain why their plans are better than their opponents' plans. This is not 
only the case in Australia and the UK but also in the US, where partisan 
opposition is more diffuse and less institutionalised but where there is no 
shortage of opportunities for opposition parties to make their alternative 
positions known. 
III. A Contextual Framework for Assessing Reconstructive Prime 
Ministerial Success. 
The third article focuses on reconstructive prime ministers in Australia and 
presents a method for assessing the relative success of this leadership type. 
The basis for the framework is Nichols and Myers' work on how presidents 
'exploit the opportunity for reconstructive leadership' (2010) . Nichols and 
Myers present three tasks: shifting the axis of partisan cleavage, maintaining a 
majority coalition and institutionalising the regime. They argue that the three 
tasks must be completed for a reconstruction to occur. I significantly amend 
their conceptualisation, arguing that completion of the tasks happens 
incrementally, so that one reconstructive leader may do a better job of 
completing one of the tasks than another. These tasks are not completed 
sequentially as Nichols and Myers imply, but are on-going and must be 
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continually managed. This is more apparent when we remember the 
importance of oppositions, which often seek to prevent or undo government 
leaders' achievements. 
A further departure from Nichols and Myers' original work is that each task is 
more complex than their description indicates. Each task is multifaceted and 
leaders can be judged on different facets within each task. The task of shifting 
the axis of partisan cleavage has three parts. Leaders must repudiate the 
previous regime and if there is a crisis that accompanies the regime downfall, 
they should frame that crisis to their own benefit. In shifting the axis of 
partisan cleavage they must define the political and policy logic of the new 
regime. Finally, they must defeat alternative arguments about the nature of 
societal problems that lead to a reconstruction and arguments about 
government leaders' proposed solutions. 
Maintaining a majority coalition, as described by Nichols and Myers, requires 
that leaders bring together 'different groups within the social structure' (2010: 
816). Leaders must gather various social groups in a loose alliance that 
supports the reconstruction. This is vital, but Nichols and Myers largely ignore 
the formation of a similar coalition in the legislature. While the two elements 
of coalitions are related, one does not guarantee the other and the actions 
required of leaders to maintain each coalition greatly vary. 
The third task, institutionalising the regime, varies depending on the nature of 
the new regime. One part of the institutionalisation process, institutionalising 
electoral advantage, Nichols and Myers describe as an optional addition to the 
other elements. This part of the task is not especially noticeable in the 
Australian examples examined. In discussing institutionalisation, Nichols and 
Myers primarily focus on how regime ideas are entrenched into government. 
These ideas could involve state-building and additional governmental 
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services, or a contraction of the state and a new logic of smaller government. 
Orren and Skowronek (1998: 698-701) remind us that in this task we must also 
examine reconstructive leaders methods of destroying existing institutions to 
enable their governmental rearrangements. 
The empirical section of the third article compares the reconstructive prime 
ministerships of John Curtin, Ben Chifley and Bob Hawke in Australia. It finds 
that Bob Hawke had the most success of the three leaders. He was particularly 
successful in maintaining societal and parliamentary coalitions thanks to his 
"consensus" style. He was also highly effective at repudiating past failures 
and defeating opposition alternatives, although as noted in the second article 
of this thesis, he was assisted by considerable opposition support. Curtin was 
the second most effective of these three leaders. He was better than Hawke at 
defining the new regime; Curtin's full employment message was a touchstone 
for the following decades in Australian politics. However Curtin was not as 
effective in maintaining a social majority, a task which he neglected to some 
extent. Similarly, Chifley's failings were largely the result of neglect. He was 
the least effective of these three reconstructive leaders, largely because of his 
lack of enthusiasm for rhetorical leadership . This made it difficult for him to 
maintain the shift in the axis of partisan cleavage, or to maintain control of the 
definition of the reconstruction. 
This article's most important conclusion for the thesis is that the modified 
version _of Nichols and Myers' three tasks forms an effective framework for 
assessing reconstructive leadership success. The framework readily adapts to 
the Australian political system. Maintaining a legislative coalition is the task 
that differs most, with a greater focus on working within parliamentary 
parties, than assembling supporters from both major parties, as happens in the 
US. 
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IV. Situating Success: Analysing US Presidential Leadership in Historical 
Context. 
The fourth article continues the development of a framework for 
understanding success. Unlike the previous three articles it does not include 
extended case studies, but success for the four different types of leadership 
uses examples of 20th century US presidents. This article includes the most 
developed notion of leadership success presented within this thesis. It 
introduces personal success, partisan regime success and normative success, 
the three forms of political leadership success. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
the structural variations in their availability in different historical contexts. 
The article also highlights the importance of political leaders pursuing both 
the material and the interpretive elements of success. Given their public status, 
government leaders are uniquely placed to use rhetoric and create interpretive 
success as well as to use their institutional positions to guide material 
achievements. 
As the article stands alone for the benefit of a different audience, it reiterates 
some of the findings of the third ar ticle when discussing reconstructive 
leadership. Unlike in the third article, the discussion uses American examples, 
comparing Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, and includes a focus on the 
three forms of political leadership success. It is more difficult to define success 
for Skowronek's three non-reconstructive leadership types. Articulators agree 
with the direction of the regime but need to update its messages to account for 
new societal problems. The more articulators achieve, however, the more they 
provoke the internal contradictions in regime coalitions and hasten the 
regime's eventual failure. The best option is to moderate their action and 
carefully manage the competing wings of their coalitions both in society and 
in legislatures. This means eschewing some opportunities for personal success 
to encourage partisan regime and normative success. They can be judged by 
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the coherence of the regime they leave, and by their ability to institutionalise 
and explain necessary changes involved in updating the regime. More active 
articulators tend to have greater personal successes but do m ore damage to 
the regime. 
Several authors have argued that pre-emptive leaders should adopt a 
modera te course, because those that wield their power more actively and 
challenge the regime tend to diminish their reputations. Crockett (2002) is the 
foremost advocate of this position. However, the fourth article of this thesis 
disputes his position. The moderate strategy is primarily an advantage in 
saving pre-emptive leaders' reputations. It creates personal success but does 
littl e for the leader's party and has minimal longer term effect on the regime. 
Most importantly, it gives pre-emptive leaders little chance to bring about 
their visions of good society. Thus, the fourth article argues that an approach 
more like Nixon's, which sought to weaken the coalition that supported the 
regime, is preferable to Eisenhower's, which entrenched a regime that he 
believed was bad for American society. Nixon was hardly a model leader in all 
respects, and his blatant disregard for due p rocess damaged perceptions of the 
integrity of the presidency and more broadly of American government. This 
was a definite failure, but it was not the inevitable result of Nixon 's active 
stance. Given their belief that the regime is not best for the nation, pre-emptive 
leaders should be judged on their ability to weaken and overcome the regime. 
Finally, on superficial examination it is hard to see that disjunctive leaders are 
capable of any form of success. The regime is dying and its ideas no longer 
seem capable of responding to contemporary political problems. The coalition 
is also di vided and weak and opposed by an increasingly strong alternative 
political grouping. This means that disjunctive leaders must appeal to a 
narrow middle ground, as when they act, they are attacked either for 
departing from the regime or for continuing with its discredited ideas. The 
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narrowness of their support also inhibits their ability to achieve interpretive 
success, which explains why disjunctive leaders like Carter and Hoover often 
have significant records of legisla tive achievement but have reputations as 
abject failures. The normative advantage of disjunctive leaders is that they 
have the ability to experiment with new ideas and programmes, and that these 
often form the basis of the early years of reconstructive presidencies. We 
should focus most of our analysis of disjunctive leaders on this function. The 
need to experiment to overcome new problems means that many proposals 
will not be successful. Disjunctive leaders need to adopt an active stance that 
allows them to engage many different solutions and retain those that work. A 
moderate stance will not meet the challenges of this form of leadership. 
Conclusion 
Few would deny the importance of political leaders to democracies, yet 
publics are generally cynical about their roles and methods. This is a complex 
phenomenon but in part it resu lts from unrealisti c expectations people have of 
their leaders. Political leaders do help to create these expecta tions with lofty 
campaign rhetoric and promises; however high expectations also derive from 
a belief that leaders all have similar powers and therefore similar capacities. 
As a result, scholarly observers and publics alike tend to judge leaders against 
standards that are only rarely obtainable. 
Once we take account of the different historical contexts political leaders 
occupy;we can develop criteria for judging their success that are sensitive to 
their varying opportunities and challenges. Such an understanding of political 
leadership reveals that many more of our political leaders have been 
su ccessful than is commonly acknowledged . We need therefore to reorient our 
theoretical understanding of the broader concept of political leadership. 
Greater attention to historical context allows us to observe different ways for 
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political leaders to succeed. More importantly, it demonstrates that we need to 
broaden and diversify our understanding of political leadership itself to 
account for the fact that it does, and should do, different things at different 
times. 
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Article 1 
The Politics Prime Ministers Make: Political Time and Executive 
Leadership in Westminster Systems 
Matthew Laing and Brendan McCaffrie2 
Stephen Skowronek's 1993 book The Politics Presidents Make sought to explain 
why some American presidents transform United States politics whilst others 
became prisoners of it. He begins with the premise that presidents are the 
primary agent of change in US politics, but argues that their success or failure 
hinges more on their 'fit' into the political and historical context they inherit 
rather than on personal skills or sh;le. Most significant is the relationship 
between the president and the central policy ideas and institutional 
arrangements that constitute the governing orthodoxy of the day, which he 
terms the 'regime'. Presidents who gain power in opposition to a weak and 
discredited regime have the greates t opportunity to act and change politics. In 
contrast, those who are affiliated with and defend a weak regime usually find 
themselves with limited political capital. 
Skowronek's theory succeeds in providing broad explanatory narratives for 
the course of presidential leadership through American history. We believe it 
can have similar utility in interpreting executive leadership in other political 
systems, and that such cross-national, cross-systemic applications can help 
students of executive leadership to scrutinise the original theory. Our goal in 
this chapter is to explore the potential for Skowronek's model to be gainfully 
transplanted into Westminster systems in order to reinterpret the leadership 
2 The ordering of the authors' names is alphabetical rather than an indication of their relative 
contributions 
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possibilities, constraints, predicaments and performances of prime ministers. 
For this task we have chosen Australia, a country with a Westminster tradition 
that also borrowed American traditions such as a powerful elected upper 
house, a federation of states and a written constitution. 
First we explore whether it makes sense for us to transplant the theory-
whether the institutional and political premises on which Skowronek based 
his theory are also present in Westminster systems. Second, we apply the 
model to three recent Australian prime ministers, demonstrating how 
Skowronek's leadership types are present in Australia. In doing this, we draw 
out some wider implications for the original theory and reflect upon the future 
utility of this perspective. Although we use Australia to anchor our analysis, 
throughout the discussion we continue to demonstrate the wider applicability 
of Skowronek's theory to Westminster countries. 
The Politics Presidents Make: Patterns of Leadership Authority 
Skowronek's political time theory shows that presidents f·ace three competing 
impulses; the impulse to repudiate and shatter the dominant political ideas of 
the day, the impulse to create a new orthodoxy, and the impulse to maintain 
and affirm the existing governing order and constitutional arrangements. 
These impulses make up the first of Skowronek's three chronological patterns 
of executive politics, the persistent pattern. Their paradoxical nature creates 
the root problem for all presidents. They must simultaneously defend what 
has come before, whilst also implementing change and adapting government 
to emerging challenges. 
The second, emergent pattern, describes the development of the powers and 
abilities of the presidency. It identifies change in the office itself - from the 
weak, patrician, patronage-reliant presidency of the 1790s to the highly 
centralised and professionalised office two decades later. Presidential power 
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and institutional properties determine the strategies that leaders may employ 
to enact change. Skowronek's principal contribution, however, is describing 
the fundamental structures that transcend such developments. For 
Skowronek, presidents' levels of authority-the scope that other actors and 
institutions give presidents to act-are more important in determining their 
effecti veness than the formal powers they hold. In his analysis, 
chronologically distant presidents with similar levels of authority are more 
comparable than chronologically adjacent presidents with divergent authority 
levels, despite intervening changes in the power and institutional form of the 
presidency. The variation in authority structures is developed in what 
Skowronek calls the recurrent pattern. This defines the relative authority that 
presidents have to wield their competing impulses to shatter, create and affirm 
the political order. 
Some presidents hold little authority to challenge the orthodoxy and the 
interests that seek to protect it, and thus achieve little change to the political 
order. Other presidents receive a warrant to shatter what came before and 
develop a new order. The recurrent pattern follows a cyclical version of time 
('political time'), with regimes being created, maintained, then decaying and 
ultimately being superseded. Decay occurs when new issues and problems 
emerge which orthodox ideas can no longer solve; these ideas lose the support 
of the public and political elite. Finally, the regime crumbles, providing 
opportunities for astute leaders to propagate alternative ideas and create a 
new regime. 
The term ' regime' is used to describe a wide variety of poli tical phenomena, 
but here it describes bundles of ideas and institutions that shape political and 
policy behaviour. This definition seeks to explain actor behaviour beyond 
formal institutions (see Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 725~6). The key feature of 
regimes is not their degree of codification but their degree of acceptance -
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regimes are necessarily very widely accepted and acknowledged norms that 
guide political behaviour (see Skaaning 2006: 9- 11). For example, the 
persistent belief in Keynesian economics and social welfare policies in the 
post-war period within most western democracies constitutes a regime (or a 
paradigm', see Hall 1993). 
In US politics, the authority structures that recur in political time are the 
product of the strength of the regime and how the president is positioned 
towards the regime. Presidents are either opposed to or affiliated with the 
prevailing regime and its ideas. Naturally, this is a somewhat crude 
characterisation; few leaders are entirely opposed to or affiliated with a 
particular regime. Yet Skowronek plausibly demonstrates that all presidents 
can be classified into these positions. Opposed presidents seek to shatter the 
regime and create a new order based on new ideas, while affiliated leaders 
seek to defend and strengthen the status quo. 
The ideas that make up the established regime can either be vulnerable or 
resilient. Again, this will always be a matter of degree rather than an absolute, 
but generally it is clear (at least in retrospect) that a regime is one or the other. 
When a regime is resilient, the political order is ideologically, organisationally 
and institutionally well supported. When the regime is vulnerable, it 
represents an orthodoxy that has lost credibility, and no longer seems capable 
of managing emerging problems. Typically, when the nation is beset by 
problE'ms that the regime cannot solve, the result is a crisis. 
Regime Opposed leader Affiliated leader 
Vulnerable Reconstruction Disjunction 
Resilient Pre-emption Articulation 
Table 1. Recurrent structures of Presidential Authority (Skowronek 1997: 36). 
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Leaders who oppose a weakened regime are reconstructors (see Table 1). The 
failings of the system are palpable and as such, presiden ts like Franklin 
Roosevelt gain large warrants for change, and forge new ideas and new 
arrangements to create a new regime. This situation affords leaders the 
capacity to shatter the political order and create a new one, which is the 
greatest authority to effect political change. Presidents who come to office 
affiliated and committed to the existing ideas and arrangements when the 
regime is resilient are termed articulators. Such presidents generally seek to 
maintain or strengthen the regime rather than make grand alterations. 
Changes made by these presidents are 'orthodox innovations'. 
Presidents who are affiliated with a failing system occupy a position that is 
termed disjunction. These leaders can become trapped; some may recognise 
that the system is failing but lack the authority to repudiate it. Alternatively, 
they may be ideologically committed to the ideas of the regime, and by their 
own choice remain doggedly committed to it. Finally, pre-emptive leaders 
seek to repudiate the existing order or significant elements of it but their 
authority to do so is dampened by a resilient regime. Pre-emptors typically do 
not strike out against every element of the orthodoxy, but their leadership is 
characterised by major 'signature issues' on which they do make such efforts. 
These leaders are wild cards who fail to notice or to accept the limits to their 
authority and mistakenly believe that they have warrants to recreate the 
political system. 
Transplanting Skowronek: Political Regime Cycles in Australia 
Skowronek conceives of his first and most fundamental pattern, the 
'persistent' pattern, as a product of the United States Constitution. He depicts 
the persistent pattern as 'built on what all presidents share by virtue of the 
formalities of the constitutional design' (Skowronek 1997: 12), and describes a 
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paradox in that 'the presidency is a governing institution inherently hostile to 
inherited governing arrangements' (Skowronek 1997: 20). Thus, it is the 
constitution that generates the conflicting impulses to 'order-shatter', 'order-
create' and 'order-affirm'. 
The constitution's limits on presidential action are further confused by its 
sharing of the responsibility and powers for governing among three co-equal 
branches. Article II of the US Constitution vests 'executive power' in the 
president, but gives no indication of what this allows the president to do 
(Rudalevige 2006: 507). By contrast, Article I only gives Congress the 
'legislative powers herein granted'. This leaves a wide berth for differing 
interpretations of presidential power within the constitutional system, creating 
an ambiguity over its proper use, which has encouraged presidential power to 
accrue or diminish relative to the legislative branch according to presidents' 
political authority. 
In practice, the presidency has become the focal point for .. the American polity 
and the symbolic centre of government. In spite of their limited formal 
powers, the public sees presidents as the principal leaders of American 
government and society (Rockman 1995). Thus presidents face simultaneous, 
competing demands to maintain legitimacy and authority. They must exercise 
the independent powers of the office on their own terms whilst reconciling the 
disruption and change this brings to the established order and received 
commitments they inherit. They must strike this balance in an environment 
where presidential powers are constrained and yet the dominating nature of 
the office is largely accepted. 
Although Skowronek relies on the United States constitution and the specific 
institution of the American presidency to articulate this pattern, in a 
discussion of his book, he states that his intention was not to suggest the 
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tensions between order and change in executive leadership are uniquely 
American (Skowronek 1995). Similarly, Bert Rockman comments in a chapter 
on comparative executive politics that political time needs different indicators 
across political systems, but the basic concept has universal p roperties 
(Rockman 1995: 78, Young 1995). 
Skowronek's persistent pattern identified a fundamental problem of 
governing through time, but America's formal institutions of government are 
not the sole root of the problem. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that 
Skowronek's typology of leadership can suit a wide range of political contexts 
('t Hart 2010: 8-11). The conflicting demands of legitimacy and authority are 
likely to manifest themselves similarly wherever executive and legislative 
power are made accountable to the public, and wherever competing reformist 
and conservative views flourish in society. This is especially true where one or 
o ther of these forces can gain majority control of the legislature and dominate 
the political arena. 
Although Skowronek never identifies this, without the public competition of 
ideas the presidency would not hold its competing impulses. The clarity of the 
institutional distinction of these demands in the US likely makes the outcomes 
of their interaction with the fluctuation of authority through regimes more 
volatile. Thus we expect examples of the four types of leadership to be purer 
in the US than elsewhere. Outside the US, Skowronek's theory is most likely to 
work .in Westminster nations like Australia with hi stories of strong executive 
leadership and two major parties, and least likely to work in consensus 
systems with histories of multi-party coalition governments that combine 
progressive and conservative forces within a single executive. 
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Comparing Executives: President Vs. Prime Minister 
In Westminster systems the constitutional position of the prime minister is 
often vague. The UK lacks a written constitution, while the constitutions of 
those countries that do have one, like Australia, are silent on the roles of prime 
minister and cabinet (Rhodes et al. 2009: 87). Unlike US presidents, 
Westminster prime ministers sit in the legislature. This gives them both the 
executive abilities to oversee and maintain laws, and the legislative abilities to 
create and destroy them. Thus, the impulses of Skowronek's persistent pattern 
are immediately apparent, particularly in instances of single party government 
majorities. Prime ministers, with cabinet, can harness progressive or 
conservative ideas to shatter, affirm and create the political order, usually with 
greater freedom than US presidents. 
While Westminster executives are usually more powerful against the 
legislature than US executives are, the position of prime ministers within the 
executive is weaker than that of presidents. The nature . .of prime-ministerial 
power is contested. Each major Westminster country has had enduring 
academic debates about the 'presidentialisation' of politics, in which prime 
ministers are said to have risen from first among equals status to be 
paramount in government through the centralisation of power and increasing 
media attention to leaders (Poguntke and Webb 2005, Walter and Strangio 
2007). 
An alternative 'core executive' understanding of Westminster government 
holds that a handful of influential ministers and advisers in various 
(somewhat fluid) configurations are most important in decision-making 
(Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995, Weller 2007). In Westminster countries, the 
prime minister's strength relative to cabinet has fluctuated depending on the 
leadership styles and interests of a prime minister, as well as on outside 
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factors such as wars and economic difficulties. Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 
contend that the most powerful prime ministers relative to their cabinets were 
First World War leaders, Britain's David Lloyd George, Canada's Robert 
Borden, and Australia's William Morris Hughes (2009: 102). This can be read 
as implicit support for Skowronek's theory, suggesting that the war-time 
context enhanced prime ministerial authority and this rather than a 
development of institutional power enhanced prime-ministerial strength. 
Prime ministers are the most important figures in each of these conceptions. It 
is in their interest to be consultative within the executive in a way that US 
presidents do not need to be, as Westminster ministers have greater capacity 
to take decisions. But even for those who adhere to the core executive model, 
prime ministers 'will appear the dominant and decisive figure' (Weller 2007: 
285). Certainly, among parties and the public 'leaders are looked upon as the 
transformative agents of politics' (Walter and Strangio 2007: 12). However, in 
terms of setting policy and implementing regime change, prime ministers 
commonly operate in tandem with their treasurers. Bob Hawke/Paul Keating, 
John Curtin/Ben Chifley, and John Howard/Peter Costello are prime examples 
of this phenomenon. Reinforcing the earlier argument, prime ministers have 
tended to be the agenda setters and symbolic leaders of reform, securing 
support with the electorate, whilst their treasurers have had more substantial 
roles in implementation. 
Ministers in Westminster countries have greater independence than their US 
counterparts, giving prime ministers a greater need to compromise and 
discuss positions within cabinet. As Hargrove notes, the unitary nature of the 
US executive, and its separation from the legislature, gives it greater creativity 
(2001: 60). The president can overrule cabinet in a way that a prime minister 
cannot. This allows more scope for presidents to champion policies that would 
create drastic change, a consultative cabinet means that decisions are more 
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likely to be compromises and therefore less radical. Prime ministers never 
have an absolute monopoly on authority to sha tter the political order and 
create a new one the way some presidents have had. We expect executive 
compromises to ensure that Australia provides less pure examples of prime 
ministers standing in opposition to the political orthodoxy as either 
reconstructors or pre-emptors. 
In these two types of political systems, authority and power interact with 
similar consequences, but their locus and emphasis are different. This is 
particularly important with regards to authority-presidents and prime 
ministers build and require authority in different forums. Presidents primarily 
use the consti tution and their own electoral mandates as major wellsprings of 
authority from which to build coalitions within the legislature and amongst 
partisan groups. By contrast, Australian prime ministers have no direct 
constitutional authority and only indirect electoral legitimacy, thus they must 
rely heavily upon primacy in the media and public popularity as sources of 
authority. Conversely, the prime minister commands far more power over the 
legislature than the US president does. But that power is ineffective if it cannot 
be coupled with the authority to exercise it. Prime ministers use authority to 
cement their position within their cabinet and party, and to deploy against 
opposition from both the bureaucracy and opposition parties. Both prime 
ministers and presidents are very much beholden to the effectiveness of their 
authority claims in order to build coalitions and advance agendas, but those 
claim~ have different origins and different patterns of use. 
The Executive and the Legislature: Congress and Parliament 
While the president is dominant within the American executive, the executive 
itself is not strong in comparison with the legislature. In part this is because of 
the way the two polities understand the executive. Compared to the US, 
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Australian political culture 'tolerates and is not unduly disturbed by executive 
power' (Hart 1992, 197). This difference is also institutionalised; the separation 
of powers in the US prevents the president from dominating Congress, but in 
Australia the prime minister heads both the executive and an extremely 
disciplined parliamentary party, meaning that the executive can have its 
legislation passed far more easily. Conversely, without a disciplined party to 
rely upon, presidents must painstakingly build supporting coalitions for each 
policy one at a time (Davis 1992: 13). The individual nature of their authority 
encourages US presidents to build support publicly and thus pressure the 
legislature into supporting their policies (Kernell 1993). 
This is not to say that Australian prime ministers can pass whatever legislation 
they see fit. By virtue of an electoral system that favours the two major parties, 
the prime minister's party has held a majority of seats in the House of 
Representatives for all but a few brief periods since 1909. This coupled with 
near absolute party discipline on parliamentary votes means that it is usually 
easy for the Australian executive to have its legislation pass the lower house. 
The Senate is different, however, as the government typically does not hold a 
majority there. This makes bargaining necessary, either with the major 
opposition party or with minor parties that together (or alone) can help the 
government to pass bills. Presidents have neither the advantage of a 
guaranteed majority in one house of the legislature, nor of having strong party 
discipline to ensure that legislators will support them. This makes presidents 
more iikely to suffer public failures, which in turn reduce their authority to 
make further changes. 
Institutionalised Opposition 
Another difference between the Australian prime minister's position 
regarding the legislature and the US president's is that the prime minister 
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faces an organised and institutionalised opposition. This is a mixed blessing 
for prime ministers. Party discipline makes the opposition ineffective 
legislatively (Kaiser 2008: 33) but legisla tive impotence leads the opposition to 
make direct appeals to the public, heightening the prominence of the 
opposition leader as an alternative prime minister (Reid and Forrest 1989: 62, 
Uhr 2009: 62). The opposition can capitalise on the mistakes of the 
government, damaging its public support and promoting its own leader as a 
ready-made, better a lternative (Uhr 1992: 105). The contest between opposition 
and government is not an even battle, but the permanency of opposition 
leaders means they speak with more authority and legitimacy than forces 
opposed to the US president can. 
Maddox notes that Au stralia's coherent single-party opposition is more 
legitimate in the eyes of the public than a fractured opposition would be (2005: 
238). While this makes it easier for the opposi tion to attack the government, it 
also makes the opposition an easier target. Its alternative policies can be 
analysed and discredited, whereas an ad -hoc opposition is hard to define, let 
alone attack. As Robert Dahl famou sly observed of the US, 'to say where "the 
government" leaves off and "the opposition" begins is an exercise in 
metaphysics' (1966: 34). Presidents cannot afford to vigorously attack the 
opposition as opponents on one bill may be supporters on another. Overall, 
the opposition to the president is less effective in the public sphere, but more 
effective in practical terms than Westminster opposition . Given that each of 
these spheres has a significant effect on the leader's authority and power, the 
differing natures of opposition will likely mean that prime ministers approach 
problems in different ways from presidents, but this should usually have little 
net effect on the authority of the leader. 
Different Westminster countries, with their variations on legislative-executive 
relations, will offer different opportunities and constraints that will increase or 
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diminish the independent power of prime ministers. Those with less power 
are less likely to create a set of policies that opposes the orthodox governing 
logic of the regime and less likely to succeed if they do, but prime ministers 
everywhere are unlikely to reach the depths of authority that presidents can. 
Prime ministers' power over parliament ensures that situations such as 
President Carter's inability to have the SALT II arms control treaty ratified by 
a Senate controlled by his own party would not be replicated in a Westminster 
system (Hargrove 2001: 55). This no doubt will change the outcomes of our 
application of Skowronek's theory to Australia and other Westminster 
countries. A prime minister whose authority has dissipated to a level 
comparable to that of Carter at the end of his presidency would likely still be 
able to get most major legislation through parliament in some form. Thus we 
expect that examples of disjunctive prime ministers will be less obvious 
failures than disjunctive presidents are. 
Executive Leaders and their Parties 
Compared to their prime-ministerial counterp arts, US presidents enjoy 
'enviable security of tenure' (Heffernan 2005: 58). Impeachment is the only 
mechanism for removing a president outside of elections. This can only be 
achieved by a legislative supermajority, and only when the president has 
committed 'high crimes or misdemeanours' . Prime ministers can be and are 
removed by their parties if their performance slips, particularly if the electoral 
prosp~cts of the party decline. This is more common in Australia than other 
countries, although still quite rare, happening three times in the last forty 
years. However, the constant threat of removal requires that prime ministers 
respond to their parties' concerns. The difficulty of removing presidents 
increases the chances of p rolonged and dramatic failures, whereas failing 
prime ministers are likely to be removed by a party nervous about its electoral 
prospects. This party accountability mean s that Westminster prime ministers 
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battle for authority with the parliamentary party to a much greater extent than 
US presidents, whose primary battle is with Congress as a whole. 
Furthermore, there is greater incentive for members of the Congress to act 
independently and against the president - the importance of position-taking 
and credit claiming with regards to their constituencies has made 
Congressional independence high and party-presidential unity low (see 
Mayhew 1974). The authority battle is more private in Westminster countries. 
If party members defeat prime ministers or force them to compromise on 
policy initiatives, this is unlikely to be publicised. Conversely, presidents 
whose legislation is rejected by Congress must cope with public failure and 
the inevitable compromise of popularity and authority that this involves. This 
potential for failures to beget more failures heightens the potential for 
dramatic losses of authority in the US, and thus clearer examples of 
disjunctive leadership. 
Term Limits 
A final relevant institutional difference between the two systems is that of 
tenure. American presidents are limited to a maximum of two four-year terms, 
whereas prime ministers can endure for as long as their parties and the public 
are willing to retain them. This likely creates two major differences. Second 
term presidents may more readily attempt to have legislation pushed through 
Congress, as they are conscious that it is their final chance to implement their 
desire1 J?rojects and secure their historical legacies. This potentially sets up 
presidents for greater legislative failures in second terms, whereas prime 
ministers have less need to rush. Prime ministers must always consider their 
re-election, and that of their party. As such they are less likely to make radical 
departures, even if they are approaching a self-determined retirement. This 
also means prime ministers who are powerful within their parties are able to 
continue as prime ministers for extended periods while the nature of political 
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time changes around them. Thus we are more likely to see long-serving prime 
ministers change from one of Skowronek's categories of leadership to another. 
Our institutional comparison of the US presidency and the prime ministership 
has consistently led to the expectation that the four leadership types 
Skowronek identified will be present in Australia in more moderate forms. 
Institutional differences are likely to prevent prime ministers from taking 
oppositional positions in some circumstances in which a president would do. 
They will also allow struggling prime ministers to achieve more than 
struggling presidents. Moreover, our examination of executive leadership has 
shown that the three competing impulses of the persistent pattern are present 
in Westminster prime ministers. There is every reason to believe that prime 
ministers possess the same drives to use their powers independently and to 
make new and lasting changes to national politics as presidents do. Similarly, 
there is every reason to believe that prime ministers are tempered in these 
desires by an impulse to uphold the received order. 
Prime Ministerial Leadership and Regime Dynamics in Australia 
Having examined some of the institutional and theoretical considerations of 
transplanting Skowronek's theory, we now apply it in a Westminster context. 
For this chapter, we have chosen three consecutive Australian prime 
ministers - Malcolm Fraser (1975-83), Bob Hawke (1983-91), and Paul 
Keating (1991- 96). Examining these prime ministers allows us to show each of 
Skowronek's four recurring authority structures as they appear amidst these 
three leaders. Our cases are chronologically contiguous, allowing transitions 
in political time to be observed. Importantly, we are able to see the crumbling 
of one regime and the beginning of another. As the exploration of political 
time narratives is a long and complicated exercise for a single chapter, 
focusing on three recent and diverse cases is the best compromise for 
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demonstrating the breadth and power of political time theory whilst 
remaining as parsimonious and consistent as possible. 
Malcolm Fraser 
Malcolm Fraser's career up to his assumption of the Liberal Party leadership 
in 1975 had been nothing if not a study in fealty to the conservative regime of 
the Menzies era. It was a quality that saw his personal authority within the 
party and the nation wax and wane. In the late 1960s it was a liability-under 
Harold Holt and John Gorton a modernizing trend and a renewed emphasis 
on the 'small-1 liberal' elements of the party (Horne 1980: 15, Brett 2003: 142, 
Moore 2010: 249) sidelined Fraser. 
But Gough Whitlam's attempts to dramatically change the course of 
Australian politics were pre-emptive and the government's challenge to the 
economic orthodoxy proved disastrous (Hughes 1979) . A 1974 exposition by 
Fraser called for Australia to return to the post-war liberalism of the Menzies 
era (Fraser and Simons 2010: 259-60) . Stressing a return to-orthodox principles 
and economic managerialism, Fraser won by a landslide at the 1975 election. 
He had read the political times well, and found the politics of his time called 
for orthodox innovation upon the established pattern, not the wholesale 
revolution of the Australian state that Whitlam had attempted. The public 
backed him overwhelmingly, giving Fraser extensive warrants to res tore 
Australia economically, and also in foreign policy, social welfare, health and 
education, to an essentially pre-Whitlam orthodoxy (Camilleri 1979, Palmer 
1979). 
Fraser as Articulator 
Articulators face a difficult balancing act-and Fraser particularly so. A 
fundamental problem of articulation is the need to stay the course whilst 
maintaining the majority coali tion and assuaging underlying dissension 
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(Skowronek 1997: 41-2). As the 'highest authoritative source' and 'salesman' 
for the orthodoxy, Fraser initially did this well (Weller 1989: 175-213). 
However, the enviable majority delivered by his 1975 victory and the 
seemingly unquestionable mandate for this project masked the underlying 
vulnerability of the post-war economic consensus. The beginnings of this were 
evident in 1975 when Fraser showed himself to be a sceptic of the Keynesian 
orthodoxy (Brett 2003: 150) . But any rejection of recent economic tradition by 
Fraser was rhetorical rather than actual. An interventionist at heart, he 
maintained protectionism, arbitration, managed exchange rates, strong 
government intervention in the market, and traditionalist approaches to 
foreign affairs and social welfare (Kelly 1992: 34-7). The first two terms of the 
Fraser government were a balancing act. Fraser was pragmatic, introducing 
moderate reforms to the economic regime like tax indexation, wage indexation 
and significant budgetary restraint (Hughes 1979: 37-49). Coupled with 
pragmatic reform in industrial relations, conservation, immigration and 
Aboriginal affairs; Fraserism was orthodox innovation that held 'restraint' as 
its by-word (Ayres 1987: 303), but nonetheless constituted a successful and 
appropriate response to the political context. His authority increased thanks to 
gradual economic recovery and his approach appeared successful into the 
early 1980s (Ayres 1987: 354). 
The balancing act became increasingly difficult as the free-market neoliberal 
faction of the Liberal Party became larger, more influential, and more critical 
of Fr~ser (Brett 2003: 181-2). Fraser's capacity to control the party while 
maintaining the regime was weakening by the early 1980s. Articulators' 
projects fall apart if their regime no longer provides coherent solutions to 
emerging problems. The lack of solutions undercuts the articulator's authority, 
and gradually they shift from the authoritative voice of traditional reason to 
appear increasingly out of touch with new political realities. This is the 
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problem of disjunction-as difficulties emerge, the regime gradually loses 
credibility, the public withdraws support, and elites begin to build a coalition 
for a new regime. 
Shift to Disjunction 
The fundamental weakness of the regime became obvious by 1981. Though 
buoyed by resource investment and previously positive terms of trade, the 
Australian economic picture had ultimately been distorted by them. The 
resources boom collapsed amidst a gloomy international economy, 
culminating in a major economic crash in 1982. Unlike 1975-76 though, Fraser 
could not steer a path through the crisis as an ally of the governing orthodoxy. 
Elites were losing faith in the Keynesian regime, and a growing number 
within Fraser's government were now openly challenging the dominant 
economic ideas. 
Disjunctive leaders may recognise the shifting political landscape but have 
little authority available to respond to the change. A m;jor report by a blue 
ribbon committee on the future of the Australian economy in 1980-81 threw 
the problem into stark contrast-its findings captured the growing elite 
sentiment against interventionist government economics and proposed 
sweeping changes to government financial management. However, Fraser's 
position was difficult as he lacked a clear mandate from his own political 
allies, or other organised interests, to push for implementation. Indeed, as the 
economic crisis worsened into 1982, the Fraser government clung more tightly 
to orthodoxy in its response. The 1982 budget was a classic expansionary 
Keynesian budget that sought to stimulate the economy at the cost of deficit 
financing (Fraser and Simons 2010: 372). It brought Fraser into conflict with 
proponents of economic liberalism ('dries') within the party, such as Treasurer 
John Howard, who publicly disavowed the expansionary budgeting months 
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later. During the 1980s, elite opinion turned decisively against protectionism, 
but Fraser's commitment to the orthodoxy was such that he continued to 
defend it (Brett 2003: 164). 
As the articulator of a successful regime, Fraser had few troubles maintaining 
a unified cabinet and party under the authority of stable continuity. When the 
regime became vulnerable and his position became one of disjunction, that 
unity crumbled. Fraser's waning authority gave rise to challenges from the 
party's dries. Industrial Relations Minister Andrew Peacock's resignation in 
1981, and challenge to Fraser as leader in 1982, demonstrated that the prime 
minister's hold on the party was waning. Another blow came when Fraser's 
long-time deputy and ally Phillip Lynch, who had warded off a first challenge 
in 1980, was usurped by John Howard in 1982 (Weller 1989: 163-4). It was 
against this background of waning authority that Fraser and the regime he 
represented were rejected by the electorate in 1983; delivering a Labor 
government that would bring the major reform that Fraserism had not 
delivered (Brennan and Pincus 2002: 70-74). 
That 'the defeat of the Fraser Government was the product of the weight of 
time' (Ayres 1987: 432) is a fitting summary of how Fraser fell from an 
enormous majority to crushing defeat in just seven years. In 1975 his 
affirmation of the political and economic orthodoxy was what the public 
desired after the chaos of the Whitlam government, yet underlying economic, 
indust,rial and social tensions in Australia resurfaced. At the end of the 
Keynesian regime, Fraser excelled at defending and maintaining the regime 
against increasingly strident criticism. Ultimately, his skill was no match for 
the shift in elite and public opinion that demanded a new era in the dominant 
ideology of government, and he became a prisoner of his own politics - no 
longer able to provide solutions to emerging problems, but also unable to 
repudiate the failing regime. 
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Bob Hawke 
Bob Hawke's Labor Party won the 1983 election and he became prime minister 
at the perfect time for a reconstruction. The Fraser government and the regime 
it represented had crumbled and new economic ideas were available and 
being implemented in other parts of the world. However, Hawke was cautious 
and his reconstruction was gradual. He and Treasurer Paul Keating 
redesigned the Australian economy, abandoning protectionism and opening it 
up to the global marketplace. He had not campaigned on a platform of major 
economic change; the Labor election policy had advocated orthodox 
Keynesian solutions to save the economy from recession. Labor in opposition 
had attacked the idea of financial deregulation (Kelly 1992: 79). Unlike modern 
American reconstructors, Hawke did not seek rapid change- the economic 
failures of the previous Whitlam Labor government contributing to his careful 
approach (Hawke 1994: 145). Hawke's economic message altered slightly 
when the size of the projected deficit ($9.6 billion) became apparent. This 
figure reflected the fact that Fraser had already planned to add government 
stimulus to the economy and meant Hawke could reduce the deficit by cutting 
some planned expenditure, preaching austerity while still actually adding 
stimulus to the economy. 
Hawke was uncharacteristically pragmatic for a Labor leader (Blewett 2000: 
397), a style which separated his reconstruction from those of contemporaries 
like Rcmald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who showed greater commitment 
to monetarist reform and its neo-liberal ideology. Hawke was committed 
neither to this new logic, nor to the old Keynesian principles, whjch meant 
that Australia's reconstruction was slower and more centrist than most. 
Hawke did not ruthlessly slash the budget deficit, seeking to avoid the 
unemployment that a rapid spending reduction would cause (Kelly 1992: 60). 
His reconstruction was less the result of a master plan than the knock-on effect 
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of a series of independent policies, beginning with the decision to remove 
currency exchange controls. 
Crucially for a reconstruction in a Westminster system, Hawke obtained 
significant authority within his party. He and Keating were able to implement 
policies that were previously unthinkable in the Labor Party (Willis, 2003: 
140). Hawke government minister, Neal Blewett described Hawke's party 
relations in terms reminiscent of most reconstructive presidents; 'he was 
occasionally rebuffed, as in his first efforts to privatize the airlines and 
telecommunications in 1988, [but] defeats were rarely permanent' (2000: 399). 
His authority largely stemmed from his immense public popularity and a 
sense that he could communicate with the public better than alternative 
leaders, and was more likely to win elections (Moore 2010: 287). 
Policy Shift 
Hawke's national economic summit of April 1983 brought union and business 
leaders together to discuss a solution to the nation's economic problems. Most 
significant, was an 'Accord' with trade unions under the terms of which union 
leaders agreed not to push for higher wages, as long as government was able 
to compensate workers with 'social wage' improvements through tax cuts and 
improved social services. The Accord reflected Hawke's consistent preference 
for a consensus position, something that not all reconstructors seek, given 
their strong warrants to repudiate the orthodoxy. Hawke's method differed 
from Reagan's attempts to destroy the received order with ruthless cuts to 
departmental spending and confrontational strategies to deal with unions and 
other entrenched interests. It also differed from Thatcher's explicit rejection of 
the need for consensus. Hawke preferred to explain, to persuade and to allow 
all stakeholders to have input in the reconstruction process. As Orren and 
Skowronek contend, a successful reconstruction requires 'the accommodation 
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of important social interests opposed to the reform thrust of the regime-
builders' (1998: 696) . Hawke's inclusiveness ensured the ultimate success and 
longevity of his reconstruction but reduced his control over its design. 
In 1983, Keating announced the floating of the Australian currency on the 
foreign exchange market. As Kelly notes, this decision 'transformed the 
economics and politics of Australia' and 'signalled the demise of the old 
Australia-regulated, protected, introspective' (1992, 76). Just as important 
though, was the deregulation of the financial sector that followed soon after. 
Controls on the banking sector were abolished and foreign banks were 
allowed into Australia. The Hawke government introduced the most extensive 
set of tax reforms since the previous reconstruction in the 1940s, instituting 
capital gains and fringe benefits taxes and reducing the top marginal tax rate 
by 13 per cent (Blewett 2000: 398). Tariffs were cut savagely in most industries. 
Protectionism, fund amental to the Australian economy since Federa tion, was 
essentially abandoned (Steketee 2001, Willis 2003: 152). 
Shifting to Articulation 
Reconstruction can only be temporary, Hawke established a new orthodoxy 
and inevitably shifted to a politics of articulation, seeking to opera te within his 
new orthodoxy rather than continue to remake the political order. In such 
situations, other interests reclaim some of the authority that they had ceded 
during the emergency. Hawke's authority was directly attacked by economic 
events and by Keating. Hawke's control of the party was damaged by the 
early 1990s recession, which had amplified the disillusionmen t of Labor voters 
who had always been reluctant supporters of market-based economic reforms 
(Blewett 2000: 399). When his authority dropped, the party room's criticism of 
Hawke became louder and more pertinent. The party and much of the public 
considered Hawke's response to the recession to be inadequate. This was 
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crucial in encouraging caucus members to consider leadership change 
(Blewett 2000: 403). 
Hawke's decline was exacerbated by the effect of opposition leader, John 
Hewson's "Fightback!" package. Hewson planned to continue and radically 
deepen the economic reforms started by the Hawke government, creating a 
purer neo-liberal economy. He proposed a further massive reduction in tariffs, 
sweeping labour market reform to encourage competitive practices and the 
introduction of a Goods and Services Tax (Abjorensen 1993: 194-5). Fightback! 
showed that Hawke's government had lost its reformist energy (Blewett 2000: 
404). The prime minister had completed his shift to articulation, seeking to 
preserve his reconstruction against Hewson's Liberal Party. In this context 
Keating began to defeat Hawke's proposals in caucus. In 1991 he launched his 
two assaults on the party leadership, succeeding with his second challenge. 
Hawke began his prime ministership with the towering authority to remake 
Australian politics that only a reconstructor is afforded. He persuaded his 
party to adopt policies that were anathema to Labor tradition and 
implemented the most sweeping economic change yet seen in one Australian 
prime ministership. However, once the majority of his reform agenda was 
implemented, his authority began to fade, his public popularity declined and 
his weaknesses became more obvious. 
Paul Keating 
Paul Keating's prime ministership is an example of pre-emptive leadership. 
Skowronek's pre-emptive leaders are characterised by their opposition to a 
resilient governing orthodoxy, this typically backfires as elites and institutions 
of government, or the public reject the leader and seek a return to routine 
politics. Pre-emptive leaders are usually not opposed to the entire regime, but 
their opposition to certain elements of it defines them (Skowronek 1997: 456). 
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Keating demonstrates this pattern. His economic policies were of articulation 
as he sought to consolidate the Hawke government's reform project, but his 
prime ministership will be best remembered for his attempt to change 
Australian culture. Keating sought the creation of an Australian republic, 
promoted a rapid increase in Australia's economic and political engagement 
with Asia and advocated reconciliation with Australia's indigenous 
population. Keating's visionary style better suited a nation-changing 
reconstructive project than a period of consolidation. However, the time for 
reconstruction was over, the Australian population was more concerned about 
the recession than the prospect of social change, and at the 1996 election 
Keating was rejected and the socially conservative John Howard returned 
Australia to the status quo. 
Economic Policy: Articulation 
Keating was disappointed to become prime minister after Labor's major 
reforms had already been implemented. As one of his economic advisers, John 
Edwards noted, 'nothing he could do now in economic reform could approach 
the significance and value of what he had been able to do in the 1980s' (1996: 
514). His desire to be innovative was obvious, but he could never be anything 
but incremental in his economic policies (Cockfield and Prasser 1997: 99). This 
is unsurprising; as Hawke's treasurer, Keating was heavily involved in the 
design of the Hawke government's economic reforms and was a firm believer 
in them. Moreover, no prime minister at this time would have had the 
authority for radical economic reform. 
The Keating government made important economic changes, but these were 
orthodox innovations rather than attacks on the now entrenched competitive 
market economy. Some of Keating's most important changes, such as the 
creation of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the 
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implementation of mandatory superannuation contributions, were the 
culmination of processes implemented during Hawke's prime ministership 
(Kelly 2009: 124-5). These were crucial steps in institutionalizing and 
safeguarding the regime. However, Keating's authority gradually waned as 
his policy focus became more ambitious. His 1993 election victory had been a 
rejection of the opposition, ra ther than an endorsement of his government, but 
Keating chose to interpret it as support for his agenda of equitable economic 
growth and Australian cultural independence (Edwards 1996: 515- 16). 
Keating's overestimation of his warrant is typical of pre-emptive leaders, and 
it inevitably leads to their public rejection . 
Cultural Policy: Pre-emption 
Although Keating's economic policy w as that of an articulator, his cultural 
policy opposed the resilient regime. Pre-emptive leaders seek ' to establish the 
distinctiveness of their course', usually through 'one particularly bold policy' 
or 'signature issue'. For President Bill Clinton, this was his heal th care policy 
(Skowronek 1997: 456), for Keating it was a sweeping cultural programme 
designed to 'redefine the nation' (Curran 2006: 257). He disliked Australia's 
historical reliance on others, particularly Britain, for cultural identity and 
strategic interest, and he sou ght to redefine history in terms that emphasised 
Australia's independence and maturity. In effect he repudiated the legitimacy 
of Australia's history (Kelly 2009: 152). However, Keating was opening 
culturctl questions that most voters felt were already settled a t a time when 
their priority was the continuing effects of the recession. 
Keating was rejected as much for his dismissal of existing cultural ideas as for 
the content of his new policies. Individually these changes may have been 
acceptable to the Australian people but together they were not. There was 
little support for removing the bases of the national identi ty. Without 
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repudiating the existing national story, Keating could not have created a new 
and lasting story of his own. However, he lacked the warrant to shatter the 
cultural order, let alone to create a new one. Significantly, the economic 
reconstruction under Hawke had been largely supported by the Liberal 
opposition but this cultural shift never received bipartisan political support. 
As a single component of this cultural policy, Keating's engagement with Asia 
was the biggest shift. Keating convinced President Bill Clinton to focus more 
on the Asia-Pacific region and participate in the first Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation leaders' meeting. This was a major success, as was his 
improvement of Australia's relationship with Indonesia. However, the 
Australian public remained unimpressed, and could not accept Keating's 
axiom that Australia should find its security ' in Asia', not 'from Asia' (Kelly 
2009: 168). This idea challenged a century of Australian fear of outsiders, 
particularly outsiders from South-East Asia. Keating had failed to persuade 
the public that it needed to abandon this attitude. 
Indigenous affairs policy also saw Keating advancing more quickly than 
public opinion. His famous Redfern speech in December 1992 saw him 
recognise publicly that 'we', meaning 'white Australia', are responsible for the 
worst problems that Aboriginal Australians have faced throughout their 
history. As Don Watson, who authored the speech noted, that word 'we' 
became problematic as it implied that the current generation of w hite 
Austra.lians should feel guilt for the actions of past generations (2008: 291). It 
was difficult for people to accept Keating's version of the past and it was 
therefore difficult for many to accept his programme for the future. Keating 
vigorously supported the High Court's Mabo decision, which recognised 
indigenous land rights, and pressed ahead with native title legislation. 
However, his attempts to explain the importance of native title publicly met 
consistent responses of fear and resentment (Watson 2008: 381). 
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The US political system is designed in such a way that it encourages Congress 
to prevent presidents in opposition to a resi lient regime from succeeding. In 
Australia, like many other Westminster countries, the blocking power of 
institutionalised opposition is often limited. In Keating's case, there was no 
institution or opposition in a position to rebuff his government. As a result, it 
was the electorate that displayed its discontent with Keating's preemption. As 
historian David Day stated, 'the electorate was unwilling to embrace the 
future that Keating held out for them. Instead, old prejudices resurfaced as 
Australians re turned under John H oward to the apparent certainties of the 
past' (2000: 435). At a time when the public demanded stability and a focus on 
economic recovery, Keating misread his opportunities and offered a 
programme of major cultural change. 
The Politics Prime Ministers Make: Conclusions 
These three cases demonstrate that recurrent authority structures are present 
in a similar form for prime ministers as for presidents. Additionally, we can 
clearly see the collapse of one regime and the beginning of another. For many, 
Skowronek's model appears somewhat deterministic and overly structural 
(Arnold 1995, Wilson 1994), but in part this is because Skowronek did not 
explain the potential for different leaders to create different kinds of 
reconstructions, pre-emptions, articulations or disjunctions. There is 
significant room to move within each of these categories. For example, 
Hawk~'s cautious reform stands in stark contrast to the activity of the famous 
first hundred days of Franklin Roosevelt or a similar period of the Reagan 
revolution. Thi s may reflect in part prime ministers ' need to carry the support 
of cabinet as well as parliament, but it also reflects Hawke's stylistic penchant 
for consensus and gradualism. 
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The cases demonstrate that the output of the theory differs somewhat in 
Australia. Two of our prime ministers shift from one authority structure and 
leadership pattern to another during their term. This in part is made possible 
by the fact that Australia has no term limits, and long-serving prime ministers 
may be confronted by eventful exogenous changes altering the viability of the 
existing regime. During Fraser's government, for example, the Australian 
economy suffered a deep recession that catalysed a questioning of the 
orthodox Keynesian ideas to which he was affiliated. Likewise Hawke's four-
term government had to adjust from its early years of reform to its later years 
of consolidation, a transition it struggled to come to terms with. 
The Australian cases also provide us with an intriguing example of pre-
emptive leadership. Pre-emptors are the least developed of the presidential 
types in Skowronek's work, largely because they are not essential for the 
perpetuation of the political time cycle. Keating's experience highlights that in 
Westminster systems too, the politics of pre-emption are a potentially lethal 
business for reformers who try to force their hand. Westminster-style pre-
emptions are likely to be quite different from those that Skowronek describes, 
in that the public at elections rather than the institutional political elites would 
be responsible for halting the leaders' disruptions of political order. Keating's 
pre-emption is also intriguing for the fact that it centred on social and cultural 
policy, whereas the pre-emptions identified by Skowronek usually pertain to 
attempts to push the boundaries of the scope of government action. This 
reminds us that regimes are in large part about how a nation defines itself, and 
not just about the mechanics of public policy. This leads to questions of how 
much is really available for redesign when a disjunction occurs. If it is the 
entire national identity, then this could encompass many more policy areas 
than are traditionally recast. If it is only parts of the regime that are available 
for redesign, then this is an important consideration for reconstructive leaders. 
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The most important finding of this chapter is that Skowronek's political time 
theory can be usefully applied in a Westminster context. Our explorative 
attempt to do so for Australia has shown similar patterns of executive 
leadership at work as in the US, but the reasons for this are likely to be 
common to many other polities both in the Westminster tradition and ou tside 
it. It seems that this theory is likely to work wherever the executive leader is 
the main agent of change and an adversarial culture of conservative and 
progressive politics endures. Though variations between systems will 
inevitably result in changes in the way leaders are able to act, we believe those 
actions can be better understood through the lens of political time. Some 
groundwork for Skowronek's theory is in fact in place in Westminster 
scholarship. The existence of regimes and the importance of political context in 
determining leadership choices is not entirely new (Hall 1993, Studlar 2007, 
Johansson 2009). However, this is the first direct application of Skowronek's 
political time to a Westminster context. It demonstrates the exciting 
opportunities to bring together leadership and development theory to provide 
new ways to understand political history in these countries. 
The successful transplant of this theory should serve as a reminder that there 
is a need to place greater emphasis on the context within which leaders act 
when evaluating their performances. Many of the leaders we consider failures 
were unfortunate in the times that they came to power and their authority to 
make politics were circumscribed by the wider political context. This is not to 
under~ine the role of skill in leadership, but to remind those who would 
judge leaders that there is no level playing field . Even if one leader directly 
follows another, their authority levels can be divergent and the challenges 
they face can be so different that these leaders should be judged against 
different sets of criteria. Different skills and different leadership styles are 
more appropriate at different times. Skowronek's political time theory 
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provides the opportunity to bring context into the equation of leadership in 
many political systems, particularly those with Westminster traditions. 
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Article 2 
Understanding the Success of Presidents and Prime Ministers: 
The Role of Opposition Parties 
Brendan McCaffrie 
This article examines three examples of reconstructive leadership in the 1980s: 
Reagan in the United States, Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and Hawke in 
Australia . It finds three primary ways that opposition parties contribute to the 
success of reconstructive leaders. Firstly, oppositions contribute negatively to 
the success of presidents and prime ministers through ineptitude and internal 
division. Secondly, they assist government leaders through engagement with 
their ideas. Oppositions may agree with the ideas of government leaders, 
enhancing the leaders ' ability to achieve their desired changes. On the other 
hand, they may disagree and potentially diminish leaders' success. When 
opposition parties fail to win elections it discredits their alternative ideas, often 
leading them to adopt government positions. This entrenches the government 
position, enhancing perceptions of leaders' success. Consequently, when 
government changes hands, new government leaders consolidate their 
predecessors' changes - the third way opposition parties aid reconstructive 
leaders. Thus, oppositions contribute to the implementation of leaders' 
programmes and to their legacies, two crucial elements in assessing leaders' 
success. 
Scholars of political leadership have long struggled with how best to 
understand successful political leadership. Typically, such efforts focus on 
leaders as independent actors and undervalue the contributions of other actors 
and institutions in the political system, ignoring the role of parliamentary and 
congressional opposition. Leaders do not affect all political outcomes (' t Hart 
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2011), and even at their most influential, they are still restrained by the 
political system and actors within it. This article seeks to demonstrate that 
opposition parties significantly contribute to government leaders' success. 
Successful leaders have often received support from opposing parties, helping 
them to make greater reforms and enhancing their legacies, and perceptions of 
their success. Naturally, oppositions also act to diminish perceptions of 
government leaders, but this article focuses on the less common, positive side 
of the relationship between oppositions and government leaders. 
Within the political leadership literature, rankings exercises are the most 
common approach to evaluating leaders. However, whether these actually 
measure success is questionable. In their rankings of leaders, experts tend to 
highlight either leaders' characteristics or the context in which they led (Curry 
and Morris 2010, McCann 1992, Nice 1984). However, their understanding of 
what successful leadership is remains implicit. Dean Simonton's model 
explains early all of the variation in United States' (US) presidential rankings 
(1991), but his six factors3 are not directly based on performance or results 
(Curry and Morris 2010). This suggests that rankings explain something other 
than success, likely reflecting the rankers' preferences. Nonetheless, they are 
useful as a guide to expert perceptions of leaders. 
Allan McConnell observed that success is by definition outcomes based (2010). 
Thus most theoretical approaches to leadership success have emphasised 
active _leadership that creates societal change and substantial legacies. James 
MacGregor Burns' notion of transformational leadership privileges leadership 
that invokes change in society, particularly through the development of 
followers (Burns 1978, see also Lord 2003, 18-19). Erwin C. Hargrove placed 
US presidents into three categories: preparation, achievement and 
3 The six factors are tenure in office, scandal, assassination, being a war hero, lead ing during 
war years, and intellectual brilliance. 
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consolidation. Presidents of achievement are those who enact major reforms 
(1998, 62). For Richard Neustadt (1980, 147----48), the accomplishment of a 
course of action or 'purpose' and the legacy left for successors are two factors 
among four. 4 Legacy is particularly important given that we understand 
success retrospectively (Rockman 1984, 187-94). The greater a leader's legacy, 
the more it influences the present day and merits positive assessments. 
Stephen Skowronek (1997, 27-8) focused on context, contending that the 
leaders we consider most successful are those who had greater authority to 
use the powers of their office as a result of national circumstances. 
'Reconstructive' leaders have the most authority. They respond to a crisis that 
threatens the existing logic of government action and create a new 'regime' 
based on a new logic (Skowronek 1997, 36-9). For example, Roosevelt 
responded to the Great Depression and created a regime based on New Deal 
social measures and Keynesian economics. Reconstructive leaders contend 
with great challenges, create great change and leave substantial legacies. This 
is not the only way to be considered successful, although it is the most 
common. Reconstructive leaders routinely rate at or near the top of rankings 
tables and are highly representative of current theoretical understandings of 
successful leadership. Skowronek's patterns of authority also operate in 
'Westminster' countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. 
Experts in these countries also rank reconstructive leaders among their most 
successful leaders, including Clement Attlee and Margaret Thatcher in the UK, 
and John Curtin, Ben Chifley and Bob Hawke in Australia (Gordon and 
Grattan 2004, Theakston and Gill 2011). 
This article examines three examples of reconstructive leadership in the 1980s: 
Ronald Reagan's in the US, Thatcher's in the UK and Hawke's in Australia. It 
finds three primary ways that opposition parties contributed to the success of 
4 The other two factors are sensitivity to the effects of power, and coping with pressure. 
98 
these leaders. The first is ineptitude. During reconstructions, oppositions are 
typically hampered by association with recent failure when in government 
and divided over their parties' future directions. This usually ensures 
ineffective opposition, improving the chances of government leaders winning 
elections and convincing the public of policy changes. Secondly, oppositions 
assist government leaders through engagement with their programmes. They 
may accept proposed changes or oppose them. Those that oppose a 
reconstruction can damage government leaders but they rarely succeed. 
Naturally, it is easier for government leaders to pass legislation and convince 
the public when oppositions accept their changes. Finally, oppositions aid 
reconstructive leaders by later consolidating their programmes when in 
government. If leaders' policy changes were quickly overturned, their legacies 
would diminish, as would assessments of their success. 
The Government-Opposition Relationship and Policy Outcomes 
Institutional accounts of government-opposition relations, particularly those 
examining majoritarian systems, have tended to assume that governments 
simply ignore oppositions. However, oppositions expend enormous energy 
critiquing and attempting to change government policy (Kaiser 2008: 34). It is 
unusual for governments to completely ignore their opponents as there are 
strong incentives to listen (Helms 2008: 14). Oppositions can improve policies 
by suggesting amendments to legislation and participating constructively in 
committee processes. Governments may also respond to opposition criticism 
to avoid potential damage. Sometimes this involves adopting part or all of an 
opposition policy (Seeberg 2011) . Occasionally oppositions can set the agenda, 
raising public awareness of issues and forcing government action. Oppositions 
may also have unintended effects on government poHcy as governments tailor 
policies to divide opinion within opposition parties, or deliberately design 
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policies at variance with opposition preferences (Klingemann, Hofferbert and 
Budge 1994, 91). 
The interplay between government and opposition affects positive and 
negative perceptions of government leaders. The relationship may improve 
policy, but oppositions can also highlight policy mistakes and encourage a 
public perception of government failure. Occasionally, the relationship 
between government and opposition can be improved by friendship between 
senior members of opposing parties. In Australia, Treasurer Paul Keating and 
Shadow Treasurer John Howard developed such a friendship during the early 
years of the Hawke government, based on a shared understanding of the 
Treasury portfolio and the need for economic reform. It was short-lived, but 
helps explain Howard's acceptance of many Keating initiatives (Errington and 
Van Onselen 2007, 104- 05) . Some US Congressional leaders have developed 
simi lar interactions with presidents from the opposing party. Democratic 
House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson 
developed a supportive working relationship with Republican President 
Dwight Eisenhower, allowing Eisenhower greater legislative success than 
could have been expected. 
Case Selection 
This article examines the British Labour opposition to Thatcher, the Australian 
Liberal-National coalition opposition to Hawke, and the US Democratic 
opposition to Reagan. In the US, the Democrats' majority in the House of 
Representatives meant opposition was focused there. However, during 
presidential election campaigns, the Democratic candidates Walter Mondale 
(1984) and Michael Dukakis (1988) effectively led the opposition. The 
relationship between government leaders and oppositions is varied and 
complex. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine it in its entirety . 
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Rather, the article explores the contribution of institutionally and politically 
weak oppositions to government leaders' success. If these weak oppositions 
can have such influence then we can also expect stronger oppositions to do so. 
While Reagan, Thatcher and Hawke are not routinely considered their 
countries' greatest leaders, there are significant advantages to using these 
examples. They began reconstructive change almost simultaneously. The 
changes were similar, involving a reduction in government intervention in the 
market economy in response to the problem of stagflation. Australia's Liberal 
Party was a centre-right opposition, and tended to agree with Hawke's 
reforms, whereas the centre-left US Democratic and British Labour 
oppositions instinctively sought to prevent the Reagan and Thatcher 
reconstructions. These cases allow us to examine different opposition 
responses to similar situations. 
There is much to be gained by examining opposition relationships with non-
reconstructive leaders, but for the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to 
examine the category most commonly associated with success. If oppositions 
can influence perceptions of these strongest government leaders, we can 
assume that they influence weaker leaders. Although these oppositions 
generally failed, each had some successes. Thus these cases include the 
relationship between an ascendant opposition and a struggling government 
leader. 
The purpose of identifying opposition contributions to government leadership 
success is well served by examining adversarial rather than consensual 
democracies. If oppositions with limited institutional strength affect the 
success of presidents and prime ministers, then it is reasonable to expect that 
oppositions with strong legislative veto powers will also do so, although the 
nature of this influence will differ. 
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Opposition in majoritarian systems encompasses significant variation (Uhr 
2009). Much of this is explained by differences in the institutional 
opportunities of oppositions (Helms 2004). The UK opposition could not halt 
Thatcher's legislative programme while the Conservatives retained party 
discipline. In Australia, Hawke's government lacked a Senate majority, giving 
the Liberal opposition some opportunity, in conjunction with minor parties, to 
prevent bills from passing. However, minor parties could negotiate with the 
government to ensure legislation passed. In the US, the opposition task was 
different because of its separation of powers system. US legislators are not 
alternative executive leaders, but Congressional Democrats shared many of 
the goals and behaviours of a parliamentary opposition party (Mann and 
Ornstein 2008, 13). The Democrats' institutional opportunities were greatest, 
given they held a m ajority in the House of Representatives and, after 1986, 
also in the Senate, although difficulties in maintaining party discipline made 
organising opposition difficult. 
Contribution 1: Inept Opposition 
Often analyses of reconstructive prime ministers dismiss their political 
opponents as weak or inept. Eric Evans described British Labour as having 
'saddled themselves' with Michael Foot, a leader who was 'unelectable' (1997, 
22) . Dennis Kavanagh considered Labour's opposition to Thatcher to be 
'ineffective' (1989, 97), while Geoffrey Fry stated: 'If Foot had been the worst 
Labour_ Leader since Lansbury, Kinnock ... proved to be the second worst' 
(2008, 35). Similarly, in Australia, Paul Kelly (2008, 101) wrote that Liberal 
leadership contenders Andrew Peacock and John Howard were ' two relatively 
uninspiring options'. After Howard's first term as opposition leader (1985-89), 
Kelly (2008, 228) considered Howard's 'ability as a politician did not match the 
historic objectives he sought' . In retrospect, this judgement seems harsh. 
Howard's 11-year prime ministership revealed a competent politician. Thi s 
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later success reflects his learning from mistakes (Errington and Van Onselen 
2007), but also that he led the opposition at a difficult time. 
Opposition Associated with Past Failures 
The government leaders studied here each benefited from an opposition 
associated with recent failure in government. Reconstructive leaders 
necessarily take office during crises in which governing orthodoxies have 
failed. Publics blame prior government leaders and their parties for those 
failures. Previous leaders Jimmy Carter, James Callaghan and Malcolm Fraser 
were blamed for economic downturns that proved unresponsive to orthodox 
Keynesian solutions. Each struggled with disputes within their parties over 
whether a different approach was necessary (Fraser and Simons 2010, 373, 
Skowronek 1997, 404-06, Theakston 2003, 94). 
For some opposition leaders the association with failure was personal. Walter 
Mondale, Carter's Vice President, sought throu ghout his own presidential 
campaign to distance himself from Carter, cl aiming to have privately opposed 
his unpopular decisions (Lynn 1984). In Australia, Hawke used the previously 
unannounced, surprisingly large budget deficit to undermine the economic 
credibility of Fraser's Liberal government. This damaged Howard, Fraser's 
Treasurer, hurting the Liberals when he was Peacock's Shadow Treasu rer and 
later when he was leader. All governments attempt to discredit their rivals, 
but it is simpler when the public blames the opposition for continuing 
economic problems. This also makes it easier for governments to win 
elections, a necessary precondition of leadership success. 
Party Divisions 
Each of these opposition parties developed divisions during the end of their 
unsuccessful periods of government. Failure to solve economic problems led 
some party members to advocate alternative methods while others argued that 
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old methods should be better applied. Once these parties lost government, 
uncertainty about future directions intensified. In 1981, Speaker Thomas P. 
'Tip' O'Neill identified seven different groups within the House Democrats 
working independently to devise responses to Reagan's programme (Farrell 
2001, 551). Most of these groups had little lasting impact. Liberal Democrats, 
who believed Carter's conservatism caused his failure, still dominated the 
party. 
They argued the Democrats should return to the ideas of the New Deal and 
vigorously oppose Reagan (Farrell 2001, 544). However, there was a small 
conservative element of the party that supported the President's programme, 
either because they believed Keynesianism had failed or because his 
popularity in their constituencies threatened them (Stockman 1986, 222). Most 
opposed Reagan once his popularity diminished, yet particularly during 1981, 
the Democrats' divisions worked in Reagan's favour. Within the Australian 
Liberal Party, Malcolm Fraser's refusal to break with Keynesian orthodoxy 
frustrated the party's 'dries', who believed in a pure form of economic 
liberalism (Henderson 2003) . Howard became the dries' champion, but 
Peacock was an ideological chameleon. In 1981 and 1982 Peacock called 
himself a dry to build support for a leadership contest against Fraser, though 
his commitment to such ideas was questionable. He became opposition leader 
in 1983, defeating Howard largely due to superior public presentation skills 
and because the dries lacked the numbers to give Howard victory (Errington 
and V~ Onselen 2007, 102). As leader, Peacock generally avoided taking sides 
between wets and dries but this satisfied neither, fuelling tensions (Kelly 2008, 
119). 
The 1984 election heralded significant changes in personnel and increasingly 
the dries dominated the party room. This did not reduce friction over the 
leadership. Howard remained a destabilising influence throughout Peacock's 
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leadership, complaining that the party lacked philosophical clarity (Errington 
and Van Onselen 2007, 118-19). When Howard became leader, Peacock was 
equally destabilising. Furthermore, minority elements within the party 
attempted to draft unlikely candidates like Queensland Premier, Sir Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen and Victorian businessman and party president, John Elliot. 
The Bjelke-Petersen push was especially divisive, creating a rift between the 
Liberals and junior coalition partner, the Nationals. Opposition divisions 
contributed to a sense of ineptitude, giving Hawke an advantage. 
Of these oppositions, British Labour suffered most from division. Callaghan's 
repositioning of the party outraged its left wing, which saw him as ineffective 
and a betrayer of Labour tradition (Shaw 2000, 112). The left was 
outnumbered within the par]jamentary party, but dominated branch 
membership and used this strength to make party procedures more 
democratic. This included replacing parliamentary caucus election of leaders 
with an electoral college system representing party members, unions and 
parliamentarians. Labour MPs battled among themselves to the detriment of 
the party, resulting in Michael Foot's surprise election as party leader in 1980. 
Callaghan resigned before the party could adopt the electoral college, 
attempting to secure the leadership for fellow right-wing member, Denis 
Healey (Fry 2008, 32). Foot, from the left, was only elected because at least five 
members of the right voted for him to sabotage the party (Shaw 2000, 114). 
The increasing dominance of Labour's left, and its increasing ideological 
distance from the right, led a small group to defect and form the Social 
Democratic Party (Crewe and King 1995, 25-6). The group joined with existing 
third party, the Liberals, to form ' the Alliance'. This amalgam seized votes 
from Labour, receiving 25.4 per cent of the vote at the 1983 general elections, 
just short of Labour's 27.6 per cent. This fracturing, not just of Labour but of 
the left-wing vote, ensured Thatcher's electoral success. 
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Contribution 2: Opposition Positioning 
Oppositions can affect the outcomes of reconstructions. Obviously, 
government leaders are less successful if oppositions prevent their 
reconstructive changes. However, the positioning of oppositions can also 
assist reconstructive leaders. This happens in two ways. One is 
accommodation, in which oppositions shift from opposing reconstructions to 
accepting major elements of them. Accommodation legitimises and entrenches 
a policy shift. Oppositions can also agree with the reconstruction from the 
outset, simplifying the passage of legislation and helping to convince the 
public of its benefits. 
Foot's Total Opposition 
In the UK, Foot's Labour opposition responded to Thatcher's reconstruction 
with total opposition. Previously, Callaghan had based his opposition more on 
the scope and speed of Thatcher's changes than on their direction. He and 
deputy leader Healey argued, for example, that exchange controls should have 
been relaxed rather than abolished (McRae 1979), and urged the government 
to be less doctrinaire in budget cuts (Ballantyne 1980). However, the growing 
influence of the left ensured that Labour's opposition became dogmatic. 
The Labour manifesto for the 1983 election promised to overturn the Thatcher 
reconstruction by renationalising privatised industry, reintroducing exchange 
controls, repealing Thatcher's industrial relations changes, increasing social 
spending and reducing unemployment. The public disliked Thatcher's 
government initially as the number of unemployed reached unprecedented 
levels. However, anti-Thatcher sentiment tended to increase support for the 
Alliance, not Labour. Thatcher, with assistance from the conservative press, 
successfully painted Labour as extreme. Although Thatcher's programme was 
extensive and divisive, her government appeared more moderate and 
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pragmatic than Labour. By the time of the elections, substantial economic 
improvement diminished support for Labour's plans to overturn Thatcher's 
programme. 
Oppositions with no institutional opportunities to block government 
programmes can only diminish reconstructive leadership success by offering 
the public better alternatives. This required stronger presentation skills than 
Foot possessed. His advanced age, untidy appearance and verbosity 
contributed to terrible television performances (Jones 1994, 498). 
Mondale's Total Opposition 
Before the 1984 presidential election, Reagan's campaign team was delighted 
that he was running against Walter Mondale, a committed liberal Democrat 
(Hunt 1985, 131-32). Like Foot, Mondale struggled with a campaign platform 
of staunch opposition in an improving economy. Inflation and unemployment 
had eased, vindicating the President's programme. Mondale's economic focus 
was the increasing deficit, a difficult issue on which to cap1talise, especially as 
his strategy included a tax increase that Reagan argued was unnecessary 
(Klott 1984). This, along with Mondale's pledges to create additional social 
welfare schemes, saw Reagan label Mondale's programme 'higher taxes, more 
bureaucracy and a bigger welfare state' (quoted in Raines 1984). 
Mondale's enormous loss, winning only Washington DC and his home state of 
Minnesota, further discredited New Deal liberalism. American political 
discourse favoured Reagan's small government, free market approach. It is 
unlikely that Mondale would have won the election by accepting large parts of 
Reagan's programme. However, such profound failure as the candidate of 
liberalism discredited this path for subsequent Democratic presidential 
candidates and encouraged them to take a more centrist approach. 
The Democrats in Congress: Total Opposition with Institutional Opportunity 
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As Speaker of the House of Representatives when the Democrats had a 
majority there but not in the Senate, O'Neill effectively led the party for most 
of Reagan's presidency. He radically increased his media exposure, appearing 
more frequently than any previous Speaker (Harris 1998, 196-200). A 
committed New Deal liberal, O'Neill opposed Reagan's reconstruction, but 
unlike UK and Australian opposition leaders he could summon the numbers 
from his own party to block Reagan's legislation. 
O'Neill's problem was Reagan's popularity. This increased after he survived 
an assassination attempt in March 1981. In the first months of his presidency, 
Reagan supported the budget proposal introduced by conservative Democrat 
Phil Gramm and Republican Del Latta, that aimed to drastically cut spending 
and taxes. Despite O'Neill's objections he acquiesced, believing the people 
wanted Congress to support the President (Tolchin 1981). He reasoned that he 
would fail to block the popular President's favoured bill, so instead he would 
make Reagan responsible for any negative consequences (Farrell 2001, 558). 
O'Neill supported the House Budget Committee's proposed budget, but 
Reagan, confident the Gramm-Latta bill would pass, did not compromise. 
Reagan enjoyed similar success in a July 1981 vote on major tax cuts. 
The economic slump that began in late 1981 and continued into 1983 damaged 
Reagan's public standing, emboldening the Democrats to oppose his policies 
and pass their own bills. The President had no effect on the budget bill of 1982 
(Kemel_l 1986) and in the following years was forced to accept tax increases on 
gasoline and pay roll tax to allow for greater social security spending. This 
greatly reduced the effect of his earlier tax cut (Wilentz 2008, 148-49, 169). 
These setbacks devastated Reagan's legislative programme. There were 
sporadic achievements such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but Reagan was 
unable to achieve his desired spending cuts, and was ultimately responsible 
for a ballooning federal deficit. Nevertheless, he was credited with the 
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economic recovery that began in 1983 and his rhetorical skill created a new 
logic in which 'big government' was anathema with both public and Congress. 
Naturally, this required public persuasion, and as Kane and Patapan 
reminded us, this occurs in a competitive environment (2010, 382). But O'Neill 
and other Democratic leaders could not match the President's performance. 
Halting legislation alone cannot defeat reconstructions. 
Oppositions must defeat government leaders rhetorically to prevent them 
from altering the logic of government. In cases of total opposition, government 
leaders are assisted by oppositions' failure. Successes like the legislative 
achievements of the Congressional Democrats diminished perceptions of 
Reagan's leadership, but the inability of opposition leaders to rhetorically and 
electorally defeat Thatcher and Reagan allowed each success in their 
reconstructions. 
Australian Liberals: Opposition Agreeing with a Reconstruction 
Unlike the other oppositions examined here, the Liberals helped Hawke 
significantly from the ou tset by agreeing with his reconstruction. The dries' 
numerical superiority meant the Liberals championed small government and 
free market ideas similar to those the government implemented . Hawke's first 
major policy shift was to float the currency and abolish exchange controls. 
Speaking for the opposition, deputy leader Howard stated, 'it will p rove to be 
a very intelligent and correct decision' (quoted in Mockridge and Kelly 1983). 
The parties retained differences. Most notably, the Liberals advocated a 
market-based, rather than centrally arbitrated wage system. Labor could never 
support this. 
Throughout the 1984 election campaign Peacock avoided mentioning his 
party' s sweeping economic liberalisation programme. Instead, he campaigned 
negatively, accusing Hawke of leniency towards organised crime and of 
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associating with criminals. He opposed the government's assets test for 
retirement pensions and its 30 per cent tax on lump sum superannuation 
payments, despite support for these policies from the economic liberals he 
represented (Errington and Van Onselen 2007, 114). Peacock's campaign was 
effective, and Labor won the election less convincingly than expected. This 
showed that a well-conducted negative campaign can damage government 
leaders and, potentially, retrospective judgements of their success. 
Liberal agreement with the direction of the reconstruction meant that the 
government was not heavily criticised for some failures. In 1985, Howard 
convinced Shadow Cabinet to support Treasurer Paul Keating's proposal for a 
consumption tax. Peacock wished to oppose it and accused his Shadow 
Treasurer of being too helpful to Keating. Given Keating's failure to gain 
support from business, unions, community groups, and ultimately from 
Hawke, Liberal opposition to it would likely have damaged the government. 
In September 1985, Howard became opposition leader, assisting Hawke in two 
ways. While most opposition leaders would have struggled against Hawke's 
personal popularity, Howard was a weaker media performer than Peacock. 
Hawke's other advantage was Howard's ideological commitment to a more 
extreme economic liberalisation. This allowed Hawke to make major reforms 
while appearing moderate and electable. This echoed Thatcher's advantage 
over the ardently left-wing version of British Labour in the early 1980s. After 
the fail_ure of his consumption tax, Keating announced a compromise tax 
reform package. Howard opposed its capital gains tax but not its other 
measures, again allowing the government to make substantial changes with 
minimal resistance. Howard's approach suited the situation when Keating 
admitted in 1986 that Australia was heading for economic disaster unless it 
reformed its practices. 
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The business community, unions and media thought Hawke's response 
inadequate and government popularity dropped (Short 1986). This allowed 
Howard to promote his economic liberalisation programme as the solution. 
For several months, the government appeared to borrow policy from Howard, 
particularly his more moderate workplace relations ideas (Steketee 1986). 
Liberal leadership tensions resurfaced and Howard's ascendency evaporated. 
When Hawke called the 1987 election his opponents fought among 
themselves. 
Divisions over Bjelke-Petersen's attempt to become Prime Minister saw the 
Liberals and Nationals fighting the election separately rather than in their 
usual formal coalition. The Liberal campaign proposed sweeping tax cuts 
designed to appease the coalition's natural supporters, such as business 
groups and farmers (Errington and Van Onselen 2007, 132). Howard thought 
the tax cuts economically unwise and polling showed that the electorate 
doubted they could be delivered (Kent 1987). These implausible promises as 
well as Liberal disorganisation reduced pressure on the Hawke government to 
alter policy. 
Disunity also damaged the Liberals' 1990 election campaign. In 1989 Peacock 
regained the leadership in a 'palace coup' led by a small group of 
frontbenchers (Warhurst 1990, 9) . The schadenfreude of those who deposed 
Howard left bitterness among his supporters and harmed public perceptions 
of the party. Peacock continued the Liberal push to deepen the reconstruction. 
He proposed spending cuts, restrictions on unemployment benefits, changes 
to monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation, increased privatisation and 
industrial relations reforms. Hawke Labor sought to minimise discussion of 
economic policy during the campaign, while the Liberals flound ered in 
attempting to replace the public health insurance scheme, Medicare, without 
disadvantaging people who relied on it. 
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The opposition's divisions and policy failure again ensured Hawke's victory. 
His government remained the centrist party, advocating the retention of 
Medicare and new but less punitive restrictions on unemployment benefits. 
This ability to be a reform leader without appearing extreme was crucial to 
Hawke's success in convincing the public of his government's reforms 
throughout his prime ministership. It owed much to the opposition's 
engagement with the Hawke government's ideas. 
Kinnock's Accommodation 
Those parties that initially practised total opposition to government leaders 
gradually came to agree with the ideas of their reconstructions. After its 1983 
election defeat, British Labour elected Neil Kinnock as leader. Kinnock was 
from Labour's soft left, and was initially supportive of total opposition, 
advocating the renationalisation of industry and opposing Thatcher's policies 
on taxation, social security and industrial relations. His position on each of 
these issues changed as part of a 'gradual acceptance of much of the Thatcher 
agenda' (Kavanagh 1997, 224). 
The 1987 election loss and the left's dwindling influence within the party 
allowed Kinnock and other modernisers to accelerate this process. After 
Kinnock made Tony Blair Employment Spokesman in 1989, they pledged to 
retain most of Thatcher's industrial relations legislation (Shaw 2000, 128) . The 
party came to accept that Keynesian policies were no longer tenable, or at least 
too problematic to re-impose. Kinnock Labour decided to join the European 
Community's Exchange Rate Mechanism, guaranteeing a low inflation 
strategy similar to Thatcher's. There were limits to the policy agreement. 
Labour opposed the government's privatisation of various industries as well 
as Thatcher's 1988 tax cuts, which Kinnock thought inequitable. 
112 
Labour's shift vindicated Thatcher's reconstruction but also made the 
opposition a greater electoral threat. Kinnock's opposition to Thatcher's 
unpopular Community Charge or 'Poll Tax' gave Labour a significant lead in 
the polls. In February 1990 Labour led by 15 points and Kinnock was preferred 
Prime Minister. Labour led throughout that year (UK Polling Report 2011). 
Undoubtedly, this was significant in the Conservatives' removal of Thatcher 
from the leadership, although discontent with her personal style and policy 
disagreements within the party also contributed. Labour's shift had both 
positive and negative effects on perceptions of Thatcher's leadership. 
Dukakis' Accommodation 
Republicans successfully attacked liberalism throughout the 1980s, causing 
many Democrats to disown the term. Presidential candidate of 1988, Michael 
Dukakis, presented himself as a conservative Democrat (Gray 1989, 253). 
Economic issues were less prominent in this campaign than most, but Dukakis 
proposed spending cuts to reduce the federal debt and, without making direct 
promises, sought to avoid the impression that he would raise taxes (Natoli 
1988). His effort to appear neither as a liberal, opposed to Reagan's policies, 
nor as a Republican aligned with them, saw Dukakis stress competence rather 
than ideas. The Democrats titled their unusually short platform document, 
'The Restoration of Competence and the Revival of Hope'. 
Dukakis' unashamedly liberal nomination opponent, Jesse Jackson, ensured 
that Dtikakis could not avoid association with liberalism. While Dukakis never 
directly repudiated Reagan, Jackson accused the President of abandoning the 
poor. Jackson's strong party following ensured that the platform became an 
incoherent compromise between his economic justice message and Dukakis' 
competence message (Smith 1992, 534). Dukakis lost the election by a large 
margin, allowing Bush to consolidate Reagan's reconstruction. Dukakis' 
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accommodation mean t that as President, he too would have consolidated the 
Reagan programme. 
Contribution 3: Consolidating Reconstructive Leaders' Legacies 
Successors to Reagan, Thatcher and Hawke secured their changes. As Rose 
and Davies (1994, 116) noted, this was to be expected. Governments of long 
duration naturally leave stronger legacies than short-lived governments, 
especially as government policies are effectively confirmed by the public at 
elections (Heffernan 2002, 746). Many of the changes these leaders introduced 
would be difficult to remove even if subsequent leaders tried . To renationalise 
recently p rivatised industries would be costly, especially as the revenue from 
the sales had already been used (Rose and Davies 1994, 47). The popularity of 
tax cuts makes them hard to reverse . Such factors are important, but 
Thatcher's, Reagan's and Hawke's legacies are greater than the policies they 
instigated. Each led a shift in the ideas that dominated their national politics. 
The general acceptance of these ideas by the opposition parties, at least by the 
time they re turned to government, ensured a continuation of the new 
approach. 
Consolidating Thatcher's Legacy 
John Major's prime ministership consolidated Thatcher's legacy. Major 
fo llowed her trajectory largely because he lacked a distinct vision. He fought 
rising inflation and interest rates, sought to reduce government borrowing, 
and increased privatisation (Theakston 2003, 108). Labour continued its 
accommodation to Thatcher's regime throughout Major's prime ministership. 
Blair, leading Labour from 1994, accelerated its modernisation and 
conservative economic policy shift. Under Blair, Labour announced it would 
match the Conservati ves' spending plans for its first two years in government 
and would not raise personal income taxes for its first term. 
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The extent to which Blair's government represented a continuation of 
Thatcherism is contested (see Beech 2008, 6- 7, Gray 2004) . While Blair Labour 
increased social spending, it imposed market mechanisms on social service 
providers to increase their efficiency (Gray 2004, 39). Blair's government had 
different priorities from Thatcher's, but followed a similar logic. Certainly, 
Blair did not attempt to overturn the major elements of Thatcherism, thereby 
enhancing Thatcher's legacy and perceived success. 
Consolidating Reagan's Legacy 
The next Democratic President, Bill Clinton, rejected the liberal label in favour 
of ' third way' politics, seeking a middle ground between conservative 'small 
government' and liberal ideas. Clinton advocated numerous measures in 
opposition to the Reagan reconstruction but these generally failed. 
Republicans blocked his fiscal stimulus bill with a filibuster, and his attempts 
to increase spending on education, job training, public works and health care 
met a similar fate (Edwards 1998, 755). 
In the 1994 Congressional elections, a disciplined Republican party made 
Clinton, taxes and big government major election issues and won majorities in 
both the House and Senate. Clinton became far less legislatively active, and 
did little to attack Reagan's legacy. Priva tely, he complained that he was an 
'Eisenhower Republican' (Crockett 2002, 187). He reluctantly accepted 
Reagan's influence, acknowledging in his 1996 State of the Union Address 
that: 'The era of big government is over.' This concession enhanced Reagan's 
legacy. Thus, Clinton made a vital contribution to positive appraisals of 
Reagan's presidency. 
Consolidating Hawke's Legacy 
In April 1990, after Peacock's second opposition leadership, the Liberals 
elected John Hewson, whose commitment to neoliberalism was even stronger 
115 
than Howard's. Hewson's policy programme, Fightback!, advocated further 
sweeping reductions in tariffs, labour market reform to encourage 
competition, a consumption tax, a rapid increase in privatisation and 
maintenance of extremely low inflation. The government's support 
plummeted as the nation slipped into a recession and Hawke proved unable 
to counter Fightback! This created the conditions for Keating to challenge and 
depose Hawke as leader. In this way, Hewson's programme damaged 
assessments of Hawke's leadership. 
Keating became Prime Minister after his economic vision had been 
implemented (Edwards 1996, 514). Having been influential in designing and 
implementing the Hawke government reforms, his prime ministership 
naturally consolidated that programme. He introduced the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, designed to prevent anti-
competi tive business practices, and removed compulsory arbitration in 
employment agreements. Liberal opposition to Keating came in two phases: 
firstly, Hewson's accelerated reform drive, which halted after Keating's 
surprise victory at the 1993 election; secondly, Howard's more pragmatic 
second opposition leadership. 5 Howard's campaign held Keating responsible 
for the early 1990s recession rather than arguing for reform. 
As Prime Minister, Howard implemented a moderate version of his desired 
industrial relations reforms, creating a system of individual employer-
employ~e workplace negotiations. He later introduced a consumption tax. 
These were reforms that Hawke would not have made, but continued the 
direction of his reconstruction . Howard was generally considered a good 
economic manager. His success owed much to his predecessors, but equally, 
5 Alexander Downer led the opposition briefly and unsuccessfu lly between Hewson and 
Howard. 
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his approach strengthened the system they had created, contributing to 
Hawke's legacy. 
Conclusion 
The skills of presidents and prime ministers and the contexts of their 
leadership are crucial to assessments of their success, but so far political 
science has ignored the effects of oppositions. These cases show that the 
achievements and reputations of even the most successful government leaders 
are influenced by oppositions. Certainly, other factors not examined here 
contribute to assessments of the success of leaders. The Iran-Contra scandal 
diminished assessments of Reagan, and Thatcher's and Hawke's parties 
damaged their reputations by removing them from office. 
Each leader benefited from divided, often ineffective oppositions. Each 
benefited from opponents who were inferior public performers, and from 
successors who entrenched their reforms. However, even these apparently 
weak oppositions enjoyed moments of success and demonstrated that 
oppositions can successfully undermine government leaders. That these 
various oppositions eventually accepted their opponents' programmes was 
partly due to external circumstances. Economic improvement in the three 
countries ensured that subsequent leaders retained market-based approaches, 
but the extent to which reconstructive leaders were responsible for the 
improvement remains debatable. 
The contribution of oppositions is one additional factor crucial to the success 
of government leaders. Future attempts to understand the success of 
presidents and prime ministers should consider the complex public and 
private relationships between leaders and their opponents who do much to 
assist and much to damage them. Fundamentally, we should recognise that 
when an opposition is deliberately unhelpful it presents a different, more 
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difficult challenge to government leaders. However, we should also consider 
how effectively government leaders engage with oppositions and attempt to 
develop a positive relationship. A greater understanding of this interaction 
can only improve our understanding of success in political leadership. 
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Article 3 
A Contextual Framework for Assessing Reconstructive Prime 
Ministerial Success. 
Brendan McCaffrie 
This article develops a framework for assessing political leadership success by 
comparing leaders in similar historical contexts. It finds that Nichols and 
Myers' three tasks of reconstruction can be used to assess the relative success of 
reconstructive prime ministers, but tha t the tasks are more complex than their 
original conception acknowledges. Examination of three reconstructive 
Australian Prime Ministers shows that the relationship between skill and 
context is intricate. Different skills and leadership styles are suited to different 
contexts, but are also suited to different aspects of the shared context. 
Reconstructive leaders must also pay sufficient attention tp tasks that are 
beyond their natural strengths. 
Prime Ministerial leadership is complex and does not easily lend itself to 
analyses of success or failure. Perhaps the greatest challenge is comparing 
leaders of different times who face differen t problems. A second challenge is 
disentangling the leaders' reputations from their actual performance. 
Comparing the performance of leaders who occupy a similar historical context 
on tasks relevant to that con tex t addresses both of these difficulties. The 
understanding of historical context used here derives from Skowronek's work 
on the American Presidency, which defines the opportunities available to 
leaders according to their relationship with the prevailing orthodox governing 
ideas and institutional arrangements, termed the "regime" (1997, 2008). 
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Throughout history, regimes are created then gradually weaken, before being 
destroyed and replaced. Thus, regimes create recurring contexts that leaders at 
different points in history share. This article develops a method for assessing 
leaders' success in one of Skowronek's four contexts; "reconstructive" 
leadership, which demands that leaders build a new regime after the previous 
one has collapsed. Examining one of Skowronek's types cannot solve all 
problems of analysing leadership success, but it illustrates the advantages of a 
historical-context based approach. 
Studying prime ministerial success benefits our understanding of leaders' 
constraints and opportunities and the ways that they can operate within and 
around them. However, a greater understanding of reconstructive political 
leadership is also important because of its far-reaching policy implications. 
Reconstructive leaders have unparalleled opportunities to implement what 
Hall calls third order change (1993), which alters the parameters of multiple 
areas of public policy for decades. Thus, an understanding of reconstructive 
leadership is crucial to those who study public policy. 
The approach developed here assesses reconstructive leaders using a modified 
version of Nichols and Myers' three tasks of reconstruction, which those 
authors used to test whether reconstructions have occurred (2010). As the 
analysis is based on tasks, it assesses performance, not reputation, and as the 
tasks relate to one historical context, it compares leaders who had similar 
opportunities. The cases below demonstrate both that reconstructive 
leadership is broad and varied and that the skills it requires are similarly 
varied. 
Nichols and Myers' approach is applied in studies of the three most recent 
reconstructive Australian Prime Ministers, John Curtin and Ben Chifley in the 
1940s and Bob Hawke in the 1980s. These choices demonstrate three different 
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leadership styles in one context. Hawke's consensus approach was well-suited 
to coalition building, but less appropriate to defining his reconstruction, 
Curtin's rhetorical prowess meant he was better at this latter task, while 
Chifley's more retiring, administrative approach suited institutionalisation 
and party management. However, reconstructive leaders' success also 
depends upon their ability to address tasks that come less naturally to them. 
Historical Context and Success 
Context complicates assessments of Prime Ministerial success. Circumstances 
favour some leaders, allowing them greater authority and thus greater 
achievements. As their authority principally derives from historical context 
and their exploitation of it, applying the same criteria to Prime Ministers in 
other contexts is unfair. Furthermore, Crockett shows that, if leaders in certain 
contexts attempt extensive changes, the result is invariably negative for the 
polity. Therefore, these leaders have a "normative duty" to be steady 
administrators, while those in different historical circ1.1mstances have a 
normative duty to make major changes (Crockett 2002: 45). Rather than 
considering Dwight Eisenhower unsuccessful because his achievements were 
less substantial than Franklin Roosevelt's, we should judge these leaders by 
different criteria appropriate to their historical contexts. 
Historical context is not entirely determined and leaders can redefine contexts, 
thereby enhancing their authority ('t Hart 2012). This is most apparent when 
leaders ·change their institutional contexts, altering the resources of both the 
office and their governments (Bennister 2007). Leaders can also alter their 
historical contexts discursively or by changing the relationship between 
government and political interests, although these are more difficult. There are 
limitations on the extent to which leaders can redefine context. Wars and 
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economic crises are impossible to ignore and can entirely define leaders' 
challenges and opportunities. 
Skowronek shows that recurrent patterns of authority, shaped by historical 
context, define the paramount challenge of executive political leadership. This 
allows comparison of historically distant leaders on their ability to surmount 
similar authority challenges (1997: 17-18). The relationship between leaders' 
authority and institutional resources is complex. Leaders' institutional 
resources are not equal regardless of their place in history, but contextually 
derived authority shapes capacity to use resources (Skowronek 1997: 17-32). 
This understanding of the relationship between authority and resources 
conflicts with the way Prime Ministerial leadership is often conceptualised. 
Heffernan depicts authority as predominantly derived from personal 
resources (2003: 350-351). Undoubtedly, authority is derived both ways, but 
Heffernan's is probably more important in constrained historical contexts. 
Authority derived from personal resources relies heavily upon fickle factors 
like public opinion and is therefore less stable than contextual authority, 
especially for reconstructive leaders. 
The patterns of authority Skowronek identified within the US are present 
elsewhere (1995); they appear wherever the executive leader is the most 
creative agent of change and where an ideological battle between progressive 
and conservative forces can lead to one of these groups controlling 
governIJ1ent. Australia meets these criteria and a pattern of regimes similar to 
Skowronek' s has been observed there (Laing and McCaffrie 2013, Walter 2009: 
341-347). Such patterns are also evident in the UK (Studlar 2007) and New 
Zealand (Johansson 2009). The cases below provide further evidence of the 
broader applicability of Skowronek's approach and the first evidence of the 
applicability of Nichols and Myers' framework outside the US. 
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Skowronek describes four types of President, defined by the resilience or 
vulnerability of the regime they inherit and their affiliation with, or opposition 
to, that regime (see Table 1) (Skowronek 1997: 37-44) . Ronald Reagan inherited 
a regime based on Keynesian economics and the New Deal welfare state, 
which the stagfla tion crisis had shown to be vulnerable. His opposition to this 
vulnerable regime made him a reconstructive leader, giving him the authority 
to replace the old regime with a new one based on neoliberal economics and 
small government. Reconstructive leaders are typically remembered for major 
achievements and las ting legacies, and usually rate at or near the top of 
rankings studies (Nichols, 2012). 
Regime Opposed leader Affiliated leader 
Vulnerable Reconstruction Disjunction 
Resilient Pre-emption Articulation 
Table 1. Recurrent structures of Pres idential Authority (Skowronek 1997: 36). 
All four leadership types are shown in Table 1, but this ar ticle focuses 
exclusively on reconstructive leaders, providing the first investigation of 
variations in their success. Nichols and Myers provide a starting point, 
arguing that some leaders fail to reconstruct in a situation that demands it 
(2010: 815). They describe three tasks that reconstructive leaders must 
complete: realigning the axis of partisan cleavage; building and maintaining a 
majority partisan coalition; and ensuring that their new regime is 
institutionalised. These tasks form the basis of the framework for assessing 
reconstructive leadership success developed below. 
128 
Some criteria of leadership success are important in all contexts. Recent work 
by 't Hart (2011) and by H elms (2012) suggests that all leaders must be 
effective, accountable, maintain the support of followers and be (or at least 
appear) authentic and honest. However, historical context shapes leaders' 
abilities to address even these concerns. Leaders during crises must prioritise 
effectiveness over accountability, although at other times these criteria are 
more evenly balanced . Furthermore, the actions required to be considered 
effective and to maintain support differ depending on context. Reconstructive 
leaders who succeed in completing Nichols and Myers' three tasks are likely 
to be judged highly on all of Helms' and ' t Hart's criteria. Effectiveness and 
maintaining followers' support are directly related to Nichols and Myers' 
tasks of institutionalisation and maintaining a majority coalition. Furthermore, 
if leaders are effective, they are more likely to be judged as ethical (Ciulla and 
Forsyth 2011: 233). Thus, the augmented version of Nichols and Myers' tasks 
applied below addresses these universal concerns. 
Skill is crucial in explaining Prime Ministerial success. The "skill in context" 
approach to political leadership (Hargrove 1998, Bell, Hargrove and 
Theakston 1999, Hargrove and Owens 2003) holds that the most successful 
leaders are those whose skills are appropriate to, and reinforced by, their 
context. The constrained context of Jacques Chirac, John Major and George H. 
W. Bush encouraged their use of transactional bargaining skills, whereas 
reconstructive leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher and Reagan, required 
greater vision (Bell, Hargrove and Theakston 1999: 546-547). The cases below 
support the argument that different skills are relevant to leaders in different 
contexts. However, reconstructive leadership tasks are so varied that most 
leaders have appropriate skills for some of them and success also depends 
upon completing tasks that do not match leader's skills. Nichols and Myers' 
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three tasks suggest rhetoric and persuasion, coalition building and bargaining 
and administrative and organisation building skills all are crucial. 
Augmenting Nichols and Myers' Framework 
Nichols and Myers' framework provides a basis to investigate the success of 
reconstructive leaders, but it requires augmentation . They suggest their three 
tasks must all be completed for a reconstruction to occur, allowing leaders 
either to fail or succeed (2010). However, the tasks are better conceptualised as 
being completed by degrees, with leaders having more or less success at each. 
The discussion below shows that the tasks are more complex than Nichols and 
Myers describe. Furthermore, they are on-going and leaders must continually 
fight to maintain success in each . An augmented version of the tasks is 
provided in Table 2 at the end of this section. 
Shifting the main axis of partisan cleavage 
Nichols and Myers' first task, shifting the main axis of _partisan cleavage, 
requires that reconstructive leaders increase the salience of certain conflicts 
within society (2010: 815). Leaders must alter public and elite understandings 
of what is most important in politics and thereby change the philosophy of 
government. Reagan used his "government is the p roblem" stance to link his 
positions on tax policy, market deregulation, and aggressive Cold War foreign 
policy (Nichols and Myers 2010: 816). These changes may be underway 
already but the leader must galvanise public and elite desires for 
reconstruction and define the new orthodoxy. 
Reconstructive leaders' authority to repudiate past arrangements provides the 
greatest resource leaders can have (Skowronek 1997: 27). Successful 
repudiation creates the discursive space to define the future regime. Typically, 
reconstructive leaders capitalise on political crises to repudiate past 
arrangements, framin g the crisis to justify their reconstruction. This reflects 
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William Riker's notion of "heresthetics", by which leaders structure the 
political world to their advantage (1986) . The American Civil War justified 
Abraham Lincoln's break with the past, however, for reconstructive leaders in 
the 1980s, such as Reagan, Thatcher and Hawke, stagflation was a less obvious 
crisis. Therefore, considerable skill can be required to define and frame events 
so as to exploit them (Hargrove and Owens 2003: 11). 
Oppositions can make redefining politics more difficult, be they coherent, 
institutionalised oppositions in Australia or more diffuse oppositions in 
America. Reconstructive leaders must counter alternative explanations and 
solutions to succeed. Some oppositions contest both the reconstructive leader's 
definition of, and solution to, the problem. Others accept the leader's 
definition of the problem, but contest elements of the proposed solution. A 
third possibility sees oppositions agree with major aspects of the redefinition, 
thus assisting the reconstruction (McCaffrie 2012) . Reconstructive leaders 
must retain control of the reconstruction's definition, or risk seeing an 
ideologically different regime emerge. Success here usually sees oppositions 
alter their policies and agree with substantial sections of reconstructive 
leaders' programmes. 
This discussion suggests three elements to this first task of reconstruction (see 
Table 2). To shift the axis of partisan cleavage reconstructive leaders must 
repudiate the previous regime to make discursive space for another world-
view. Tlleir repudiation should frame political and policy problems to suggest 
their solution as the best alternative. Reconstructive leaders must also redefine 
the political and policy logic, raising the salience of particular societal conflicts 
as Nichols and Myers describe. Furthermore, they must defeat alternative 
arguments, thereby maintaining control of the redefinition. 
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Assembling a New MajorihJ Partisan Coalition 
Nichols and Myers consider assembling a new majority partisan coalition to 
be a task of: "bringing together different groups within the social structure" 
(2010: 816). The support of important social groups aids the implementation of 
policy changes and helps leaders to maintain a political advantage. This is 
crucial, but Nichols and Myers' description underemphasises leaders' need to 
maintain legislative majorities. This latter challenge varies in different political 
institutions. US Presidents cannot rely on their own parties to vote with them 
in the legislature as Australian Prime Ministers can (Elgie 1995: 127-128). For 
Prime Ministers, much of the contest of ideas occurs within parliamentary 
parties, rather than in the legislature (Laing and McCaffrie 2013). As most 
Australian Prime Ministers hold secure lower house majorities, their initial 
focus is ensuring that factions and groupings within the party accept changes, 
before assembling cross-party support in the Upper House. As reconstructions 
require the implementation of new ideas, this often requires that leaders re-
orient their party to support the new regime (Skowronek 1997: 38). 
There are two distinct face ts to developing a majority coalition (see Table 2). 
One is social and is closely related to the reconstructive leader's redefinition of 
the axis of partisan cleavage. The other is legislative and involves creating and 
maintaining a firm parliamentary, congressional or party majority. 
Maintaining both majorities makes reconstructive success more likely. 
Institutionalising the new political regime 
Reconstructive leaders must reshape the institutional environment to 
accommodate and consolidate the new regime. Nichols and Myers examine 
two facets of institutionalisation. One entrenches the political advantage of 
new regime supporters, such as Andrew Jackson's development of the first 
mass poli tical party (Nichols and Myers 2010: 821). This is largely an optional 
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addition to the other, more important, form of institutionalisation which 
entrenches the regime ideas in the institutions of government. This facet of 
institutionalisation itself has two parts; the destruction of pre-existing 
governmental arrangements and the creation of new ones (Orren and 
Skowronek 1998: 698-699) . When the destruction of what comes before is less 
complete, it helps entrenched interests fight reforms. Nichols and Myers note 
that institutionalisation is the most variable of their tasks. Thus, it is the most 
difficult to assess in relative terms. Approaches greatly vary as different 
regimes require different forms of institutionalisation. 
Appointments in key bureaucratic positions are crucial to successful 
institutionalisation as important officials can slow or even stop 
reconstructions. Reconstructive leaders must also establish mechanisms that 
entrench the new regime logic. This might mean creating or destroying 
government departments, or enhancing or diminishing the powers of existing 
agencies. However, institutionalisation is achieved, it must ensure the new 
governing logic becomes a natural part of government and is therefore 
difficult to remove. 
Shifting the Axis of Assembling a Majority Institutionalisation 
Partisan Cleavage Coalition 
Repudiate prior regime, Build a legislative majority Destroy prior frame ~risis to advantage institutions 
Define the new regime Build a social majority Create new 
institutions/ redefine 
existing ones 
Defeat opposition Entrench political 
attempts to attack advantage 
redefinition 
Table 2: Framework for Assessing Reconstructive Leadership Success. 
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Applying the Framework 
Table 2 summarises a framework for testing reconstructive leaders' 
performance. Leaders who perform strongly in each of these eight categories 
ensure a strong reconstruction and a lasting regime. The framework must be 
applied with sensitivity to the priorities of the reconstruction, as these 
priorities can alter the relative importance of the tasks. It was important for 
Franklin Roosevelt to destroy existing institutions, but far more important for 
Reagan as smaller government was vital to his reconstruction. The changing 
makeup of society alters which social groups must be included in a majority 
coalition. The economic focus of the two reconstructions examined below 
meant that business and unions were pivotal. However, in the 1980s 
additional social groups had emerged in areas such as welfare and 
environment and they needed to be included in Hawke's reconstructive 
coalition. 
In analysing a Prime Minister's performance on each of th.e eight categories, 
we must consider the effect of the performance on the overall success of the 
reconstruction. If a failure imperils the reconstruction this is assessed more 
harshly than a failure with superficial consequences. However, there is no case 
in which greater success in any of the categories would not advantage the 
leader. Similarly, when Prime Ministerial performance varies within the 
categories over time, the effect of this variation on the reconstruction guides 
assessm~nts of the leader's performance. If Prime Ministers initially counteract 
opposition arguments, but quickly falter, they imperil the reconstruction. This 
is judged more harshly than if leaders perform this task well for several years 
and implement their reconstruction, before later struggling. 
The following three case studies are presented in order from most to least 
successful according to this article's analysis. The analysis uses the augmented 
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version of Nichols and Myers' framework, as indicated in a table at the end of 
each case, in which the Prime Minister's performance is rated on a five point 
scale (very weak, weak, average, strong, very strong). This is a simplification, 
but a useful one for comparing leaders' performance. The choice of Prime 
Ministers allows us to compare Curtin and Chifley' s state-building 
reconstruction with Hawke's in which the government's role dimini shed. A 
disadvantage in this selection is the lack of Liberal Party leaders. This reflects a 
quirk of history, Australia has had three reconstructions since Federation, but 
none has been instigated by leaders of the modern Liberal Party. The Curtin-
Chifley reconstruction was complicated by Curtin's death in 1945, before 
World War II ended. Curtin began the reconstruction, but had not 
institutionalised it. However, as the tasks are on-going, each leader performed 
all tasks and can be assessed upon them. 
Bob Hawke 
Hawke's reconstructive leadership is the most successful 9f those examined 
here. He completed the tasks to a grea ter degree than the other leaders. 
Inheriting a mix of protectionism and Keynesian demand management, 
Hawke shifted the Australian economy towards a more open, market-based, 
approach. This saw the floating of Australia 's currency and a series of 
deregulatory measures. For a reconstructive leader his weakness of vision was 
unusual, but he compensated for this with success in other areas, particularly 
in maint_aining a majority coalition. 
Shifting the Axis of Partisan Cleavage 
Unlike his contemporaries Thatcher and Reagan, Hawke built his programme 
on a promise of "consensus". In the years before his Prime Ministership, 
Hawke repudiated the Fraser Government's confrontational style, which he 
claimed had "'poisoned' the 'very wellsprings of national life"' (quoted in 
135 
Curran 2006: 244; also Hawke 1979). Hawke had a strong reputation for 
resolving industrial disputes as President of the ACTU, thus rus definition of 
the problem prescribed his own leadership style as the solution (Pemberton 
and Davis 1986: 57). Hawke had a greater challenge than Curtin or Chifley in 
defining the situation to his advantage. The need for a new approach was not 
as obvious in the 1980s as it was in the 1940s, but Hawke, supported by 
Treasurer Paul Keating, framed the external threat of changing international 
economic conditions to advocate a major policy shift (1979: 67). He repeated 
throughout the 1980s, that "if the world does not trust you, then it can ruin 
you", advocating greater economic openness (Walter 1999: 30). The lack of a 
strong alternative discourse demonstrates the success of this message, as does 
support for his programme from many societal interests with ideological 
reasons to oppose the reconstruction. 
Hawke was an unusual reconstructive leader as he lacked a clear vision of 
what his reconstruction should be (see Bramston 2003: 64). Instead, he 
emphasised pragmatism and consensus, but these were the means, not the 
end. Usually, limited success in defining the reconstruction would make 
reconstruction difficult, but Hawke's successes in the other tasks ensured that 
his reconstruction was realised. His pragmatism limited his control of 
reconstructive outcomes, but it allowed him greater flexibility with policies, 
helping him to maintain a majority coalition. 
Hawke _was fortunate that the Opposition agreed with the shift of the axis of 
partisan cleavage and did not capitalise on his failure clearly to define the 
reconstruction. Instead, the rhetorical contest between Government and 
Opposition was largely about details of managing the new economic order. 
The Opposition advocated deepening the reconstruction, particularly in 
industrial relations, which enabled Hawke to maintain a centrist image and 
portray the Coalition as extreme. He was aided in thjs by the Liberals' internal 
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squabbling (McCaffrie, 2012) . Hawke effectively exploited Opposition 
weakness, allowing his more gradual approach to reconstruction to prevail. 
Majority Coalition 
Hawke's consensus style suited social coalition building. Early in his Prime 
Ministership he held an Economic Summit involving business, unions and 
other social groups seeking a consensus response to national economic 
problems. It was effective and participants supported subsequent policy steps 
(Goldfinch and 't Hart 2003: 246) . Similarly, the Government-Union Accord 
ensured that unions contributed to the economic strategy, curbing inflation by 
restricting wage increase demands in return for improvements to social 
services (Walter 2009: 268). Hawke's ACTU background gave the Accord 
credibility, helping him to persuade the unions to accept policies they would 
normally oppose. Unions and business were included in institutions such as 
the Economic Planning and Advisory Council, while in differen t policy areas 
similar roles were given to bodies such as the Australian Council of Social 
Service and the Australian Conserva tion Foundation (Moore 2003: 119). 
Hawke and his Ministers used these groups extensively in policy 
development, helping to maintain their support for the reconstruction. 
The outcomes of events such as the Economic Summit were not entirely in 
Hawke's control. However, his pragmatic consensus approach afforded him 
an advantage in forming and maintaining a coali tion. He could abandon 
policies that proved difficult to implement, as he did at the 1985 Tax Summit 
wi th the unpopular consumption tax. Such flexibility encouraged groups to 
continue to support the reconstruction. 
The Hawke Government always held strong Lower House majorities and the 
Opposition's agreement with many Government economic measures meant 
that, subject to some amendment, these were always likely to pass the Senate. 
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However, on matters such as the deregulation of the Australian banking 
system and the proposed consumption tax, Hawke and Keating needed to 
persuade the Party's left and centre-left factions (Gittins 1984, Ellercamp and 
Savva 1984, O'Reilly 1985a, 1985b) . Hawke won their support, or at least 
acquiescence, and thus profoundly recast the party (Jaensch 1989). Hawke's 
empowerment of factional leaders generally smoothed managemen t of party 
disagreements. Factional leaders were heavily involved in policy decisions 
and, thus, more able to ensure their faction's support (Boston and Uhr 1996: 
51). Hawke similarly empowered his Cabinet, allowing most ministers to 
manage their portfolios with minimal interference. This led Keating to 
publicly claim responsibility for much of the economic change that was central 
to the reconstruction, although the extent to which he deserves this credit is 
contested. However, it is clear that Hawke's method utilised his ministers well 
and was better able to maintain party unity than a dominating leadership style 
would have. 
Caucus replaced Hawke with Keating in 1991, but this resulted from 
animosity between Keating and Hawke (Weller 1994: 136) and declining poll 
ratings, not a failure to preserve party support for the reconstruction. Overall, 
Hawke' s consensus style successfully sustained Party support for the 
reconstruction. However, the context changed and the Party needed 
reinvigoration after nearly a decade of government. This called for an 
energetic leader with a clear vision, neither trait Hawke could then provide. 
However, crucially for assessing Hawke, his approach was highly effective 
throughout most of the reconstruction. 
Institutionalisation 
Many reconstructive policies were contested by the public service. Initially, 
Treasury Secretary John Stone's opposition prevented Hawke and Keating 
138 
from floating the dollar, despite Reserve Bank support for the policy. Hawke 
and Keating compromised with Stone, agreeing to fl oat only the forward rate, 
not the spot rate. However, in December 1983 rampant currency speculation 
created a potential financial crisis. Hawke and Keating exploited this 
circumstance to implement a full currency float and remove exchange controls 
(Goldfinch and 't Hart 2003: 248-249). This further evidences the importance of 
utilising context to enhance authority. It also underlines the importance of 
bureaucratic appointments. The reconstruction gathered pace when Bernie 
Fraser replaced Stone (Goldfinch and ' t Hart 2003: 245). 
The reconstruction increased the importance of non-political agencies. This 
helped entrench the regime, as it is politically difficult for subsequent 
governments to wrest powers back from such agencies. The Reserve Bank's 
powers increased by indirect means as the abandonment of Keynesian 
instruments of monetary policy meant its control over interest rates on short-
term loans to banks became the main tool for controlling inflation (Bell 2001: 
463-465). The Hawke Government also began an innovative competition 
policy, which was implemented under Keating's Prime Ministership. Keating 
deserves much of the credit for this policy and its institutionalisation. It 
created independent statutory bodies such as the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, depoliticising much business regulation (Brennan and 
Pincus 2002: 69). The creation of these agencies m eant that future attempts to 
alter financial policy would potentially face opposition from a greater number 
of expert actors. 
Most of the major economic measures of Hawke's reconstruction were well-
entrenched. The nature of many economic policy changes made them difficult 
to reverse. Re-regulating newly deregulated industries would be highly 
disruptive, as would re-pegging the currency. The Hawke and Keating 
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governments' institutional arrangements fur ther ensured tha t the logic of 
Hawke's regime was self-perpetuating (see Table 3). 
Repudiate/Frame Redefine Defeat 
Crisis Opposition 
Realign axis of Strong Weak Strong partisan cleavage 
Parliamentary Social Majority 
Majority 
Maintain Majority Initially Strong, later Very Strong Coalition Weak 
Destroy Create Inst. 
arrangements arrangements Political 
Advantage 
Institutionalise the Average Strong Average 
regime 
Table 3: Summary of Bob Hawke's reconstructive success. 
John Curtin 
Curtin is our second most successful leader, as summarised in Table 4 below, 
although his performance falls only slightly short of Hawke's. Curtin is often 
cited as Australia's best ever Prime Minister, although John Hirst argues he 
has been consistently overrated and did too little to transform society to be 
conside;ed the equal of the Hawke-Keating partnership (2010: 167-168). 
However, Hirst overlooked Curtin's transformative economic actions 
(Edwards 2005), focusing exclusively on his defence policy and arguing that 
its novelty is often overemphasised (see also Curran 2011). 
The dominant regime for three decades preceding Curtin's Government 
centred on the "Australian Settlement" (Kelly 2008), wi th its moderate-liberal 
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economics, protectionism and targeted, not universal, welfare (Walter 2009: 
337). The economic liberalism of the Settlement appeared responsible for the 
Depression, facilitating arguments for grea ter economic control (Walter 2009: 
173). Curtin's reconstruction implemented Keynesian economics w ith a 
greater emphasis on government planning and increased government welfare 
(Walter 2009: 151, 173; Edwards 2005; Stephens 1976). Curtin performed the 
rhetorical tasks of repudiation effectively and firmly entrenched economic 
intervention and full employment as the new governing logic. Yet, limitations 
in his social coalition building, reinforced by Chifley's similar weakness, made 
his successor's job difficult and imperilled the reconstruction. 
Shifting the Axis of Partisan Cleavage 
Curtin's rhetorical skill ensured his success in all aspects of shifting the axis of 
partisan cleavage. He succeeded in tying the Depression and the War together 
as reasons for his reconstruction. In repudiating past problems, he framed his 
full employment vision as the solution: " the manhood of _this country will not 
rot in unemployment as it did after the las t war" (quoted in Black 1995: 226). 
From early in the War, Curtin attacked Prime Minister Robert Menzies' 
European defence focus, given the threat from Japan (Day 1999: 384). He used 
that threat to justify greater economic planning. Curtin opened his 1940 
election campaign arguing, as he did throughout the war, that economic 
planning was necessary to utilise the nation's resources to win both the war 
and t~e peace (The Advocate 1940). This planning meant national control of 
banking and interest rates, and national direction of investment. 
Curtin's successful redefinition of the partisan cleavage began in opposi tion. 
Full employment became a goal of both major parties, although the Coalition 
government questioned Curtin's proposed methods. At the 1937 election, 
Prime Minister Joseph Lyons contended that Curtin would remove individual 
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freedom, replacing it with Government "dictation" (Sydney Morning Herald 
1937). The non-Labor parties repeated this attack throughout Curtin's 
leadership, arguing for greater business independence in achieving full-
employment (The Argus 1943). Curtin's clear vision of full employment quickly 
became the orthodoxy. 
Curtin rejected Menzies' appeal to form a national government. This was a 
risk, but it allowed him to contest and discredit the UAP Government's 
defence strategy, a major factor in that Government's collapse. In opposition, 
UAP divisions became more apparent and, during the 1943 election campaign, 
Menzies and a group of supporters undermined the Liberal-Country Party 
Coalition's leadership (Day 1999: 509-510). The Opposition agreed with much 
of the reconstruction, evidence of Curtin's success in shifting the axis of 
partisan cleavage. This and the Opposition's division and apparent ineptitude 
helped him maintain control of the reconstructive definition. 
Majority Coalition 
Curtin led a Labor party that had recently split because of the difficulties of 
governing during the Depression. His surprise leadership victory resulted 
from his consistent personal opposition to the deflationary Premiers' Plan that 
the Labor government had followed. This made him acceptable to renegade 
Jack Lang supporters and able to re-unite the Party (Irving 2001: 70-71). Curtin 
was well supported by Caucus and maintained party unity, despite many 
issues · that might have caused further splits, particularly conscription. He 
enabled Labor to advocate a positive programme after a period of "intellectual 
bankruptcy" (McMullin 1991: 186). Curtin and Hawke were similarly effective 
at maintaining party unity, despite both dealing with difficult party 
circumstances. 
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Developing a social coalition to support full employment required business 
and union support. The unions needed little convincing; the ACTU only 
worried that the Government was not entirely committed to this cause, 
quibbling over government statements promising the "fullest possible 
employment", rather than "full employment" (Courier-Mail 1945). The 
Government dismissed union arguments against giving ex-servicemen 
priority in employment (The Argus 1944) . When such disagreements arose, 
Curtin ensured the unions remained in the coalition, without surrendering his 
priorities. 
The Government's relationship with business was more difficult than that 
with the unions, but the War enabled Curtin to garner business support for the 
reorganisation of the Australian economy. Wartime production was 
paramount, necessitating a business partnership with government. Business 
helped the national cause, particularly in submitting to extensive government 
direction of production. As business agreed with the need for full employment 
and social security based welfare (Walter 2009: 194), and as Curtin believed in 
the importance of manufacturing in ensuring full employment (Bell 1993: 17), 
there was considerable room for cooperation. 
However, business did not remain in the post-war reconstructive coalition. It 
disagreed with the extent of Curtin' s planned government economic 
intervention and with the proposed level of taxation. Curtin met with the 
Chamber of Manufactures before the War ended to discuss peacetime 
economic plans . Disagreements over the extent of government economic 
involvement were considerable. The Chamber's President questioned the 
nature of price controls, the prospect of political control of the Commonwealth 
Bank and several other regulations and restrictions. The Chamber essentially 
advocated returning to pre-War economic arrangements, eschewing Curtin's 
new direction (The Argus 1945a). Later, the Chamber complained, with some 
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justification, that the Government White Paper on Full Employment ignored 
concerns it raised at the conference. 
Curtin understood business' importance to his reconstruction, but was 
unwilling or unable to compromise. The ideological divide between Curtin' s 
Government and business was significant, but the extent of policy agreement 
could have enabled cooperation. Undoubtedly, lack of compromise was a 
failure of both business and government, but it resulted in business eventually 
becoming a committed enemy of the Labor Government. The primary 
contention during Curtin's Prime Ministership was Labor's attempts to 
increase government micro-economic intervention. Business opposition meant 
Labor was unable to implement such plans (Bell 1993: 21-24) . Curtin's 
coalition building compares unfavourably with Hawke's inclusiveness and 
delicate balancing of competing interests. His performance in maintaining a 
social majority was mixed and his difficulties made institutionalising the 
regime more complex, directly affecting Chifley's Prime Ministership more 
than his own. 
Ins ti tu tionalisation 
Although Curtin died before he could complete the regime' s 
institutionalisation, he was crucial in establishing government powers that 
allowed institutionalisation to occur. However, his success here was uneven. 
His uniform taxation measures succeeded, permanently increasing 
Commonwealth Government powers in relation to the States. Curtin gained 
parliamentary support by promising not to raise taxes, despite personally 
wanting them raised (Edwards 2005: 135-137). Control over income tax 
enabled the Government to fund post-war state building measures, such as the 
migration programme and the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Scheme, and 
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welfare measures, such as the old age pension and unemployment insurance 
(Edwards 2005: 139). 
However, Curtin was not entirely successful at building government powers 
for the reconstruction. The 1944 "14 Powers" referendum was designed to 
extend government powers over industry, production and employment, as 
well as establishing certain social powers and enshrining personal freedoms. 
Curtin devoted little effort to the campaign (Day 1999: 550) and the bundling 
of fourteen different propositions into one question made success less likely. 
His struggles in maintaining a majority coalition were also instrumental in the 
referendum's failure, with business joining the Opposition in campaigning 
against it (Bell 1993: 23). The failure of this referendum, and other attempts 
during Chifley's Prime Ministership, limited Labor's capacity to 
institutionalise its micro-economic controls. The Government had to abandon 
plans for institutions designed to administer public funds in certain private 
industries and to direct national investment (Bell 1993: 23). 
The War helped the regime's institutionalisation. New demands on the public 
service meant it virtually doubled in size, gaining functions and capacity 
(Walter 2009: 181). The scale of this reorganisation meant Curtin did not need 
to destroy existing arrangements. He created a Ministry of Post-War 
Reconstruction, which was designed as "an instrument of social change" for 
the post-war period (Coombs 1981: 26). H. C. Coombs, that Ministry's first 
Direct?r was young and energetic and, with Chifley's oversight as Minister, 
developed a staff that shared these characteristics. They created the White 
Paper on Full Employment, providing the blueprint for post-war economic 
policy (Walter 2009: 183-185). The generational change in the public service 
was crucial in allowing government to develop with a clear focus on post-war 
requirements. 
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Curtin did much to reform and revitalise the Labor Party and make it an 
electoral force. He held a political advantage, having used defence issues to 
weaken the Coalition parties, but could not entrench it before dying; that task 
would be Chifley's. Overall, Curtin successfully capitalised on favourable 
circumstances to begin the process of institutionalising the regime. Yet, the 
prospects of micro-economic reform to match the Governments' macro-
economic changes were limited by a lack of relevant powers and a difficult 
relationship with business. 
Repudiate/Frame Redefine Defeat 
Crisis Opposition 
Realign axis of Strong Strong Strong 
partisan cleavage 
Parliamentary Social Majority 
Majority 
-
Maintain Majority Strong Weak 
Coalition 
Destroy Create Inst. Political 
arrangements arrangements Advantage 
Institutionalise the NA Average Strong 
regime 
Table 4: Summary of John Curtin' s reconstructive success. 
Ben Chifley 
Chifley is the least successful of the reconstructive leaders examined here. 
Tasked with continuing Curtin's push for full employment and safety from 
any future Depression, he did too little to control the definition of the 
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reconstruction. Despite his strength as both a party and organisational leader, 
Chifley's struggles with the axis of partisan cleavage limited his ability to 
succeed at the other two. Chifley was talented, but he engaged too little in 
areas outside his expertise (see Table 5 below). 
Shifting the Axis of Partisan Cleavage 
Chifley continued Curtin's repudiation of the conditions that led to the Great 
Depression, using fears of another depression to justify major policy shifts. 
This was particularly evident in policies that increased government economic 
control. Introducing bills to strengthen banking regulations in 1945, Chifley 
explained that the banks' failure to extend credit during the Depression 
motivated the changes (The Argus 1945b). He sought full employment and a 
new export focus to make Australia independent and less vulnerable to 
external shocks (Day 2007: 474). 
Chifley lacked interest in public persuasion. Despite his government's 
expansive nation-building vision for the future, his campaign speeches 
reduced his plans to unconnected policy proposals (Day 2007: 462). His 1947 
attempt to nationalise Australia's banks demonstrated his failure at each of the 
elements of shifting the axis of partisan cleavage. This was a significant, 
controversial policy, but Chifley announced it with a cursory press release 
lacking any explanation for the action (McMullin 1991: 248) . He eschewed an 
opportunity to repudiate the previous banking system and to clarify the 
definition of the reconstruction by explaining the future place of banking. 
Opponents of the measure, including the banks themselves, dominated 
discussion of the issue for several weeks: Their argument, that nationalisation 
was about creating socialism in Australia, went uncontested (The Argus 1947). 
Although other Ministers made occasional efforts to connect nationalisation to 
the repudiation of Depression era banking practices, Chifley neglected to 
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elaborate until he introduced the bill to parliament two months later (Sydney 
Morning Herald 1947, Day 2007: 491-492). 
Chifley was an unenthusiastic campaigner and Menzies' rhetoric easily 
defeated his at the 1949 election. Chifley's radio performance was dull and 
Menzies outshone him in the most important communications medium of the 
day (Ward 1999: 326-327). Menzies argued for less government interference in 
economic matters (Lee 1994: 515), promising to end petrol rationing and 
reduce banking regulations. However, he advocated the retention and even 
expansion of welfare, extending child endowments to first children 
(Henderson 1994: 102). Chifley relied heavily on the electorate's trust in his 
record, rather than on a vision for the future. His policy broadcast mentioned 
the importance of the Government's public works programmes in ensuring 
full employment and preventing a future depression, but largely detailed past 
achievements (Day 2007: 529-531, Sydney Morning Herald 1949). Labor's 
election loss was avoidable and at least partly the result of Chifley's poor 
campaigning (Lee 1994: 514). Chifley imperilled the recoi-lstruction, handing 
Menzies control of the regime. This is clear evidence of his deficiency in 
maintaining control of the reconstructive definition and in defeating 
opposition. His failure was not total, as he successfully led Labor at the 1946 
election, although this was against a weaker opposition. 
Majority Coalition 
Chifley's maintenance of a parliamentary majority was a strong point. He was 
an excellent party leader and included Caucus in decisions more than Curtin 
had. Through this inclusiveness, Chifley generally ensured that Caucus 
accepted his preferred path, including approving the reform programme that 
comprised the bulk of Labor's reconstructive agenda (Freudenberg 2001: 83). 
This was unsurprising as it conformed to traditional Labor priorities (Johnson 
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1989: 18-19). However, Chifley also convinced Caucus to approve ratification 
of the Bretton Woods agreement, overcoming staunch opposition from many 
within his Party in a battle that lasted more than two years. The left of the 
Party was vehemently opposed and the centre took much convincing, but 
Chifley won them over with tax reductions and pension increases (Crisp 1960: 
198-212). 
In terms of Chifley' s social coalition, the unions' support was solid, except for 
Communist elements which sought to disrupt economic recovery. This was 
particularly evident in the coal miners' strikes of 1949, in which Chifley gained 
support from the labour movement for punitive action against the striking 
miners. Although significant elements of most major union groups disagreed 
with such measures as freezing union funds, Chifley fought hard and gained 
the support of the ACTU and other major unions for his harsh approach 
(Crisp 1960: 364). His decision to use the army as strike-breakers further tested 
union support. This move was probably unnecessary, occurring as the strike 
was dissipating (Day 2007: 524), and it likely cost Labor votes in the 1949 
election (Crisp 1960: 367, Lee 1994). 
The distance between business and the Labor Government, evident at the end 
of Curtin's Prime Ministership, worsened under Chifley. Within a week of the 
Japanese surrender, business pressured the Government to remove wartime 
controls, even as public servants warned that it was moving too swiftly in this 
directi?n (Burns 1947). Curtin and Chifley never really sought to compromise 
and encourage business to become part of the coalition. Again, Chifley's bank 
nationalisation scheme was the most obvious example. Nationalisation not 
only reinforced business' exclusion from the majority coalition, it encouraged 
business to form a coalition against him. Chifley was a skilled operator within 
the labour movement, but struggled to build support outside. 
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Chifley's maintenance of a majority coalition was mixed. He managed 
extremely difficult situations with the unions in the 1949 miners' strike well, 
although using the army was damaging. The peacetime priorities of business 
were always likely to keep it outside the Labor Government coalition but 
Chifley exacerbated tensions with business, rather than pacifying them. A 
more inclusive approach may have gained Chifley greater support for his 
economic measures. Union support for the reconstruction was always likely, 
so Chifley should have focused more heavily on gaining business support. 
Institutionalisation 
The institutionalisation of the reconstruction owed much to Curtin' s 
effectiveness in shifting the partisan cleavage and to the unprecedented public 
faith in government that came from the War (Walter 2009: 207) . Chifley's 
greatest influence was in altering the public service. He initially found it full of 
older, rigid, bureaucrats, whose influence was "stultifying" (Day 2007: 416) . 
He ensured younger, more energetic people were hired. 
As the Curtin-Chifley reconstruction m eant expanding government capability 
into a range of new areas, it also meant an increase in formal government 
powers. Thus, the 1946 election saw three referenda to increase 
Commonwealth Government power over social services, marketing of 
primary produce and conditions of employment. The social services question 
was the only success. It enabled the government to introduce a pharmaceutical 
benefits scheme, including free medicines, despite opposition from medical 
and pharmacy associations (Day 2007: 473; The Argus 1947c). As noted above, 
the failure of the other referenda limited Labor's ability to add micro-
economic controls. 
Many of Chifley's state-building initiatives, such as the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric scheme, the Australian National University and population 
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management to direct migrant workers to areas of need, were supported and 
continued by Menzies (Walter 2009: 206). Some, like the hydroelectricity 
project would have been difficult to reverse as construction had started. The 
Menzies Government only modestly altered banking legislation to ensure 
greater independence of the banks (Coombs 1981: 133), but this demonstrated 
the potential effects of Chifley's loss of control of the regime's definition. 
Losing the rhetorical contest means losing control of the reconstruction and 
limits a leader's chances of completing the other reconstructive tasks. 
Assessments of Chifley' s leadership must be downgraded because he lost the 
ability to ensure reconstructive success. 
Repudiate/Frame Redefine Defeat 
Crisis Opposition 
Realign axis of Average Weak Weak 
partisan cleavage 
Parliamentary Social Majority 
Majority 
Maintain Majority Strong Average 
Coalition 
Destroy Create Inst. Political 
arrangements arrangements Advantage 
Institutionalise the NA Strong Weak 
regime 
Table 5: Summary of Ben Chifley's reconstmctive success. 
Conclusions 
Despite Nichols and Myers' stating that their framework applies only to the 
United States (2010: 836), the validity of Skowronek's theory outside America 
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has been established and the cases investiga ted here suggest that Nichols and 
Myers' work effectively can be applied to other countries. This supports the 
frequent calls for more comparative studies of executive leadership. Many 
advances in American Presidential research have not been matched elsewhere. 
Carefully applying theoretical advances to new settings can enhance the 
understanding of executive leadership in other countries, as well as improving 
the original work. 
The cases here show that an augmented version of Nichols and Myers' 
framework can be used to assess the success of reconstructive Prime Ministers. 
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate the paramount importance of realigning 
the partisan cleavage. Successful realignment can assist in the other tasks or 
compensate for shortcomings in them, but, without realignment, 
reconstruction is impossible. Chifley, the leader who ranked lowest of our 
cases, had the least success on this task. However, Hawke's example shows 
that leaders can compensate for a partial weakness in realigning the partisan 
cleavage with success on other tasks. 
Our three leaders had individual strengths which contributed to their different 
performances as reconstructive leaders. Although the "skill in context" 
argument is correct in stating that leaders are more successful when their skills 
are reinforced by context, this can happen in various ways. Intuitively, vision 
and rhetorical skill seem most important for reconstructive leaders, given their 
sweeping policy agendas, but Hawke shows that a pragmatic, managerial 
approach can also suit the reconstructive contex t, in particular in helping to 
assemble a majority coalition. The broadness and complexity of reconstructive 
leadership means that most leaders will find some of their strengths are 
useful. Nevertheless, leaders should avoid Chifley's mistake of neglecting his 
weaker tasks. 
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There is a greater challenge for future research in creating criteria for judging 
Skowronek's other leadership types. Tasks involved in reconstructive 
leadership are more easily defined than tasks involved in other leadership 
types, because the context of a failing regime means that the usual leadership 
interest in making major political changes accords with the normative need for 
change. In other historical circumstances, normative concerns and leaders' 
desires are less likely to coincide, so it is harder to define what such leaders 
should do. 
Historical context is crucial in understanding success in political leadership. 
Context does not determine leadership success, but it provides leaders with 
varying opportunities and constraints, such that we should expect 
qualitatively different things from them. Thus, assessments of success should 
apply different criteria to leaders of different historical contexts. The 
framework here provides a beginning for achieving this in the reconstructive 
context. 
This method of comparing leaders of one historical context with others of the 
same context allows comparison on criteria that are sensitive to what they can 
realistically achieve. This is superior to judging all leaders by the same criteria, 
regardless of opportunities. It allows a deeper understanding of varying paths 
to success and helps us to discern how individual leaders should act to make 
best use of their circumstances and abilities. This can also create more realistic 
expect~tions of leaders, which, in turn, encourages them to act in ways more 
appropriate to their contexts. 
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Article 4 
Situating Presidential Success: Analysing US Presidential 
Leadership in Historical Context 
Brendan McCaffrie 
In understanding US presidential success, presidents in different historical 
contexts should be analysed separately. Those presidents who fully exploit a 
more constrained situation should not be considered less successful than those 
who effectively utilise more expansive opportunities. This article uses 
Skowronek' s presidential typology to provide a basis to investigate success in 
varying historical contexts. I argue that presidential success has three forms: 
personal success, partisan regime success and normative success. Most of 
Skowronek' s presidential types are structurally precluded from achieving all 
three of these forms. Assessments of presidential success should therefore begin 
with different expectations of presidents that are appropriate to their context. 
Studies directly analysing success in US presidential leadership are 
surprisingly scarce. This inattention stems from the difficulty of success as a 
concept, and from the difficulty of analysing something as complex and varied 
as an entire presidency ('t Hart 2011). Studies of presidential success tend to 
assume that all presidents are comparable and that · each has equal 
opportunities to succeed. Often they acknowledge that historical context can 
be important, but their methods for analysing success rarely reflect this in a 
systematic way (Simonton 1987: 227, Landy and Milkis 2000, Neustadt 1980, 
Rockman 1984). Presidential success is frequently only discussed as a 
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secondary focus, or it is left implicit. The under-examination of this topic 
encourages an unsophisticated understanding of success . Presidential studies 
typically rely on a concept of "greatness", which is both under-defined and 
necessarily out of reach for most p residents. Yet, if we acknowledge the 
structural advantages and disadvantages of various historical contexts as we 
examine presidential performance, it is clear that success is possible for all 
presidents although it differs with context. 
This article uses Skowronek's conception of the presidency as a contextually 
sensitive avenue to the systematic study of presidential success (1997, 2008). 
Skowronek describes four types of president, defined by their distinct 
historical contexts and opportunities. The types are based on the relationship 
between presidents and regimes. These regimes are defined as the dominant 
collection of ideas and institutions in national politics, supported by a coalition 
of political elites and social groups (Skowronek 1997: 9-10). The strength of the 
regimes presidents inherit and their affiliation with or opposition to these 
regimes, shape their authority as well as their opportunities and constraints. 
Skowronek's first type, reconstructive presidents oppose a regime that is 
vulnerable and failing and therefore have the greatest structural opportunities 
to act. They remove the prior regime and develop a new one based on new 
ideas that endure and influence the course of future decisions and programs. 
Reconstructive leaders typically exercise active leadership that creates major 
changes and leaves an enduring legacy. As such, they meet the scholarly 
literature's most frequent criteria of presidential success (Burns 1978, Neustadt 
1980, Rockman 1984, Landy and Milkis 2000). Landy and Milkis' description 
of "great" presidents reads almost exactly as a description of Skowronek's 
reconstructive presidents (2000: 3). Unsurprisingly, reconstructive presidents 
regularly outperform other types in rankings studies (Nichols 2012). This 
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suggests that much of the greatness these scholars observe reflects structural 
advantage rather than superior performance. 
The three other leadership types (see Table 1) are generally less fortunate. 
Presidents of articulation are affiliated with regime ideas and supporters when 
the regime is resilient and unlikely to collapse. They build upon their 
reconstructive predecessors' work, but without the same towering authority. 
Pre-emptive presidents oppose a resilient regime. Their opposition is generally 
rebuffed by regime adherents in public and political spheres. Pre-emptive 
presidents who use their power aggressively generally usually end 
controversially and with diminished reputation. Finally, disjunctive presidents 
are affiliated with a decaying, vulnerable regime. These presidents have the 
least authority to act. Skowronek considers theirs 'an impossible leadership 
situation', meaning it is uncertain that they can succeed at all (1997: 365). The 
regime's political answers are no longer effective but these presidents lack the 
authority, and often the ideological inclination, to reconstruct politics. 
Comparing presidents within these types acknowledges their different 
opportunities and allows us to judge them by standards they can realistically 
meet. 
Crockett (2002) first observed that Skowronek' s work can be applied to 
political success; however, he only explored this potential in one of the four 
types. As yet there has been no other attempt to explain how success varies 
within_Skowronek's presidential types. 
Regime Opposed leader Affiliated leader 
Vulnerable Reconstruction Disjunction 
Resilient Pre-emption Articulation 
Table 1. Recurrent structures of Presidential Authority (Skowronek 1997: 36). 
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Leaders must operate within their contexts, but they are also capable of 
redefining them ('t Hart 2012, Riker 1986). Presidents are almost certainly 
incapable of deliberately changing category but they can derive authority from 
personal resources, such as popularity, to become uncommonly successful 
examples of their type. Authority derived in this way is normally fleeting 
compared with that derived from historical context, so it is important that 
leaders in constrained contexts create and capitalise on short-term authority 
when it is possible. Presidents can also affect the strength of the dominant 
regime. Presidential efforts to strengthen or weaken the regime are pivotal to 
assessments of their longer-term success. Such actions assist successors who 
are like-minded and hinder those who are ideologically opposed. 
This article seeks to make a theoretical contribution to understanding 
presidential success. It argues that there are three forms of presidential 
success: personal success, partisan regime success and normative success, and 
that these are differently available to presidents in different historical contexts. 
Success should therefore be analysed in different ways for different contexts. 
The article provides a new way of achieving this, using Skowronek's four 
contexts and providing the first systematic approach to assessing success for 
his four types of president. The article also compares the efficacy of moderate 
and active presidential stances within each type. 
The Nature of Presidential Success 
Assigning the label "success" to presidents is difficult as single presidential 
actions regularly contain elements of success and failure . Some presidential 
actions that appear successful in the short-term may later have negative 
consequences. (Masciulli, Molachinov and Knight 2009: 10). Presidents may 
achieve desired outcomes but create significant negative side effects. In a 
complex political system, we cannot even be certain that particular outcomes 
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we observe are actually the result of presidential action ('t Hart 2011: 324). 
Naturally, the blurring of success and failure is more evident when examining 
entire presidencies. Despite this complexity, the task of understanding 
presidential success is worth pursuing. 
Success is seen either as objective, with endeavours judged successful if they 
achieve desired outcomes, or it is seen as constructed and purely a matter of 
observers' interpretations. However, as McConnell argues in his work on 
policy success, these two forms of success co-exist (2010: 30-31). Policies, or in 
our case presidents, can achieve certain desired outcomes but that does not 
ensure people will judge them as successes (2010: 39). True success is both 
material and interpretive. Therefore, presidential rhetoric is crucial in shaping 
public opinions of actions as successes and as presidential successes. 
Presidents must win a rhetorical contest with political opponents to define 
their actions. 
There are three forms of presidential success and both the material and 
interpretive realms are essential for each. The first is personal success, in 
which presidents effect outcomes they consider desirable and for which they 
gain credit. Personal success is typically observable in the short-term. It can be 
assessed through the attainment of policy goals, the maintenance of personal 
popularity, and re-election. Few if any personal successes are exclusively the 
result of a president's actions, but they redound to the president's benefit. The 
killin~ of Osama bin Laden enhanced Barack Obama's popularity and 
reputation because his decisions led to a publicly desired outcome. Yet, 
Obama could not personally ensure the mission's success. The administration 
released photos of Obama and other senior officials gathered in an operations 
room, reacting to the mission, which helped ensure the public saw Obama as 
central to the mission's success. Political achievements are always team 
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achievements, but these are "personal" successes as they involve significant 
presidential action and presidents gain credit for them. 
The second form of success is partisan regime success. This refers to how 
presidents interact with the regime, either strengthening or weakening it to 
situate their parties for future achievement. Partisan regime success is harder 
to observe than personal success, but is often more enduring. It usually leads 
to future success for the president's party, but as presidents' actions influence 
the strength and longevity of the regime, it also has a considerable effect on 
the nation's future. Depending on their affiliation with or opposition to the 
regime, presidents must advance and update, or attack and discredit regime 
ideas and institutions, as well as strengthening or w eakening the coalition that 
supports them. 
Normative success is the third form of presidential success. This is an elusive 
but essential concept. If presidents achieve their desired policy outcomes but 
harm the population, or damage the office of the presid~~cy, they have failed 
as national leaders. Normative success has two elements, one being the need 
for presidents to improve and preserve society and work for the common 
good (see Hargrove 1998). The other is to preserve and uphold the 
Constitution and the office of the presidency itself. Political actors' 
understandings of the common good differ with their political beliefs. 
Examining normative success from presidents' points of view avoids making 
the observer's ideology the standard for judging presidents. This allows 
presidents to succeed normatively regardless of their party affiliation, 
provided that their actions are not harmful. This can be ensured if presidents 
act with respect for all citizens' rights (see Thompson 2010: 25-26). Assuming 
that presidents believe their preferred path is best for the people; affiliated 
leaders should defend or strengthen the regime, while opposed leaders should 
weaken and overthrow it. 
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The second, Constitutional element of normative success requires that 
presidents preserve public trust in the office of the presidency and of the 
broader system of government. Presidents should preserve or improve the 
Constitutional character of the office and the democratic character of society 
(Thompson 2010: 24) . They must act with respect for due process and the 
traditions of national government (Thompson 2010: 26-27) . The Constitution 
provides much of the legitimacy that enables presidential action, and the other 
institutions of government help moderate presidents' ethical failings (Kane 
and Patapan 2012). Therefore, preserving these institutions is paramount in 
ensuring future good leadership. 
Presidents of Reconstruction 
The common association of reconstructive p residents with judgments of 
success (Nichols 2012) is unsurprising. Unlike the other three leadership types, 
reconstructive leaders can achieve all three forms of success and even find 
them mutually reinforcing. Reconstructive presidents' __ repudiation of past 
practice affords them the authority to redefine national governing 
commitments and achieve significant policy goals. Furthermore, as the 
opposition party is tied to the old failed regime, repudiation and redefiniti on 
discredit the opposing party. That party is usually divided about its future 
course (McCaffrie 2012) . The opposition's parlous state makes it ineffective in 
Congress and in countering reconstructive presidents' ideas and coalition 
buildi_ng, helping those presidents achieve personal and partisan regime 
success. Typically, the reconstructive presidents' parties are more successful in 
presidenti al and congressional elections in subsequent decades, allowing it to 
achieve policy goals and maintain reconstructive presidents' prior successes. 
Thus, personal and partisan regime success reinforce each other. 
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As regimes have died, society has experienced negative consequences. The 
situation calls for active leadership that reinvigorates the nation and naturally 
leads to personal and partisan regime success. These presidents have the 
greatest opportunity to implement something approaching their vision of 
good society. The reconstructive presidents, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew 
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt6 and Ronald Reagan, 
are frequently praised for revitalizing the country, despite not necessarily 
being effective at solving the problems that gave them authority (Skowronek 
1997: 37). Yet, material achievement is important as material success makes it 
easier for presidents to convince publics that their actions are successful. 
Similarly, these presidents' actions stimulate support for the presidency as an 
institution, and for the political system. The moral and political failures of 
presidents from Lyndon Johnson to Jimmy Carter diminished belief in the 
capacity of the presidency and of American government. Reagan's 
reconstruction recovered public faith in the presidency (Wilentz 2008: 226-
234); however the Iran-Contra scandal undermined his normative success. 
Despite the negative public response, Reagan's reconstructive status made 
him 'curiously untouchable' (Skowronek 1997: 424-425) . This example 
suggests a complex public understanding of ethical and constitutional 
concerns in which success in restoring faith in the constitutional order can 
outweigh later improprieties. Therefore we can expect that reconstructive 
leaders are more likely to be forgiven their indiscretions. However, in 
assess.ing Reagan, an examination of both his material failures and interpretive 
successes is necessary. 
For reconstructive leaders, success in all three forms relies upon their 
completion of the reconstruction. Nichols and Myers describe three tasks 
6 To avoid confusion, Franklin Roosevelt is referred to as FDR and Theodore Roosevelt as TR 
throughout thi s articl e. 
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essential for completing a reconstruction (2010: 815-816). Reconstructive 
leadership success can be assessed using a more complex version of these 
tasks. The most important divergence from Nichols and Myers' own 
description is that they conceptualise the tasks as being either completed or 
not completed. But completion of the tasks can be conceptualised on a 
continuum, meaning that presidents can complete the tasks to a greater or 
lesser extent and we can compare their relative success at each task. 
Shifting the main axis of partisan cleavage is the first task. It requires that 
reconstructive presidents raise 'the salience of a new political cleavage' 
(Nichols and Myers 2010: 815). A more complex reading of the task 
acknowledges that it involves repudiating the prior regime, defining the new 
one and defeating opponents' alternatives. Both FDR and Reagan easily 
defeated the opposition's rhetorical alternatives. The public still blamed the 
opposition parties for national economic problems and those parties were 
internally divided. This largely reflected the fact that both FDR and Reagan 
had so effectively repudiated the prior orthodoxy. FDR's 1932 election 
campaign vehemently attacked Herbert Hoover and the Republican 
leadership for their economic policies, fuelling an inaccurate public conception 
of Hoover as inactive against the Great Depression. However, FDR did little to 
explain his own alternatives beyond vague appeals to the impoverished 
"forgotten man" (Burns 1956: 142-144). This vagueness reflected the genuine 
incoherence of his program and his desire to appeal to everybody. Conversely, 
Reagan's rhetorical repudiation was simple, tying the Carter presidency and 
the liberal state-building orthodoxy together in arguing that 'government is 
the problem'. He offered a clear vision of individual freedom and smaller 
government. He not only changed the partisan cleavage, he made clear what it 
would become. In this particular task, Reagan was more successful than FDR. 
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The second task requires the assembly of a new majority partisan coalition. 
This involves ensuring a stable majority of interests supports the regime 
(Nichols and Myers 2010: 816) . In addition to Nichols and Myers' description 
of this task, presidents need to ensure a stable majority coalition in the 
legislature. Usually, coalition groups disagree on various issues but a 
reconstructive leader unites them behind the larger cause of the 
reconstruction. A broad definition of the regime project in the first task allows 
a greater number and variety of groups to join the coalition ensuring 
numerical superiority, at least in the short term. However, broader coalitions 
are harder to maintain. 
FDR's pragmatism made defining his new regime difficult but it made 
establishing a coalition easier. As Brinkley notes, the New Deal 'seemed to 
have something in it to please everyone except those who sought a discernible 
ideological foundation' (1998: 18). The New Deal simultaneously appealed to 
liberals and labourers in northern cities, farmers, lower income earners, 
African-Americans and conservative southern Democrats (Badger 1989: 246) . 
Despite the internal contradictions of this coalition, FDR's methods ensured 
that it remained strong. New Deal programs largely operated through local 
administrations, allowing southern leaders to operate those federal programs 
in ways that appealed to southern conservatives (Brinkley 1998: 65). 
FDR's New Deal also helped build constituent groups of the coalition. The 
implementation of the National Recovery Administration in 1933, and the 
Wagner Act of 1935, encouraged the organisation of labour as an interest 
group (Plotke 1996: 144-149). Similarly, the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA) of 1933 strengthened farm groups. By 1935, the farmers 
were a powerful enough lobby group to ensure their preferred elements of the 
now unconstitutional AAA were reinstituted in new constitutionally 
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acceptable legislation (Brinkley 1998: 31). FDR deserves significant credit for 
building the coalition that sustained Democratic supremacy for decades. 
Reagan was less successful at maintaining a workable majority coalition. He 
led a strong conservative coalition, primarily of white voters in the Sunbelt 
and disillusioned socially conservative former Democrats in northern cities. 
Prevalent in this latter group were Catholics with Irish, Italian and Eastern 
European heritage (Schaller 2007: 1, Laing 2012). The coalition also included 
political and business elites who supported supply-side economics and free 
trade (Sloan 1999: 59-67). However, this core was never strong enough to help 
Reagan win a House majority. For some legislative items, Reagan received the 
support of conservative southern Democrats (Wilentz 2008: 143-144), but this 
support was inconsistent. The 1981-1982 recession ensured that southern 
Democrats, and even many Republicans, gave Reagan less support (Sinclair 
1985: 297-300). 
The legislative weakness of Reagan's coalition made the _~hfrd of Nichols and 
Myers' tasks, institutionalizing the regime, more difficult. Institutionalisation 
involves destroying elements of the existing machinery of government and 
creating or redesigning others so that the operations of government support 
the new regime (Orren and Skowronek 1998: 698-701, Nichols and Myers 2010: 
816). The continuation of the regime becomes an issue of "normal" politics, not 
partisan debate. For FDR, this meant building government agencies to 
admi~ster new governmental functions. For example, the Social Security 
Board administered new welfare state functions (Brinkley 1998: 23). Social 
security would always be comparatively easy to institutionalise, as once its 
payments existed removal would eliminate benefits to which people had 
become accustomed. The Wagner Act's National Labor Relations Board 
reformed labour relations, reducing industrial conflicts' propensity to incite 
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extensive societal unrest (Plotke 1996: 91). Again, such a widely felt 
improvement would be difficult to remove. 
By contrast, Reagan's smaller government approach required him to remove 
existing programs and benefits. As Pierson notes, this is psychologically more 
difficult for voters and recipients to accept (1996: 145-146). Institutionalisation 
was especially difficult for Reagan because other than a period of consistent 
success in his first year, passing his preferred legislation was difficult. Even 
the significant gains of 1981 gave way to significant losses in the latter years of 
his presidency. The 1981 tax cuts, central to Reagan's program, were all but 
reversed by tax increases of 1982 and 1984, made necessary by the growing 
budget deficit (Heclo 2008: 562). While Reagan had some success in 
institutionalizing deregulation (see Cook and Polsky 2005), his chief impact 
was rhetorical. 'He created a political atmosphere in which Republican 
opposition to taxes, always a creed, became a militant mantra' (Hargrove 2003: 
29). This shift in the political logic meant any changes that suggested "big 
government" were almost unthinkable. However, this ·is the result of his 
success in shifting the axis of partisan cleavage, not institutionalizing his 
regime. FDR's greater success in the second and third reconstructive tasks 
made him a more successful reconstructive president than Reagan, allowing 
him greater and more enduring personal success and ensuring that his 
partisan regime success was more complete. 
For r~constructive leaders, assessments of all three forms of success require 
that they complete Nichols and Myers' three tasks to a high level. It is 
normatively important to replace an enervated regime with one that can 
reinvigorate national politics, and doing so also provides partisan regime and 
personal success. Normative success requires regime implementation proceed 
by upholding ethical standards and preserving constitutional forms . Reagan' s 
failings over Iran-Contra and FDR's over his unsuccessful efforts to "pack" the 
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Supreme Court each reflect poorly on these presidents in this realm, but on 
balance each left the presidency a more capable institution than it was when 
they took office . 
Of Skowronek's leadership types, reconstructive presidents have the least 
excuse to fail on this particular measure, and can be judged more harshly for 
doing so. As shown in Table 2, all three forms of success are available to 
reconstructive presidents who take an active, rather than moderate, leadership 
stance. More cautious presidents do not capitalise fu lly on their opportunities 
and limit their success in all three forms. 
Personal Partisan Regime Normative 
Reconstructive 
President 
Active Available Available Available 
strategy 
Moderate Possible, but Fails to 
less than an Difficult to 
strategy 
active strategy achieve 
adequately 
reinvigorate 
allows society 
Table 2. Types of success available to reconstructive presidents. 
Articulation 
As regime affiliates, articulators lack the authority to redesign politics, limiting 
their material personal successes and the extent to which they can achieve 
interpretive success. Reconstructive presidents have already tackled the 
highest priority policy questions, so articulators must address new issues and 
problems that the reconstructive president ignored or failed to address. 
Articulators struggle to maintain the regime's vitality as even its successes 
cause societal changes which make its messages less relevant. The New Deal 
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regime's appeal to the unemployed was less salient a generation later given its 
success at reducing unemployment (Plotke 1996: 62). Elements of the coalition 
have little reason to support the regime once their goals have been achieved 
(Plotke 1996: 47). Typically, a presidency of articulation results in the 
achievement of some additional policy goals but a weaker regime with a more 
fractured coalition. 
Articulators can take advantage of new issues that arise as avenues for policy 
and legislative success. Such issues can provide a way to 'fit the existing parts 
of the regime together in a new and more relevant way' (Skowronek 1997: 41). 
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society modernised the New Deal regime with a civil 
rights and anti-poverty agenda that reinvigorated the regime and created 
many personal successes. However, recasting the regime often aggravates 
previously dormant coalition tensions. Many southern Democrats accepted 
New Deal economic programs, but not Johnson's civil rights agenda (Dallek 
1998: 109). Johnson's personal successes accelerated the demise of the coalition 
and the weakening of the regime. Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt's 
determination to increase government regulation of business, although 
applied gradually, recast governmental priorities and exacerbated a 
Republican Party schism (Morris 2001: 427). As Skowronek explains, the 
orthodox innovation that articulators like Johnson and TR advance is an 
'oxymoron'; a 'leadership charge a t odds with itself' (2008: 135-136). This is 
reflected in the conflict between personal and partisan regime success; 
presidents of articu lation cannot be wholly successful in both of these forms. 
The extent to which articulators seek to redefine politics is pivotal. An active 
stance encourages personal success, but damages the coalition, while a more 
moderate stance limits personal success but can retain coalition support for 
longer. Articulators must discern the limits of their opportunities in making 
this decision. Johnson overestimated his ability to maintain a vibrant coalition, 
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as he failed to understand that the new interest groups he courted 
representing women, minorities and environmentalists, were inherently 
resistant to president-led action (Milkis 2005: 15). By contrast, TR was aware 
that he did not have the same opportunities as Lincoln (Skowronek 1997: 228), 
but he sought to make the most of his context by managing his party's 
increasingly conflicting conservative and progressive wings. He moderated 
his stance in his first term as a result of the Congressional strength of the 
conservative Republicans (Mowry 1958: 115-123). TR did not act on tariff 
reform, a pivotal issue at the time, largely because of the potential to split his 
party (Morris 2001: 422). However, his more expansive second term action, 
including extensive railroad and business regulation, empowered the radical 
progressive Republicans at the conservatives' expense. The conservatives 
reacted, especially after the 1907 recession. TR's actions exacerbated party 
tensions, handing William Howard Taft a near impossible challenge simply to 
keep the party together (Skowronek 1997: 254) . 
Normative success in its abstract is an uncontroversial goal, but for presidents 
of articulation it is difficult to define. Articulators must seek to prolong the 
regime as this helps maintain their version of good society. Yet, completing 
the goals of the regime encourages its destruction. The fundamental paradox 
of articulation thus extends to its normative success. The rift Johnson created 
between southern and liberal Democrats helped Reagan's later repudiation of 
the New Deal regime (Shribman 2005: 240). In Constitutional terms, Johnson 
was the first of a string of presidents who reduced public faith in the 
presidency and more generally in government (Alford 2001: 41); much of this 
loss of faith was a response to the failure of the Vietnam War. TR is commonly 
credited with enhancing the institution of the presidency by increasing its 
power and capacity (Gould 1989). 
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This article suggests that long-term forms of success should take priority over 
immediate forms. Articulators must therefore focus on maintaining the 
vibrancy and relevance of the regime. This allows articulators to enjoy some 
personal success and to encourage the same for like-minded successors. This 
focus on maintaining the regime means articulators should be analysed in 
terms of the three regime components identified by that Nichols and Myers 
identified. Articulators must update the regime, manage coalition members, 
institutionalise any new regime achievements and maintain the existing 
regime institutions. However, they are unlikely to achieve unmitigated 
success. 
Articulators sensitive to the limitations of their situation can avoid or delay 
many of the worst consequences of their context. TR's moderate first term 
stance encouraged the regime's continuation, allowing normative and regime 
success. The longer term nature of success available to more moderate 
articulators suggests that this course is preferable. Incremental progress 
should make it easier to maintain the support of sceptical members of the 
coalition as it did during TR's first term. This suggests a balancing act. Failure 
to capitalise on opportunities to implement regime policies will likely also 
damage the coalition. As Table 3 shows, the moderate approach reduces 
opportunities for personal success but allows more important longer-term 
partisan regime success. Neither strategy seems inherently more likely to 
deliver normative success. 
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President of Personal Partisan Regime Normative 
Articulation 
Possible, but Possible, but less 
Active less extensive Limited extensive than for 
strategy than for reconstructors 
reconstructors 
Moderate 
Possible, but less Possible, but less 
Limited extensive than extensive than for 
strategy for recons tru ctors 
reconstructors 
Table 3. Types of success available to presidents of articulation. 
Pre-emption 
The types of success that are available to pre-emptive leaders vary depending 
on strategy. Most pre-emptors pursue an active path, fighting to change 
elements of the regime against vigorous defence. Regime defenders use their 
strength in the other institutions of government to attack such presidents, 
condemning them for flaws of character, and in two cases (Andrew Johnson 
and Bill Clinton) impeaching them 7 (Skowronek 1997: 43, Crockett 2002) . 
Dwight Eisenhower chose a different strategy, exercising caution and 
moderation. He accepted major parts of the New Deal legacy and downplayed 
his role in policy changes (Greenstein 1994), subduing regime adherents' 
reactions to his presidency. Eisenhower's uncommonly consistent popularity 
led Skowronek to label him 'the most successful of our pre-emptive leaders to 
date' (Skowronek 1997: 450). Crockett (2002: 130) and Harris (1997: 334) each 
came to the same conclusion. However, these analyses privilege personal 
success over other forms. Skowronek notes that Eisenhower's was a 'personal' 
7 Richard Nixon would have been a third impeached pre-emptive pres ident had he not 
resigned. 
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success (1997: 451) and Crockett explains that Eisenhower 'was personally 
popular ... [but] unsuccessful as party leader' (2002: 130). Also, as we know 
Eisenhower was far more conservative in his beliefs than in his actions and 
achievements (Greenstein 1994: 49-52), we may question even the extent of his 
personal and normative success. 
The moderate path helps pre-emptive presidents in negoti ations with an 
ascendant opposition party in Congress, and in maintaining personal 
popularity, but it does little to help their standing in their parties. Eisenhower 
was resented by the "Old Guard" Republicans who sought a strong 
repudiation of the New Deal (Ambrose 1984: 624). While he sought to 
modernise the Republican party, and adapt it to the context to prime it fo r 
future victories, he enjoyed only fleeting success, as demonstrated by the 
Republicans' 1964 nomination of the highly conservative Barry Goldwater as 
presidential candidate (Price 2002: 628) . Eisenhower's presidency put the party 
in no better position for future partisan regime success. 
Eisenhower exercised restraint because of his sense of the party's long-term 
interest. Writing to his brother he explained, 'Should any political party 
attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate 
labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again' 
(Eisenhower 1954). Nevertheless, there is a difference between a total assault 
on a popular regime and a measured effort to weaken it. In practice 
Eisenl10wer's stra tegy achieved neither. Although the New Deal regime 
hard ly flourished under his p residency (Harris 1997: 338), Eisenhower 
ex tended social security and active labour market policies (Wilson 2009). On 
balance he did more to entrench than to hinder the New Deal regime, and 
therefore he cannot be considered a success in partisan regime terms. 
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In normative terms, Crockett argues that pre-emptive leaders should pursue a 
moderate course that enhances both personal and "system" success (2002: 203-
246). My position conflicts with his because Crockett does not distinguish 
between the partisan regime and permanent Constitutional arrangements in 
his system success (2002: 242-243). The present analysis suggests it is ideal, 
although difficult, for pre-emptive presidents to disrupt the partisan regime 
but preserve constitutional integrity. The normative argument for maintaining 
the regime is curious given that Eisenhower feared the New Deal's 
consequences. He believed it created 'inefficient government, centralization of 
power in the federal government at the peril of the states, "creeping 
socialism," and paternalism' (Harris 1997: 336). If his normative duty was to 
bring about a vision of good society, then a strategy of moderation seems 
wholly inadequate. Crockett is correct in arguing that a frontal assault on the 
regime will diminish presidents' personal success. Yet a more judicious and 
selective strategy to weaken the regime is possible. 
Comparing Eisenhower with fellow pre-emptor, Richarl.Nixon reveals much 
about normative success for such presidents. Nixon followed a more active 
strategy than Eisenhower, although it was hardly a blind assault on the 
regime. Like Eisenhower, he protected or advanced elements of the New Deal 
regime, with some adaptation to appeal to conservatives. His Family 
Assistance Plan would have provided a system of guaranteed income rather 
than welfare, expanding federal bureaucratic capacity but emphasizing self-
suffidency. While Nixon eventually considered the plan too expensive and 
preferred to see Congressional Democrats block it rather than pass it in its 
entirety, the elements that were enacted provided a guaranteed minimum 
income for the elderly, blind and disabled (Small 1999: 188-190). 
Unlike Eisenhower, Nixon also found ways to undermine the New Deal 
regime. His Philadelphia Plan required government contractors in 
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Philadelphia to meet employment quotas in hiring African-American workers. 
The plan advanced civil rights but while African-Americans supported it, 
labour unions opposed it. Nixon privately expressed excitement about its 
potential to fracture the alliance between African-Americans and labour (Yuill 
2006: 144-145). The plan did damage the Democratic coalition, albeit modestly 
(Frymer and Skrentny 1998: 146), and improved the Republicans' future 
chances of removing the regime. Ultimately, African-American leaders and 
labour leaders remained allies, but Nixon's efforts encouraged a growing 
Republican coalition encompassing southern whites and blue collar workers, 
who felt estranged by the Democrats' civil rights agenda (Frymer and 
Skrentny 1998: 159, Schaller 2007: 19). 
Nixon's small steps towards dismantling the Democratic coalition helped the 
Republicans regain control and reconstruct politics less than a decade later 
(Graham 1996: 104). The similarities between the groups Nixon appealed to 
and those that formed Reagan's reconstructive coalition are striking. In terms 
of bringing about a vision of good society, Nixon was ~ore successful than 
Eisenhower who did not capitalise upon his popularity to diminish the 
Democratic regime, despite believing it was damaging the country. 
The Watergate scandal demonstrated that Nixon was a profound failure by 
other normative measures. He eschewed constitutional practice and damaged 
perceptions of the presidency, making it harder for Gerald Ford and Jimmy 
Carter to positively employ the powers of office. In this aspect of normative 
success Eisenhower was far superior. Greenstein's observation that he was a 
successful head of state, not just of government (1994: 5) is useful and parallels 
Galston's observation that as head of state, a president should unite the 
country and challenge it to greater aspirations (2010: 96). Pre-emptive 
presidents who take active stances are more likely to be ethical failures. The 
greater difficulty they have in achieving their ends encourages them to 
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circumvent normal practices, although such ethical failure is hardly inevitable 
(see Kane and Pata pan 2012: 70). 
For longer-term success pre-emptive presidents should act to discredit the 
regime ideas and institutions, and to use the internal contradictions in the 
regime coalition to weaken their support for the regime. As Table 4 shows, the 
different strategies encourage different types of success and failure in pre-
emptive presidencies. Arguments can be made for following ei ther strategy. In 
normative terms, ethical and constitutional failures are less forgivable than 
failures to implement a president's vision of good society, but ethical failures 
are not inevitable for either strategy. Neither strategy is ideal, but given the 
active path's greater opportunities for partisan regime success, that path gives 
slightly greater opportunities for success than the moderate one. 
President of Personal Partisan Normative 
Pre-emption Regime 
Ava ilable, but Available, Available in ·-
Active less likely than largely in terms implementing a 
strategy the moderate of weakening vis ion of good 
strategy allows the existing society, but 
regime greater 
constitutional risk 
Available but Available 
Moderate limited, especially No constitutionally. 
strategy in policy terms Less in 
implementing 
good society 
Table 4. Types of success available to presidents of pre-emption. 
Disjunction 
A disjunction is by its very nature a regime failure, as regime ideas prove 
incapable of solving pressing problems. Supporters have little reason to 
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remain active coalition members, as their goals have either been achieved or 
the regime has failed them. The governing party is usually divided over how 
to respond to the regime's decay. Superficially, the prospects for all three 
forms of success appear limited. Yet disjunctive presidents can achieve 
significant personal success. House Speaker, Thomas P. O'Neill considered 
Jimmy Carter's first hundred days among the most productive he witnessed 
(Skowronek 1997: 380). Herbert Hoover also secured most of his major 
legislative proposals (Burner 1974: 54). These presidents each took innovative 
steps that their reconstructive successors built upon. In Carter's case, 
deregulatory measures and tighter monetary control; in Hoover's, 
countercyclical interventions designed to fight the Depression (Fausold 1985: 
75). However, each received little credit for these efforts because disjunctive 
leaders struggle to control the public understanding of their actions and 
therefore to enjoy interpretive success. 
Disjunctive leaders are in a poor position to exercise rhetorical leadership. If 
they suggest a break from past practice they upset supporters, if they suggest 
continuity they are attacked by a resurgent opposition. Greenstein argues 
Carter struggled rhetorically because of 'the absence of organizing principles 
in his program' (2001: 140). Describing clear organizing principles is 
problematic when attempting to appeal to an increasingly narrow middle 
ground. Thus, disjunctive leaders like Carter and Hoover embrace technique 
as a method of persuasion, claiming to possess unique problem solving 
abilities (Skowronek 1997: 40). This method means they must actually solve 
complex political problems, not just for material success but also for 
interpretive success. However, the difficulty of solving the types of economic 
problems Hoover and Carter faced is enormous. 
Disjunctive presidents usually face major crises which define their 
presidencies. If handled well, these crises provide opportunities for disjunctive 
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presidents to enhance their authority. Hoover's response to the stock market 
crash of 1929 is regularly criticised for insufficient rhetorical effort, but his 
silence was a psychological attempt to convince the people that there was no 
crisis and to spur normal financial behaviour, thereby aiding recovery. His 
strategy succeeded briefly but as the crisis continued, his apparent absence 
undermined the confidence he sought to instil (Houck 2000: 156), and ensured 
that the Great Depression eroded his authority rather than enhancing it. 
Carter similarly failed to capitalise on opportunities to enhance his authority. 
Presidents experience honeymoon periods in their first months, when they are 
popular and Congress more frequently supports them (Farnsworth and 
Lichter 2011: 592). Carter squandered this opportunity in an effort to reduce 
government spending. He removed funding from several water resource 
projects and altered several others. The principle of the action was important 
to him, but the projects themselves were fairly small. Carter frustrated many 
of the Democratic Congressional leaders, creating a difficult relationship with 
them that endured throughout his presidency (Biven 2002: 81). Additionally, 
the compromise bill he eventually accepted undermined his claims to be a 
different, more principled president (Sloan 1999: 43-44). Thus, in a historical 
context that would provide little authority, Carter's actions exacerbated this 
problem. All presidents must capitalise on opportunities to enhance authority 
but it is especially important for disjunctive leaders, given their constrained 
situation. 
The virtually inexorable decay of the regime means that partisan regime 
success is unavailable to disjunctive presidents. Furthermore, their prospects 
for normative success are bleak. Disjunctive leaders cannot reinvigorate 
politics by saving or removing the regime. They typically face crises that 
threaten citizens' living standards and limit their ability to institute a vision of 
good society. Judged on their own standards they appear to be normative 
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failures. However, disjunctive leaders play an important role in creating a new 
regime, and on this role we can assess their performance. 
Hargrove created a typology of presidential leadership based on irregu lar 
historical cycles. His work is less complex than Skowronek's, dividing 
presiden ts into three categories: presidents of achievement, of consolidation 
and of preparation (Hargrove 1998: 63). Although his description of presidents 
of prepara tion elaborates little beyond this title, the idea that presidents of 
preparation are important in the subsequent creation of regimes is invaluable. 
For Hargrove, presidents of preparation are of accidental utility. For example, 
Carter a ttempted ' to bring the Democratic coalition back to the ideological and 
programmatic centre and unwittingly paved the way for Ronald Reagan' 
(Hargrove 1998: 63). Disjunctive presidents can make purposeful 
contributions. Carter and Hoover8 both engaged in policy experimentation 
that preceded and assisted reconstructive change. Disjunctive leaders' 
experimentation allows reconstructive leaders to build on their advances. 
Carter was more aware of the danger of inflation than most Democrats in 
Congress (Hargrove 1988: 69). However, reflecting on his presidency he 
wished he had acted more strongly against inflation from the outset (Biven 
2002: 11). In his last two years, Carter clearly prioritised inflation over 
unemployment. He publicly admitted that his administration was trying 
several anti-inflation measures with no certainty that any would work 
(Morgan 2004: 1018-1019). Unexpectedly, Carter's deregulation efforts, not 
originally part of the anti-inflation strategy, were m ost effective in reducing 
inflation. Other policies such as wage and price guidelines and fiscal restraint 
had no real effect (Morgan 2004: 1023-1024). Carter also turned to tighter 
monetary policy to control inflation, appointing Paul Volcker, a strong 
8 Curiously, Hargrove considered Hoover a president of consolidation, although he 
acknowledged that Hoover helped prepare the way for Roosevelt's achievements. 
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advocate of such a strategy, as Federal Reserve chairman (Morgan 2004: 1026-
1027). The changing economic policy continued into the Reagan 
administration, with further deregulation and monetary restraint central 
elements of Reagan's strategy. Reagan benefited from Carter's 
experimentation and policy changes but had the experimentation started 
earlier, Reagan could have benefited more. 
Hoover was once much criticised for doing nothing to combat the Depression 
(Romasco 1974), but he too experimented with economic policy before FDR's 
New Deal. Hoover trialled unsuccessful measures to combat the crisis, built on 
voluntary business cooperation. His National Credit Corporation (NCC) in 
1931 was to be run by prominent bankers, using bank funds to provide loans 
to struggling banks. The NCC bankers proved too conservative, loaning too 
little to make a difference (Butkiewicz 1995: 199). In 1932, after three years of 
refusing to entertain government spending to fight the Depression, Hoover 
relented, signing the Emergency Relief and Construction Act into law. This 
Act empowered the recently created Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC) to make major loans to states, municipalities and corporations, although 
Hoover insisted the funds be for self-liquidating projects (Sautter 1986: 83). 
This experimental venture did not grant significant personal success because 
of ' the absence of political supporters willing to credit Hoover's creativity' 
(Skowronek 1997: 282). Furthermore, his insistence that public works be self-
liquidating limited the stimulation of business. 
In other respects, Hoover rigidly adhered to past practice. He refused to 
abandon the gold standard or balanced budgets and, after his 1932 election, 
attempted to prevent FDR from doing so (Eichengreen and Temin 2000: 203-
204). The early years of the New Deal saw FDR benefiting from the 
institutional architecture of the RFC, greatly expanding its operations and 
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capacity (Todd 1992: 25-26). But as Hoover's experimentation was limited, so 
was his benefit to FDR who experimented for several years himself. 
It is hard for disjunctive leaders to have a positive impact on perceptions of 
the presidency. They obtain little interpretive success and struggle to 
galvanise public support. Often they cannot meet their claims to competence 
in practice, thereby diminishing faith in the office and political process 
(Skowronek 1997: 40). Even in ethical terms disjunctive leaders are at a 
disadvantage. When people consider leaders to be effective, they are more 
likely to judge them as ethically correct (Ciulla and Forsyth 2011: 233). 
Disjunctive leaders are generally considered ineffective. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that minor scandals in Carter's administration were treated 
harshly by opponents and media, whereas the Reagan administration 
overcame many more serious indiscretions (Sloan 1999: 42-43). 
As the normative benefit to a presidency of disjunction lies in 
experimentation, these leaders should provide active lea~ership that explores 
multiple possibilities. lt is difficult to compare the quality of experimentation 
between disjunctive presidencies, but the quantity of experimentation is 
important. The earlier that disjunctive presidents understand the nature of 
their position and begin experimenting, the better for their successors and 
potentially for their ability to influence their successors' course. However, it is 
difficult firstly, to discern the limitations of the disjunctive situation and 
secondly to act vigorously in directions not agreed to by the president's own 
party. As Table 5 shows, the opportunities for disjunctive presidential success 
are very limited but an active strategy is far superior to a cautious one. 
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President of Personal Partisan Normative 
Disjunction Regime 
Some, but Possible through 
Active strategy concrete rather No experimentation. 
than interpretive 
Limited without 
Moderate Limited No substantial 
strategy experimentation 
Table 5. Types of success available to presidents of pre-emption. 
Conclusion 
Skowronek's conception of the presidency may seem a strange basis for 
analysing presidential success. Presidential success by its nature implies 
agency, and Skowronek has attracted criticism from some who considered his 
work deterministic (Arnold 1995, Hoekstra 1999). There is, however, 
considerable space for agency within his work. More importantly, his 
attention to structure allows us to observe that where historical contexts differ, 
the capacity for agency and therefore for success differ. This allows us to 
explore how success varies in different situations. Furthermore, it avoids 
conflating presidents' structural advantage with successful performance. 
Improving our ability to assess the different types of presidential success is an 
ongoing empirical and methodological challenge and one that can only be met 
with diverse methods. Quantitative measures can help us understand the 
more material aspects of personal success, such as approval ratings and 
legislative success rates. Unfortunately, some of these measures are harder to 
apply to presidents before widespread political polling appeared. 
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Additionally, rhetorical analysis is more obviously appropriate for assessing 
presidents' roles in ensuring their interpretive success. 
Regime success is also difficult to quantify. Electoral results and demographic 
voting patterns can give an outline of the strength of a regime but elections are 
often determined by other short-term factors. Close historical analysis is 
required to understand the relationships between presidents and regime 
supporters and among different groups of supporters. Presidential rhetoric 
must be examined to understand how presidents position themselves with 
respect to the regime. Analyses of normative su ccess lend themselves to 
constitutional, ethical and psychological perspectives on the presidency. Here 
Bowles' (1999) observation that the complexity of the presidency demands the 
application of all branches of political studies is apt. 
While we are accustomed to the argument that the opportunities for action are 
limited for leaders in certain historical circumstances, this has had minimal 
effect on how presidential success is analysed . Presidents _tn different historical 
contexts should be assessed as qualitatively different; we should not expect 
them all to perform similar actions and obtain similar outcomes. When success 
is divided into its personal, partisan regime and normative forms, it is 
apparent that in many situations different aspects of success are unavailable. 
The trade-offs that some leaders must make leads us to question which aspects 
of success we prefer presidents to seek, and thus what exactly we want from 
the presidency. 
Understanding presidential success differently in different contexts is not just 
important for analytical purposes. Presumably all presidents wish to be 
considered successful, so public expectations can influence presidential 
ac tions. If we jud ge all presidents by standards appropriate to FDR we 
encourage them to act in a way that will frequently contribute to their failure. 
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More realistic public and expert expectations of presidents can lead to more 
realistic presidential attitudes. This diminishes the chances of presidential 
failure and diminishes the prospect of significant negative outcomes for 
citizens. 
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Conclusion: Framing Success in Political Time 
Political scholars since Aristotle have advised leaders how to do their jobs. 
Aristotle focused on leaders need to exercise prudence, or practical wisdom to 
balance the competing interests of society. Centuries later Machiavelli drew on 
his personal experience and counselled leaders to act with strategy and 
pragmatism. In the 20th century, Neustadt's highly influential work on the 
American presidency similarly drew on his practical experience as an adviser 
to President Harry Truman, arguing that soft power and persuasion would 
best enable presidents to accomplish political goals. Theoretical accounts of 
politi cal leadership often offer advice to leaders usually based on the actions 
of particular leaders with strong reputations, rather than on a systematic 
understanding of what comprises success (for example Burns 1978, 2003). 
Without a systematic understanding of what success is for political leaders, 
'leadership prescriptions are prescriptions without a diagnosis' ('t Hart 2011: 
324). This thesis will help political scholars who wish to offer advice tailored 
towards success. Furthermore, it can help scholars to better understand how 
political leaders act and how they should act. The historical contextual 
approach taken here illuminates often ignored constraints and opportunities 
that act on individual political leaders. Finally, the creation of criteria for 
understanding success enables a deeper understanding of the general nature 
of political leadership . Knowing what success is for political leaders allows us 
greater confidence in explaining how they achieve it. 
This thesis has argued that successful political leadership requires different 
behaviours from leaders at different times. Furthermore, success means 
different things at different times. For some leaders success requires great 
change and progress, for others it requires steady management, while for 
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another category success can be more about avoiding great losses than great 
achievements. 
Historical context plays a significant role in shaping leaders' opportunities for 
action, so to assess all leaders by the same criteria equates success with 
structural advantage when we should be more concerned with leaders' 
performance. The historical context shapes societal interest and therefore 
shapes the type of leadership that is in societal interest. To encourage 
leadership that meets the requirements of society we must expect different 
actions in varying contexts and must judge leaders of varying contexts by 
different criteria. 
This concluding chapter draws on the preceding peer-reviewed articles to 
provide four frameworks for understanding successful political leadership. 
The frameworks explain success for each of Skowronek's four leadership types 
(1997), and have significant broader implications for understanding political 
leadership. The latter sections of the chapter discuss thes~-implications as well 
as the thesis' implications for how we study politics. 
The Historical Contextual Frameworks of Successful Political Leadership 
Success is both interpretive and material (McConnell 2010: 30-31). This means 
that political leaders must actually achieve goals and must ensure that the 
public interprets their achievements; first as successes and secondly as the 
leaders' successes rather than those of other political actors. The interpretive 
and material realms of success interact. Those leaders who are perceived as 
successful gain in authority and are thus more capable of future material 
successes. On close inspection, leaders' material achievements often vary less 
than observers' impressions of those achievements. Those with greater 
authority as a result of their historical context are in a better position to 
achieve interpretive success although this does not mean that interpretive 
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success is determined by context. The material and interpretive realms of 
success are highlighted throu ghout the frameworks below, as are the different 
interactions between oppositions and government leaders on each aspect of 
success. The relative strength of oppositions confronting government leaders 
is a crucial factor in assessing success for each of the leadership types. 
There are three forms of success pertinent to political leaders: personal 
success, partisan regime success and normative success. Partisan regime 
success is central as it allows leaders to have a longer term effect. This form of 
success varies the most in how we examine success for the four different types 
of leader. Personal and normative success mostly vary by degrees of 
availability and only to a limited extent in terms of the criteria that must be 
examined. Furthermore, the difference in the degrees of the availability of 
personal and normative success is more pronounced in interpretive rather 
than material ways. This is revealing, as it suggests that leaders' concrete 
achievements are often greater than observers recognise. Studies of political 
leaders that make systematic use of his torical context to ·explain their success 
and failure could restore the reputations of many of these leaders. 
Historical Contextual Framework for Analysing Reconstructive Leadership 
Personal success 
Table 1 contains the material and interpretive factors relevant to analysing 
success for reconstructive leaders. The factors that make up personal success 
(election victories, passing legislation, and popularity and reputation both 
during and after the leader's tenure) are the same for reconstructive leaders 
and for the other three types. However, reconstructive leaders have the 
greatest opportunity to achieve success in these cri teria. In part this results 
from the weak oppositions they tend to face, which are frequently internally 
divided. This encourages reconstructive leaders to achieve in almost all of the 
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relevant boxes in Table 1. Election victories are easier against divided 
opponents, as is passing legislation. When oppositions are divided they have 
little ability to create their own interpretive success in the factors on the right 
hand side of the table, as they cannot focus on one consistent message. 
Naturally, weak oppositions do not guarantee reconstructive leaders' success 
on these criteria. Each criterion requires that reconstructive leaders act 
positively to manage their supporters and to promote a positive interpretation 
of their actions. 
Material Interpretive 
Elections Results 
Quantity, importance of Create perception that 
Legislation passed legislation it is a success, and that 
it is the leader's success 
Popularity/Reputation Po
lling, position in 
rankings studies 
Table 1. Personal Success for Reconstructive Leaders. 
If we were only to examine personal success and to neglect historical context, 
we would conclude that reconstructive leaders were more successful than all 
others. Once we expand the definition of success to include the partisan 
regime and certain normative aspects, the importance of historical context is 
highlighted and we can see that reconstructive leaders achieve much because 
of their structural advantage. 
Naturally, the factors in Table 1 interact with each other. Making legislative 
changes encourages popularity and a positive reputation, which aids leaders 
in elections. As Canes-Wrone and de Marchi show, for important issues with 
high public salience and complexity, US presidents' personal popularity 
correlates with legislative success (2002, also see Edwards 2003). Although the 
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nature of the contest of ideas is different for prime ministers, it is likely that 
high personal popularity and the prospect of winning elections will help 
prime ministers to maintain party discipline and to push through measures 
with which some in the party would disagree. Elections can be assessed in 
hard material terms, but election results clearly follow from other interpretive 
forms of success. In addition, these successes flow from the oppositions' 
inability to create their own interpretive successes. These oppositions appear 
unlikely to govern successfully and are therefore less likely to perform well at 
elections. 
Partisan Regime Success 
Table 2 illustrates the tasks that are relevant to reconstructive leaders' 
achievement of partisan regime success. The table was created in the third 
article of this thesis and is a more complex version of Nichols and Myers' three 
tasks of reconstruction (2010), with eight criteria making up the three tasks. 
Partisan regime success is the most important form of success for all types of 
leaders, but it is especially important for reconstructive leaders, as achieving 
this form of success makes them likely to be considered successful in both 
personal and normative terms. 
Reconstructive leaders, like all others, must ensure that they achieve both 
material and interpretive success. Shifting the axis of partisan cleavage, which 
is represented in the left column of Table 2, is a task with vast interpretive 
consequences. Achieving this task changes the nature and terms of the 
national political debate. Repudiating the prior regime and framing crises to 
the leaders' advantage are rhetorical tasks that require the persuasion of the 
public. Leaders must explain the nature of problems experienced in society 
and explain the efficacy of the solution they provide. The material nature of 
societal problems shape the way leaders can frame crises and their solutions, 
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as well as shaping the ease with which leaders can advocate a major political 
and policy shift. Furthermore, the opposition usually provides an alternative 
explanation of the problem and its solution. Reconstructive leaders must 
ensure that they defeat any such alternative with a more persuasive 
explanation and plan. 
Shifting the Axis of Assembling a Majority Institutionalisation 
Partisan Cleavage Coalition 
Repudiate prior regime, Build a legislative majority Destroy prior 
frame crisis to advantage ins ti tu hons 
Define the new regime Build a social majority Create new institutions/ redefine 
existing ones 
Defeat opposition Entrench political 
attempts to attack advantage 
redefu1ition 
Table 2: Partisan Regime Success for Reconstructive Leaders. 
The middle column of Table 2 shows Nichols and Myers second task, 
assembling a majority coalition. This thesis divides this task into two par ts, 
building a legislative coalition and building a social coalition. Developing a 
majority coalition in the legislature is a different task for prime ministers than 
for presidents. Prime ministers usually lead disciplined parties and can rely on 
their votes in parliament, whereas US presidents often must obtain votes from 
members of the opposing party. This means that much of presidents' coalition 
building takes place in public view whereas prime ministers must firs t build 
the support of uncon vinced members of their own parliamentary parties. 
Prime ministers must manage differences among fac tions and groupings of 
their parties to ensure a majority supports their measures. In examining this 
task, we should analyse presidents' ability to win important votes, and the 
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consistency of support they gain from important groupings within Congress. 
For prime ministers in Britain, the propensity for backbench revolts is crucial, 
whereas in Australia the evidence of internal dissent tends to express itself 
either through challenges to leaders' positions or through leaks of private 
party information. Prime ministers should be judged on their ability to 
prevent or quell such actions. 
The social aspect of coalition building requires that reconstructive leaders 
bring together a group of societal interests for long term support of the new 
regime. This follows from the way leaders define their reconstructions. A 
definition must encourage the support of multiple groups for one broader 
cause, be it smaller government, the expansion of the welfare state or some 
other rearrangement of government and society. There is little difference 
between parliamentary and presidential systems, although diverging national 
societal divisions change the nature of the task. For example, the US' regional 
complexity necessitates different goals and messages to appeal to the south, 
the north and the mid-west in a manner that is less important in Australia. In 
examining this form of success we must examine the public support that 
crucial segments of society give to reconstructive policies and the extent to 
which they cooperate with the policies that affect them. 
Institutionalisation, represented in the right column of Table 2, is a variable 
task. It alters depending on the nature of the regime that the reconstructive 
leader seeks to implement. Reconstructions such as Ronald Reagan's or 
Margaret Thatcher's that seek to reduce the state's role, are more difficult. In 
such circumstances, the opposition that builds against the reconstruction is not 
solely in Congress but also in the institutions that the reconstruction must 
remove or downgrade. Similarly, the segments of society that are interested in 
the success of particular institutions, for example welfare recipients or 
environmentalists, may form a broader societal opposition. Societal opposition 
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can arise against any type of reconstruction but opposition within institutions 
is less likely in a state building reconstruction. The successful completion of 
this task allows reconstructive policies to become normal matters of 
government and sees the policies themselves and their reorganisation of 
society endure for decades. Thus the legacy of reconstructive policies is a 
crucial measure of institutionalisation. 
The tasks of partisan regime success are all ongoing. They must be maintained 
throughout reconstructive leaders' tenures. Should a coalition disintegrate 
before the regime is institutionalised, then a reconstruction will not happen at 
that time. The longer each of the reconstructive tasks is maintained, the more 
complete and harder to dislodge the new regime will be. 
Normative Success 
Normative success for reconstructive leaders requires that they complete their 
reconstructions, as that is the best way to bring about the reconstructive 
leaders' visions of good society. It also helps to reinvigorate the institutions of 
government, particularly the presidency, thereby contributing to the 
constitutional forms of success represented in the middle row of Table 3. 
Reconstructive leaders are less likely to be tainted by scandals than other 
types: they are viewed as effective and are therefore perceived as more 
authentic and honest, whether or not that is actually the case (Ciulla and 
Forsyth 2011: 233). Again, this highlights the difference between interpretive 
and material forms of success. Interpretive normative success is more easily 
obtainable for reconstructive leaders than for other types of leaders but 
material elements of normative success such as following due process and 
respecting citizens' rights are no more likely to be achieved by reconstructive 
leaders than by any other type. 
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The criteria of normative success, illustrated in Table 3, are similar for all 
leaders because many of these represent universal ethical concerns. Leaders 
must implement their vision of good society. For reconstructive leaders this is 
achieved by accomplishing their reconstructions. From a more ethical 
standpoint, leaders should respect due process and maintain the integrity of 
political processes. They must also respect the rights of their citizens in the 
decisions that they take (Thompson 2010: 25-26). All political leaders have an 
important role to play in ensuring that citizens maintain trust in the 
institutions of government. Blatant ethical failures, like Nixon's in Watergate, 
damage perceptions of government and political office, making the job of 
successors more difficult. Leaders who maintain, or even enhance the standing 
of government institutions make it easier for successors to utilise the powers 
of office for the benefit of the nation. 
Material Interpretive 
Encourage public 
Good society Complete reconstruction support for 
reconstructive measures 
Respect due process, Encourage public 
Institutions encourage strength in all confidence in 
institutions of government government, society 
Citizens Respect citizens' rights Bu
ild personal trust with 
the public 
Table 3. Normative Success for Reconstructive Leaders. 
The most obvious variation in the criteria of normative success among the 
different leadership types, is the way types of leaders implement their visions 
of good society. The effect of stronger opposition on non-reconstructive 
leaders also creates some diversity in the way normative actions are 
represented. The weak oppositions that confront reconstructive leaders are 
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less able to hold those leaders to account, contributing to their ability to 
overcome scandals. Other leaders do not have this advantage as they tend to 
face stronger oppositions, which are better able to hold leaders to account for 
such failings. 
Historical Contextual Framework for Analysing Leadership of Articulation 
Personal success 
Personal success is largely assessed in the same way for ar ticulators as for 
reconstructive leaders, although expectations are not as high . The variation in 
the capacity of leaders to fulfil these tasks is one of the main reasons for 
separating the four types of leaders and examining them only against other 
leaders of their type. The strength of articulators' opponents varies, but they 
are generally stronger and more coherent oppositions than those facing 
reconstructive leaders. A stronger opposition m akes each of the tasks 
represented in Table 4 more difficult. Legislative success is more difficult in 
both material and interpretive terms. Stronger oppositions are more able to 
argue against executive leaders' actions. The interaction between material and 
interpretive realms of success means that lesser success in one leads to lesser 
success in the other. Articulators are therefore less able to achieve all forms of 
success. 
Material Interpretive 
Elections Results 
Quantity, importance of Create perception that 
Legislation passed legislation it is a success, and
 that 
it is the leader's success 
Popularity/Reputation 
Polling, position in 
rankings studies 
Table 4. Personal Success for Leaders of Articulation . 
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Partisan Regime Success 
Articulators tasks in terms of partisan regime success, shown in Table 5, are 
notably shorter than those of reconstructive leaders. Many of the tasks reflect 
similar challenges but are about maintaining and updating rather than 
creating, renewing and destroying. The stronger opposition makes 
interpretive success harder to win in all tasks and makes defeating opposition 
attempts to attack the redefinition especially difficult. Adding to this problem, 
articulators generally have divisions within their own parties and coalitions to 
manage, as members of the legislative and social coalitions dispute the 
original intentions of the regime (Skowronek 1997: 41). This division means 
that articulators' rhetoric must appeal to two different branches of regime 
supporters. The leaders' opportunities for interpretive success are therefore 
limited as particular actions can only really appeal to one or other of the 
groups of supporters and will only be considered successful by those to whom 
the actions appeal. 
Maintain the Axis of Majority Coalition Institutionalisation 
Partisan Cleavage 
Update regime definition Maintain a social 
Update institutions as 
majority necessary 
Defeat opposition Maintain a legislative 
attempts to attack majority 
redefinition 
Table 5. Partisan Regime Success for Leaders of Articulation. 
How articulators define their stance with respect to the regime is crucial. Some 
leaders, such as Lyndon Johnson, attempt to make a considerable revision of 
the regime and significantly update it. Others seek to retain more than they 
alter, as was the case for Calvin Coolidge. The articulators define their stance 
either as moderate or active, and in doing so open opportunities for some 
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forms of success but limit others. As discussed in the fourth article of the 
thesis, moderate leaders are more likely to keep their coalitions together but 
will have fewer personal successes, while active ones can have greater 
personal successes but are less likely to maintain the coalition in the Jong term. 
Furthermore, those who seek to update the regime must implement 
institutional changes to guarantee that the initiatives last. 
Normative Success 
Normative success should be assessed similarly for all leaders. However, 
articulators have a unique path to success in implementing a vision of good 
society. They are best able to achieve their vision of good society by making 
sure that the regime continues and remains strong. As shown in Table 6, this 
includes the interpretive task of encouraging continuing public belief in the 
regime and its ideas. More active articulators are generally less capable of 
ensuring the endurance of the regime and thus their achievements tend to last 
only for the shorter-term and tend to encourage oppos!tion movements to 
build alternative social coalitions. 
Material Interpretive 
Manage Regime to prolong Encourage continuing 
Good society it/ institutionalise updated belief in the ideas of the 
programme regime 
Respect due process, Encourage public 
Institutions encourage strength in all confidence in 
institutions of government government, society 
Respect citizens' rights Build perso
nal trust with 
Citizens 
the public 
Table 6. Normative Success for Leaders of Articulation. 
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Even tasks with an ethical basis are more difficult to achieve for articulators 
than for reconstructors, particularly in interpretive terms. A stronger 
opposition is more likely to hold articulators to account for any lapses of due 
process, of respecting citizens' rights, or other shortcomings. They also lack 
the advantages that reconstructive leaders gain as a result of restoring national 
confidence. This means that if they are not normative material successes, they 
are unlikely to be interpretive successes in normative terms. 
Historical Contextual Framework for Analysing Pre-emptive Leadership 
Personal success 
Table 7 represents personal success for pre-emptive leaders using the same 
criteria as the other leadership types. Pre-emptive leaders' ability to achieve 
personal success is, however, particularly restrained. As pre-emptive leaders 
oppose the regime while it is resilient, they face strong opposition from 
regime-defenders. This typically makes gaining materia_~ successes such as 
major legislative achievements difficult and means that there is strong, largely 
coherent, opposition seeking to prevent pre-emptive leaders from being 
credited with successes. This is more problematic for presidents than for prime 
ministers, as in Congress opposition can pass and take credit for legisla tion in 
a way that is rarely, if ever, possible for parliamentary oppositions in nations 
like Australia and the UK. Pre-emptive prime ministers, like pre-emptive 
presid_ents, find presenting their achievements as successes difficult because 
strong oppositions argue against them. 
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Material Interpretive 
Elections Results 
Quantity, importance of Create perception that 
Legislation passed legislation it is a success, an
d that 
it is the leader's success 
Popularity/Reputation 
Polling, position in 
rankings studies 
Table 7. Personal Success for Pre-emptive Leaders. 
Partisan Regime Success 
As regime opponents, we should judge pre-emptive leaders on their ability to 
weaken the regime rather than strengthen it. Thus the criteria described in 
Table 8 are essentially the inverse of the criteria by which articulators are 
judged. The task of discrediting regime ideas is a difficult one, especially 
because of the strength of regime defenders. Regime ideas are most vulnerable 
when they appear to be ineffective, for example becau_se of an economic 
downturn. Pre-emptive leaders should capitalise on such events as they take 
place. Like ideas, institutions are fairly resilient to attack unless there is an 
external event that discredits them. Moreover, institutions are the least 
vulnerable aspect of any regime and are the most likely to linger even after a 
subsequent reconstruction. There are opportunities for pre-emptive leaders to 
attack institutions by reducing their funding or capacity and we should look 
for these in our assessments of pre-emptive leaders . 
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Attack the Axis of 
Partisan Cleavage 
Majority Coalition Institutionalisation 
Discredit regime Attack the socia
l 
definition and ideas majority, build 
Weaken regime 
institutions 
elements of a social 
alternative 
Defea t opposition Create a legisla
tive 
attempts to attack majority/weaken 
redefinition opponents' majority 
Table 8. Partisan Regime Success for Pre-emptive Leaders. 
The most vulnerable aspect of regimes is their coalitions. Once these coalitions 
fragment ideas and institutions become more vulnerable to attack. Regime 
coalitions contain groups that disagree on certain issues and pre-emptive 
leaders can capitalise on this to weaken societal and legislative support for 
regimes. Pre-emptive leaders can implement policies that will appeal to 
segments of the regime coalition but antagonise other segments of it. Close 
critical analysis of the behaviour of the groups that form the coalition and their 
relationships with the leaders is the most likely way to achieve a thorough 
understanding of this aspect of pre-emptive leadership success. 
Normative Success 
The nature of pre-emptive leaders' political challenge makes is difficult for 
them to obtain normative success in each criterion shown in Table 9. If they 
attempt to implement their vision of good society, it is an inherently 
destructive task. Given the strong oppositions they face, their destructive 
efforts inevitably provoke strong opposition and pre-emptive leaders are more 
likely to be impeded in their efforts than other types of leaders. This 
encourages some pre-emptive leaders to engage in ethically questionable 
political conduct to overcome these obstructions. Any inclinations towards 
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such behaviour are only compounded by oppositions' greater readiness to 
hold pre-emptive leaders to account than they do other types of leader. 
Therefore pre-emptive leaders are less likely to enjoy interpretive success in 
the normative realm than all other leadership types, perhaps with the 
exception of disjunctive leaders. Naturally, pre-emptive leaders do not have to 
exercise the moderation of Dwight Eisenhower or else fall from grace in the 
manner of Richard Nixon. There is significant ground between these two 
examples for relative normative success. 
Material Interpretive 
Good society Defeat regime or at le
ast Encourage public 
weaken it rejection of the ideas of 
the regime 
Respect due process, Encourage public 
Institutions encourage strength in all confidence in 
institutions of government government, society 
El}_courage citizens' 
Citizens Respect citizens' rights participation, especially 
elements that have been 
excl uded 
Table 9. Normative Success for Pre-emptive Leaders. 
Part of pre-emptive leaders' normative task is more obviously positive in the 
short term than that which has already been discussed. As the bottom right 
box of Table 9 shows, pre-emptive leaders can re-engage groups and interests 
that have been largely excluded from politics under the existing regime. In this 
way, they play an important part in representative democracy. Furthermore, 
they have the capacity to question many of the existing methods and 
programmes of government that articula tors would not question . Thus, pre-
emptive leaders' actions can encourage regime defenders to improve the 
function of their policies. 
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Historical Contextual Framework for Analysing Disjunctive Leadership 
Personal success 
Disjunctive leaders usually have poor reputations because they achieve little 
interpretive success. Not only do they face a rising opposition, but their 
supporters are divided and achieving anything that can gain the support of a 
stable coalition is difficult. Few other political eli tes are willing to credit either 
the leaders' actions as their own or their results as successes. Disjunctive 
leaders' inability to achieve in an interpretive sense reduces their authority 
further and makes it harder to achieve future material successes. Thus, their 
performance on all of the criteria identified in Table 10 is likely to be poor, but 
especially in the interpretive criteria on the right side. 
Material Interpretive 
Elections Results 
Quantity, importance of Cr~ate perception that 
Legislation passed legislation it is a success, and t
hat 
it is the leader's success 
Popularity/Reputation 
Polling, position in 
rankings studies 
Table 10. Personal Success for Disjunctive Leaders. 
There are institutional differences between disjunctive prime ministers and 
presidents that alter the way we should understand their personal success. 
Prime ministers are more able to guarantee the passage of legislation and 
therefore more able to achieve in material terms. They can take credit for 
specific achievements, even if their leadership as a whole remains unlikely to 
be widely viewed as successful. The internal pressure on disjunctive prime 
ministers from within their parties is greater than that disjunctive presidents 
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face, principally because parties can remove struggling prime ministers. 9 
Disjunctive prime ministers' existence then is likely to be tenuous and they are 
therefore highly constrained by their parliamentary parties. 
Partisan Regime Success 
Partisan regime success is unavailable to disjunctive leaders. The regime dies 
during their tenure and this creates societal disruption. Perceptions of failure 
cling to disjunctive leaders because they are forever associated with crises, as 
with Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression or Jim Callaghan and the 
Winter of Discontent. These leaders cannot be considered regime successes 
because their best chances of achieving their visions of good society are tied to 
the regime itself. 
Normative Success 
Disjunctive leaders cannot enact their vision of good society but they can 
smooth the process of reconstruction for the next lead~_r by experimenting 
with new policy programmes and new government logics. Their 
experimentation allows reconstructive leaders to build on those programmes 
that alleviate the problems associated with the demise of a regime while 
discarding other ideas that do not work. It is easier to measure the quantity 
rather than the quality of experimentation but the usefulness of experimental 
policies to reconstructive successors can be a useful guide. Experimentation 
gives .disjunctive leaders material but not interpretive success (see Table 11). 
To be interpreted as successful, these leaders need to actually solve complex 
problems, something achieved by very few political leaders (Skowronek 1997: 
402, 2008: 96). Even leaders like Bob Hawke, Ronald Reagan, Margaret 
9 Al though the process for removing prime ministers is becoming more complex in many 
Westminster systems as countri es like the UK ha ve embraced leader election systems that 
involve larger constituencies (see Le Due 2001, Heppell 2008, 2010, Rafter 2003). Australia 
retains a system in which the parliamentary party alone can remove the leader. 
212 
Thatcher or Franklin Roosevelt often exacerbated national problems before 
they improved and the extent to which those leaders were themselves 
responsible for solving national problems is questionable. 
Material Interpretive 
Can't provide this but 
Good society experimentation can help Must solve problems 
reinvigorate society 
Respect due process, Encourage public 
Institutions encourage strength in all confidence in 
institutions of government government, society 
Citizens Respect citizens' rights 
Table 11. Normative Success for Disjunctive Leaders. 
Disjunctive leaders are almost incapable of having interpretive success. This 
leads to an impression that they are ineffective and lack authentici ty and 
principle. As their opposition is strong, disjunctive leaders are held to account. 
Even worse for them, their divided supporters are not entirely committed to 
defending them. Disjunctive leaders tend to fail in terms of encouraging trust 
in the institutions of governmen t. Their leadership appears to prove the failure 
of the insti tutions of government. We should judge favourably those leaders 
who are not major failures on this task, rather than expecting them to have a 
positive effect on perceptions of the institutions of government. Again, this 
should be less of a p roblem for disjunctive prime ministers than for disjunctive 
presidents as the former are more capable of making the institutions work for 
them. 
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Broader implications for political leadership 
Conceptualising successful political leadership according to historical context 
has many broader implications for the way we understand political 
leadership. Once we understand political leaders in a way that acknowledges 
their opportunities, it is apparent that many more leaders should be 
considered successful than typically is the case. Many constrained leaders like 
Jimmy Carter or Australia's John Gorton deserve closer inspection. Such 
leaders frequently performed better than their reputations suggest. This has 
important implications for the public understandings of politics. Cynicism 
about political leaders is healthy, but an assumption that all but a few were 
largely incompetent is less so. An understanding that politicians and political 
leaders generally do their jobs well could increase public trust in government 
and participation in politics. Furthermore, the better our understanding of the 
different requirements of political leadership in different situations, the better 
informed political leaders can be, and the more likely that they perform well 
and encourage positive political outcomes. 
This conception of political leadership also places a premium on Hargrove' s 
'discernment', the skill of understanding one's place in historical context 
(1998). It also suggests that when we examine political leadership skills, we 
should take account of how well they relate to the context itself, as in the "skill 
in context" conception of political leadership (Bell, Hargrove and Theakston 
1999, _  Hargrove and Owens 2003). Furthermore, we should tailor our 
understanding of leadership skills in accordance with the requirements of the 
historical contextual frameworks. 
A further important lesson for scholars of political leadership is that leaders' 
actions alter the historical context in ways that affect those leaders but that 
more acutely affect their successors. If pre-emptive leaders effectively weaken 
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regime coalitions, the articulators who succeed them have greater difficulty in 
utilising the regime. As Crockett argues, the mere existence of pre-emptive 
leaders may encourage the articulators who succeed them to act more 
aggressively to compensate for years of lost opportunity (2012: 900). In a more 
complex example, the relative success of reconstructive leaders can affect 
leaders for the entire course of the regime. For example, Reagan's lesser 
success in creating his regime, particularly in removing institutions and 
reducing government spending, created a regime with an inconsistent logic. 
The reduction of taxes without comparable reduction of spending means that 
the Reagan regime has been responsible for many of the greatest difficulties 
that have haunted successors. George H. W. Bush's decision to renege on his 
promise and agree to Congress' tax increases angered many in his party and 
damaged his re-election chances. Barack Obama has repeatedly encountered 
fervent Republican Congressional opposition over the increase of the federal 
debt limit, a problem abetted by regime adherents in maintaining the regime 
despite the widening gap between spending and revenue. __ 
Polsky argues that regimes are variable and that some are stronger, or easier to 
work with, than others (2012: 71). Some circumstances make reconstructions 
easier to complete than others. The Great Depression and World War II were 
enormous events that helped Curtin justify his reconstruction, whereas it was 
harder for Bob Hawke and other leaders of the 1970s and 1980s to use the 
protracted but less severe economic downturn of that time to justify 
reconstructions. However, this thesis argues that the success or failure of 
reconstructive leaders is crucial to the variability of regimes. The importance 
of political leaders in the success of regimes is underlined by Hawke's 
particular success among Australian reconstructive leaders, as discussed in the 
third article of the thesis. 
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The variations in the way Skowronek's political time operates in different 
institutional settings also create some interesting implications for prime 
ministers in particular. The first article of this thesis found that in Australia, 
prime ministers can change from one leadership type to another as political 
time develops throughout long tenures. This is also likely to happen in the US 
among longer serving presidents. The potential for leaders to change from one 
type to another suggests that they must be judged by different criteria at 
different times of their leadership. However, it is exceedingly difficult for 
leaders to succeed in a different, second type of leadership. Malcolm Fraser 
had advocated orthodox economic policies for many years. He could not 
simply abandon his public political past. Fraser considered the prospect of 
experimenting with a shift in the political logic towards monetarist ideas but 
ultimately remained committed to articulating the old, Keynesian economic 
logic. This meant that he could not succeed either in terms of retaining the 
regime, as is important to articulators, or in terms of experimenting with new 
reconstructive policies, as is important to disjunctive leade_rs. 
This thesis has emphasised that political leaders are in a constant contest with 
opponents and that this contest is integral to leaders' success. Furthermore, 
oppositions and government leaders often have complex relationships in 
which oppositions can help government leaders to succeed. This may be 
unwitting, as oppositions' failures encourage governments' successes, or it 
may be intentional, as oppositions suggest improvements to policies. Their 
pressure can encourage government leaders to maintain higher standards than 
they might otherwise. 
Broader implications for politics 
The thesis has highlighted a decidedly partisan and divisive form of politics. 
In particular, the contention that pre-emptive leaders should seek to attack the 
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regime that prevents them from instituting their vision of good society, 
encourages partisanship. This partisanship is enhanced by many of the tasks 
within the framework, where "defeating" opposition alternatives is 
emphasised . Partisanship is necessary to the regime structure that is so central 
to this thesis. It is hard to imagine a reconstruction taking place without some 
level of ideology driving it. A compromise between differing major parties is 
unlikely to have the same creative energy that is required to restore faith in 
national government in these countries. However, partisanship holds negative 
connotations in much political commentary, as parliamentary or congressional 
disputes are often perpetuated for political purposes, rather than to directly 
benefit the nation. The thesis should not be read as privileging majoritarianism 
or partisan politics over consensus and compromise, but it does contain a 
limited defence of the form er political style in observing that it certainly can be 
effective and can produce results that are good for society. 
The greatest benefit of partisan and majoritarian politics is its creativity. The 
more compromise is integral to politics, the less creative and more incremental 
change becomes (Self 2010: 67-69) . This means that the politi cal system is in a 
better position to recover from downturns and crises, as seen in various 
reconstructions. It may also mean that the political system is more likely to 
experience those downturns in the first place. Excessive ideological tendencies 
in one direction or another, for example free market tendencies or tendencies 
towards heavy regulation, are often blamed for crises. However, no political 
system has shown itself impervious to such problems (see McC!oskey 2011: 
183), and there is no reason to think that the greater incrementalism of 
consensus democracies makes these necessarily less prone to crises. In fact, 
nations that have performed better through the Global Financial Crisis have 
come from diverse nations with a variety of political systems, such as 
Australia, China, India, Canada and Chile. 
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Another implication of this thesis for the broader political system is the 
centrality and importance of the president or the prime minister to national 
politics. The thesis ties leadership in historical context to a wide range of 
political outcomes. This is not because there is an assumption that presidents 
or prime ministers have untrammelled power, or that they are the only 
important actors in national politics. Rather they are the political actors with 
the greatest capacity to define the government's position with relation to the 
historical context and with the greatest capacity to alter the historical context 
itself. Undoubtedly, presidents and prime ministers must and should share 
the tasks of national government with other political and governmental actors, 
but they have the greatest capacity to persuade and to create in national 
politics. 
Broader implications for political research 
The centrality of the political leader to this thesis means that it can be read as 
an argument for taking political leadership more serious!)'._ within the study of 
politics. Currently, there is no journal committed to the study of political 
leadership. Presidential Studies Quarterly approaches such a commitment 
although it concentrates almost exclusively on the presidency and not on other 
political leaders. The study of political leadership refers to most of the major 
questions of social science (Ahlquist and Levi 2011: 19). This combined with its 
importance to practical political outcomes suggests that there is good reason 
for po_litical leadership to be central to the discipline. 
The study of political leadership has been peripheral within political science in 
part because it is difficult to examine holistically with quantitative methods 
(Bowles 1999: 3-4). Quantitative researchers perennially struggle to find a 
sufficient number of comparable political leaders to attack the subject with 
statistical robustness. Given that executive political leaders are singular, there 
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are two traditional ways to make comparisons. Leaders within one political 
system can be historically assessed, by seeking to understand political 
leadership at different times and building limited generalisations that hold 
beyond the one specific leader (see Pierson 2004: 6). Leaders can also be 
subjected to cross national comparison (see for example Elgie 1995, Helms 
2005, 2012: 657-658, Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes 1997). 
This thesis has augmented both of these methods. The former method has 
been employed in a way that emphasises the cyclical, rather than linear, 
pattern defining historical context. Thus the generalisations that historical 
analysis of leadership can provide allow us to examine multiple leaders from 
multiple times, rather than treating each leader' s historical context as entirely 
unique. The comparison of leaders of these nations need not be merely limited 
to discovering their differences; similarities of patterns of leadership are of 
equal importance in understanding political leadership (Caramani 2010). 
Even theoretical contributions designed to explain poli tics in one institutional 
setting (Skowronek 1997, Nichols and Myers 2010), often observe elements 
that are fundamental to politics in democra tic nations. This is unsurprising 
given that many of the greatest problems that political leaders fa ce are 
intrinsic to democracy itself (Kane and Patapan 2012). We should therefore 
approach executive political leaders from differen t countries with the 
expectations that they possess many similarities as well as many important 
differences, rather than treating them as entirely different species. 
Conclusion 
Political leadership success cannot be studied as a phenomenon that is 
universally available and always identical. The demands and opportunities of 
political leadership vary greatly with leaders' historical contexts. In taking 
account of these differences as we examine and assess political leaders' 
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success, it becomes apparent that many more of our political leaders have 
been successful than is frequently supposed. It remains for us to refine and 
hone the framework of political leadership success created here by applying it 
to many more empirical situations, and to develop this perspective further as 
an approach to political leadership. The more understanding of success in 
political leadership is advanced, the better the quality of scholars' advice to 
political leaders will be. The greater understanding political leaders have of 
their roles and of their broader contexts, the better political leadership they 
will offer and the better democracy will function. 
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